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Electricity markets are particularly complex because they must accommodate the un-
derlying physics that govern the electric power system. These physics present non-convexities
in the social welfare maximization problem, also called the economic dispatch problem, solved
by the Independent System Operator (ISO), which is the social planner in this context. The
non-convexity of this problem presents difficulties in computing the social welfare maximizing
dispatch as well as difficulties in deriving a pricing structure that satisfies certain economic
requirements such as revenue adequacy of the ISO and non-negative operating profits for
market participants. This dissertation analyzes two sources of non-convexity that pertain
to two separate market changes that have been recently proposed in Texas. Both proposals
pertain to the real-time electricity market, which clears every 5-minutes and is myopic in
the sense that only the demand at the end of the upcoming 5-minute interval is considered
and no future time intervals are considered in the social welfare maximization problem.
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO in Texas and currently
neglects resistive losses along transmission lines when formulating the economic dispatch
problem. The first part of this dissertation regards a proposed market change to incorpo-
rate transmission losses into the economic dispatch problem. Two general approaches are
considered to accommodate associated non-convexity. Similar to current practice, the first
approach is based on a marginal pricing structure and uses convex approximations that
vii
facilitate efficient computation. By utilizing various approximations, the aforementioned
economic requirements are proven to be satisfied approximately. The second approach is
based on an alternative pricing structure in which prices are chosen to explicitly minimize
the worst-case violation of these economic requirements. For example the prices may be
chosen to minimize the potential revenue shortfall of the ISO. These alternative prices are
termed convex hull prices and can be approximated by use of convex relaxations.
The economic dispatch problem currently used by ERCOT does not endogenously
represent operating reserves to handle contingencies that may occur. Instead, operating re-
serves are currently optimized separately from the electric power generation dispatch. The
second part of this dissertation regards a proposed market change to co-optimize reserve
and generation dispatch in a social welfare maximization problem called a co-optimization
problem. Implementation of the real-time co-optimization problem is being pursued simul-
taneously with a new definition of the primary frequency responsive reserve types considered
in the market. One of these reserve types intends to accommodate standard droop control.
Another of these reserve types is newly introduced and intends to facilitate participation
of fast-acting batteries in primary frequency response. This dissertation derives reserve re-
quirements from first principles that capture the coupling of these two reserve types as well
as their ramping abilities. The newly proposed non-convex requirements represent limits on
the ramp-constrained primary frequency responsive reserve procurement. Placing these non-
convex requirements into a co-optimization problem is proven to result in the satisfaction of
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Electricity markets enable the trading of electric power as a commodity [36]. The pro-
ducers of this commodity are electric generators that are capable of converting various fuel
types into electric power and providing other services while the consumers vary from individ-
ual households to large industrial plants that gain utility from electrically powered devices.
The exchange of this commodity from producer to consumer occurs through the transmis-
sion and distribution systems, which are networks of electric conductors used to transport
electric power. Unlike traditional commodities, it is very difficult to store large amounts
of electricity, necessitating demand be met identically by supply at all times. Furthermore,
electric power demand is traditionally inelastic and uncertain on short time scales, e.g. 24-
hours, and is accommodated by adjusting the electricity production of electric generators.
As a result, significant coordination is required among electric generators connected to the
same transmission network. For this reason, among others, vertically integrated electricity
providers were established that owned and controlled all electric generators connected to the
same transmission system [83]. These electricity providers historically formed geographical
monopolies and were subject to various inefficiencies including a lack of competition [48].
In the 1980’s and 1990’s many electricity markets throughout the world began re-
structuring in a way that encourages competition [83]. This restructuring requires generator
owners and electric utilities to respectively sell and purchase electricity in a wholesale elec-
tricity market that clears in successive intervals on short time scales in order to satisfy electric
power balance. Electric utilities then absorb price variability by reselling the electricity to
the consumers, e.g. individual households, at a price that varies on slow time scales, e.g.
months, on which these consumers are capable of responding. As of year 2016 approximately
two-thirds of the electricity consumers in the United States purchased electric power through
these restructured electricity markets [29].
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Critical to this restructured market is the Independent System Operator (ISO) that
acts as the social planner of the wholesale electricity market. The ISO is a non-profit regu-
lated entity that is given the task of setting prices for electricity and providing coordinated
dispatch instructions to generators that maximize social welfare in a way that balances elec-
tric power supply and demand, and satisfies various physical constraints imposed by the
electric generators and the transmission system. To do this the ISO must solve the social
welfare maximization problem, which is an optimization problem also called the economic
dispatch problem. Approximate linear models of the underlying power system physics have
been traditionally used to formulate the economic dispatch problem, resulting in a convex op-
timization problem and sound economic principles surrounding the electricity market. This
dissertation studies variations of this economic dispatch problem that are non-convex, where
the non-convexity arises due to a more accurate representation of the underlying power sys-
tem physics. As we will see, a non-convex economic dispatch problem will not only make
the optimization problem difficult to solve computationally, but will also cause important
economic principles surrounding the electricity market to break down. For example, the ISO
may not be able to guarantee revenue adequacy as it may realize a deficit after the market
is cleared.
There are two types of non-convexities presented in the social welfare maximization
problem that are traditionally studied in the literature. First are integer-valued decision
variables that represent commitment decisions made by participating generators. These
integer-valued decision variables represent hourly start-up and shut-down decisions that are
made by each generator throughout the day and allow for start-up costs, no-load costs and
minimum up/down times to be considered in an economic dispatch problem that optimizes
over a time horizon. This type of economic dispatch problem is called the Unit Commitment
(UC) problem and serves as the social welfare maximization problem for the day-ahead
market that is cleared every 24 hours [39]. This type of non-convexity is studied extensively
in other works but will not be addressed in this dissertation.
This dissertation will study the second non-convexity that is traditionally studied
in the literature that pertains to the Alternating Current (AC) model of the transmission
network, which operates at a nominal frequency of 60 Hz in the Americas, 50 Hz in Eu-
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rope, and may vary among other synchronous networks throughout the world. This type
of non-convexity arises through continuously differentiable non-linear equations and cap-
tures physical phenomena occurring on time scales that are much faster than the hourly
commitment decisions being modeled in the UC problem. As a result, this non-convexity
is not only relevant to the day-ahead market, but is also relevant to the real-time market,
which is cleared on a faster time scales of 5-15 minutes. The economic dispatch problem
associated with the real-time market is myopic in the sense that (in its basic formulation)
it only optimizes over a single time interval. To isolate the effect of the non-convexity of
interest this dissertation will abstract away the day-ahead market and focus solely on the
myopic real-time market as well as the associated myopic economic dispatch problem. Issues
associated with multiple intervals in a so-called lookahead economic dispatch problem will
not be addressed in this dissertation.
To operate the system reliably, the ISO is additionally given the task of preparing
for contingencies. Ensuring power balance is met at all times requires provision of electric
power supply/demand that can be called upon in the event of a contingency. For exam-
ple, traditional generators may be operated below their maximum power output capability,
leaving some headroom that can be quickly called upon in the event of a generator being
unexpectedly disconnected from the transmission network. In this case the headroom is
interpreted as a reserve product that is paid for by the ISO in the context of the electricity
market. It is apparent that this reserve product is coupled with the electric power product
for each generator since total generator capacity must be apportioned between electric power
and reserve products. For this reason, many ISO’s in the US have incorporated a reserve
product into the social welfare maximization problem, which is termed the co-optimization
problem as it co-optimizes this reserve product along with the generation. Included in the
co-optimization problem is a reserve requirement that is used to guarantee sufficient reserve
to accommodate specified contingencies.
Contingencies that cause an excess of electric power demand are typically accommo-
dated by up reserve, which represents the ability of a resource to increase its power output.
Similarly, contingencies that cause an excess of electric power generation are typically ac-
commodated by down reserve, which represents the ability of a resource to decrease its power
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output. This dissertation will focus only on up reserve procurement consistent with practice
in US markets; however, the analysis can be extended to the case of up and down reserve.
Henceforth, all references to reserve will imply up reserve unless otherwise specified.
Reliably operating the power system has been a major concern in recent years due to
a dramatic change in the fuel profile of electric generators. Specifically, traditional generators
that burn oil, gas, or coal as fuel are being replaced by cleaner generators that use wind and
solar as their primary fuel. Unlike traditional electric generators, wind and solar generators
exhibit demand-like characteristics in that they are inelastic and uncertain on short time
scales. For this reason the term net demand has been coined to refer to the combination of
traditional demand minus the wind generation and solar generation. As traditional genera-
tors are being replaced by wind and solar generators, net demand fluctuations are increasing
and fewer traditional generators are available, diminishing the electric power system’s ability
to achieve power balance.
To improve power system reliability ISOs throughout the world have recently been
incorporating new reserve products into the electricity market. In general, these reserve
products represent electric power supply that can be called upon in the event of a contingency
in order to sustain electric power balance. In contrast to traditional generators adjusting
their power output to accommodate contingencies, electricity demand might provide the
ability to curtail or electric storage might prepare for discharging during such an event.
These different reserve types exhibit varying effectiveness in responding to contingencies and
the electricity market should be designed in a way that takes advantage of their diverse
properties. This dissertation will study a new reserve type that is capable of exhibiting a
nearly instant change in power output and can be interpreted as demand curtailment or
battery discharging. A novel reserve requirement will be derived from first principles and is
expressed as non-linear constraints that makes the co-optimization problem non-convex.
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO that operates the elec-
tricity market in Texas. To date, the economic dispatch problem used by ERCOT in the
real-time market does not consider reserve and uses a linear approximation of the AC trans-
mission system that neglects electric power losses along the transmission lines. A high-level
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overview of this real-time economic dispatch problem currently used by ERCOT is provided
in Chapter 2. ERCOT is governed by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT),
which issues electricity market rule changes in the state of Texas. Over the last few years
the PUCT has considered two market rule changes that call for various reserve products to be
co-optimized with the generation dispatch and for the inclusion of transmission losses in the
model of the transmission network. These two market rule changes have been considered sep-
arately by the PUCT and serve as the motivation for the work presented in this dissertation.
Accordingly, Part I of this dissertation will address the non-convexity that arises from the in-
clusion of transmission losses into the economic dispatch problem and Part II will address the
inclusion of multiple reserve products into a real-time co-optimization problem. Consistent
with the PUCT’s analysis, these two market changes will be considered separately [26, 27].
In other words, this dissertation does not consider an economic dispatch problem that both
co-optimizes reserve products and incorporates transmission losses although in practice the
ERCOT market may eventually include both features. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 further introduce
these two topics. Section 1.3 then summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation.
1.1 Economic Dispatch and Transmission Losses
The first non-convexity that will be studied is associated with the Alternating Cur-
rent (AC) transmission network [11]. Power flow through the AC transmission network is
governed by physics that can be represented by continuously differentiable non-linear equa-
tions that are traditionally approximated as being linear. The most common approximation
makes the key assumption that no real power is lost in the transmission network. This
approximation is termed the Direct Current (DC) approximation or DC model and is used
in some electricity markets including the market in Texas [42]. On the other hand, the ma-
jority of electricity markets in North America incorporate transmission line losses into the
social welfare maximization problem associated with both the real-time and day-ahead mar-
kets [21, 22]. ISOs governed by FERC claim to realize significant benefits by incorporating
losses into market operation [42]. In fact, PJM has reported 100 million dollars of savings
per year in energy and congestion costs [78]. These claims have encouraged other ISOs to
consider implementing marginal losses into their economic dispatch [65]. Perhaps more im-
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portantly, the implementation of losses into the social welfare maximization problem allows
for Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) to accurately reflect the marginal cost of losses. This
allows for LMPs to better guide investment and operational decisions, resulting in long term
benefits as well.
Despite the increased prevalence of marginal losses, a standard economic dispatch
problem has not emerged in industry, so that energy markets that consider marginal losses
have varying implementations [22]. The choice of implementation of marginal losses has
both market price and resource dispatch impacts that may significantly benefit some players
while significantly disadvantaging other players as compared to Alternating Current Optimal
Power Flow (AC OPF) outcomes [5, 11, 12], which we will view as the “gold standard”
for the dispatch problem. To better understand these various implementations, Part I of
this dissertation derives economic dispatch problems from first principles and explains the
various assumptions and approximations required to attain different practical formulations.
Common and unnecessary assumptions are identified and proper choices of tuning parameters
are specified. Certain approximations are shown to increase the error in price and dispatch
outcomes. The following four subsections introduce the topic of each chapter in Part I of
this dissertation.
1.1.1 Detailed AC OPF Problem
The economic dispatch problem that most accurately accounts for transmission line
losses is termed the AC OPF problem. This problem uses the equivalent-Π model for each
transmission line in the AC transmission network and uses no significant assumptions or
approximations except that the three-phase system is operated at a fixed frequency and is
balanced across phases so that per-phase analysis can be used. The AC OPF problem rep-
resents distribution system loads as aggregated loads on the transmission system located at
distribution substations connecting the transmission system to the distribution system. The
aggregated distribution system loads are assumed to be balanced across phases. Distribution
system characteristics are not modeled.
To represent the transmission system, complex current, power, and voltages are mod-
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eled in detail. As is typical when formulating the AC OPF problem, our formulation will
model transmission line capabilities using hard limits on various quantities including real,
reactive, and apparent power flow as well as current magnitude flows. Similarly, generator
capabilities will be modeled as having hard limits on the amount of real and reactive power
they can produce. With this in mind, we recognize that these hard limits can be violated
for short time durations and thus may be considered soft limits in practice. Although gen-
erators are capable of producing both real and reactive power, their costs will be modeled
as being a function of only the real power produced and are assumed convex as is typical in
the literature.
Chapter 3 will derive the AC OPF problem from first principles using both a polar and
rectangular coordinate representation of the complex voltages in the transmission network.
Both formulations include non-convex constraints for each transmission line and bus in the
system. This type of non-convexity is difficult to accommodate because it is prevalent among
the constraints of the problem. In fact, this non-convexity is so difficult to accommodate
that the AC OPF problem has been proven to be generally NP-hard [6, 54]. However,
iterative methods, such as interior point algorithms, can be used to effectively approximate
the solution to the AC OPF problem. Although these algorithms are only, at best, guaranteed
to converge to a local minimum, they often converge to a point that is nearly globally
optimal [9, 14].
Throughout Part I of this dissertation various convex approximations of the AC OPF
problem will be derived. The solution of the convex problems will then be compared to
the identified locally optimal solution of the AC OPF problem, which serves as an intuitive
benchmark. Furthermore, convex approximations will be derived from the two AC OPF
formulations in Chapter 3. We will see that the polar coordinate formulation of the AC
OPF problem yields very accurate approximations that fix voltage magnitudes and assume
small voltage angle differences across each transmission line. We will additionally see that
the rectangular coordinate formulation of the AC OPF problem yields a very tight relaxation
of the AC OPF problem that results in a Semi-Definite Program (SDP).
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1.1.2 Non-Linear Approximations of the Economic Dispatch Problem
The AC OPF problem formulated using polar coordinates for the complex voltages
facilitates a series of approximations that ultimately result in the DC OPF problem, which
uses the DC model of the transmission system. Assumptions used to formulate the DC model
of the transmission system require real and reactive power to decouple, voltage magnitudes
to be fixed to their nominal values, resistances to be much smaller than reactances, and
voltage angle differences across transmission lines to be very small. These assumptions are
often well-satisfied in practice, although may be violated under stressed system conditions.
As mentioned earlier, the DC model of the system does not account for transmission
losses. For this reason, the lossless DC OPF problem is typically augmented with fixed losses
allocated throughout the network as fictitious nodal demand [57, 73, 84]. References [57]
and [73] show that introducing a fixed loss representation to the lossless DC OPF problem
results in price and dispatch values that more accurately represent those from the AC OPF
problem. However, fixed loss representations do not accurately capture the marginal effects
of losses as operating conditions vary. In fact, the real power loss of a transmission line
is more accurately approximated as the product of the line resistance and the squared real
power flowing through the line, and this representation can capture the variation of marginal
losses with operating conditions [40, 81].
To account for losses many previous works augment a lossless DC power flow model
with the quadratic loss model, eg. [56, 57]. This approach is somewhat self-contradictory
because the DC model of the system is only accurate when lines are lossless. Moreover, by
assuming lossless transmission lines it is not clear where the additional load due to losses
should be allocated. Initial formulations allocated all losses to the slack bus [82], which
results in at least some of the losses being modeled as occurring far from the lines that
actually incur the losses. This is particularly problematic for remote resources, such as large-
scale wind and solar. Reference [58] recognized that the solution to the resulting dispatch
problem depended on the choice of slack bus and corrected this problem by introducing Loss
Distribution Factors (LDFs) that fix the fraction of total system losses allocated to each bus.
However, the solution to the dispatch problem in turn depends on the choice of those LDFs
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and the authors do not provide a method for determining these factors and do not clarify
how to remove this fundamental dependence on the choice of LDFs. More accurate models
include the Fictitious Nodal Demand (FND) model from [57] and [40], which allocate half of
the losses of each line to each adjacent bus. However, references [57] and [40] do not formally
justify this loss allocation model. A main contribution of this dissertation is the rigorous
justification of this loss allocation model. Chapter 4 verifies that this is indeed the proper
loss allocation by first principles derivation.
Chapter 4 is based on [32] and presents an economic dispatch problem that we term
the Transmission Constrained Economic Dispatch (TCED) problem. This economic dispatch
problem encompasses the economic dispatch problems from [40, 57] that use the quadratic
loss model as well as a more accurate economic dispatch problems that use fewer approxi-
mations/assumptions. The most accurate form of the TCED problem is derived from the
AC OPF problem in polar coordinates by using the assumptions that real and reactive
power decouple and voltages magnitudes are fixed. This TCED problem is derived from first
principles and does not utilize many of the aforementioned DC assumptions.
Although the TCED problem is non-convex, it is easily solved under the condition
that prices are positive. Under this condition this problem can be solved using the method
currently used in practice by Transpower New Zealand Limited (TPNZ), the ISO in New
Zealand [77]. Specifically, the load over-satisfaction relaxation, which relaxes power balance
by allowing generation to exceed demand (or load) at any location in the transmission net-
work, results in a convex optimization problem. However, this relaxation cannot be used in
the case where prices are negative. Negative prices are not typical but may occur in the elec-
tricity market for two reasons. First, the offered marginal cost of generation by an electric
generator may be negative, reflecting the effective marginal cost of resources that are subsi-
dized volumetrically, as is the case for wind and solar receiving US Federal “Production Tax
Credits.” Second, even if all marginal cost offers are non-negative, transmission constraints
can result in prices that are lower than the lowest marginal cost offer (and therefore possibly
negative) and can result in prices that are higher than the highest marginal cost offer. When
prices are negative the load over-satisfaction relaxation cannot be used and an alternative
method must be used to approximate the solution of the non-convex TCED problem.
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1.1.3 Linear Approximations of the Economic Dispatch Problem
The majority of electricity markets in North America intend to approximate the non-
convex TCED problem from Chapter 4 by first linearizing the loss function around some
base-case state and then introducing loss distribution factors (LDFs) [21]. The resulting lin-
early constrained economic dispatch (LCED) problem is termed the common LCED problem
because it closely represents those used in practice as reported in [21] and [58]. Chapter 5 is
based on [31], which characterizes the approximation errors associated with each of the three
assumptions required to accurately recover the optimal dispatch of the non-convex TCED
problem from the solution of the common LCED problem. This characterization is a main
contribution of this dissertation.
Reference [21] provides a summary of different linearization techniques implemented
by ISOs governed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), highlighting vari-
ations among ISOs in the choice of base-case state. The common LCED problem derived
in [21] matches that in [58] and is a linearized version of the TCED problem from Chapter 4,
which accommodates a general non-linear loss function. Many recent works have attempted
to improve upon this linearly constrained formulation in different ways. Reference [94] de-
rives a linear pricing technique that does not rely on a choice of base-case state or LDFs.
Reference [56] proposes a dispatch problem resulting in price components that are refer-
ence bus independent. Piece-wise linear representations of losses are accommodated by [75]
and [76] via the load over-satisfaction relaxation, which is accurate under the assumption
that prices are positive. Other work has focused on developing more accurate linear ap-
proximations of the AC OPF problem [19, 20, 69, 96]. Similar linearization procedures have
also been studied in the context of planning problems [1, 97]. Despite the various linearly
constrained formulations suggested in the literature, the common LCED problem from [21]
and [58] remains the most commonly used economic dispatch problem in practice.
Using the AC OPF problem as a benchmark, reference [21] illustrates that prices
associated with the common LCED problem better capture the marginal effect of losses as
compared to economic dispatch problems that represent losses as being fixed. However, using
a simple 2-bus example, [21, section V-A] additionally identifies an issue that is missed by
current practice. Specifically, using intuitive choices of base-case state and LDFs, the optimal
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dispatch of the common LCED problem may be far from feasible for the non-convex TCED
problem from which it is derived. Previous work has addressed similar issues by use of
post-processing methods [91], which, in our context, intend to identify a dispatch that is
feasible for the TCED problem by slightly altering the optimal dispatch of the common
LCED problem. Such post-processing methods do not provide optimality guarantees and
may identify a costly dispatch, as is illustrated in [21, section V-A]. To mitigate this issue, [21]
suggests a successive linearization procedure, which is similar to those from [38] and [13].
This procedure is not guaranteed to converge and requires properly tuned parameters to
encourage convergence. Recognizing that the issue exhibited by the 2-bus test case in [21] is
difficult to rectify, another contribution of Chapter 5 is to identify the source of this issue.
Specifically, this issue occurs if the common LCED problem has multiple minimizers when
the ideal choice of base-case state is used (See Remark 5.12).
Despite the prevalence of the common LCED problem, no previous work has estab-
lished a set of assumptions required to recover the optimal dispatch of the non-convex TCED
problem from the common LCED problem. To establish such assumptions Chapter 5 de-
rives the common LCED problem from the TCED problem in Chapter 4. This chapter also
shows that the common LCED problem may have multiple minimizers, in which case small
perturbations of the base-case state may result in large dispatch approximation error. Fur-
thermore, even if the base-case state matches a minimizer of the non-convex TCED problem,
it is proven that there does not always exist a choice of LDFs such that the optimal dispatch
of the TCED problem is also optimal for the common LCED problem. On the other hand,
such LDFs do exist and are identified for the special case where no line limits are binding.
1.1.4 Convex Hull Pricing
As mentioned earlier, non-convexity associated with the AC OPF problem presents
two issues. The first issue, computing a social welfare maximizing dispatch, has been studied
extensively and the solution of the AC OPF problem can now be very accurately approx-
imated via iterative algorithms. On the other hand, little attention has been given to the
second issue that arises pertaining to market design in the absence of a market equilib-
rium that guarantees revenue adequacy of the Independent System Operator (ISO). In fact,
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reference [8] identifies the problem of pricing non-convexities that arise through the AC
transmission network as an emerging challenge in electricity markets. Chapter 6 is based
on [33], which addresses this pricing problem by proposing Convex Hull Prices (CHPs) that
solve a novel multi-objective minimum uplift problem that balances a trade-off between gen-
erator uplift and Financial Transmission Right (FTR) uplift. For the first time, this chapter
presents a method of approximating CHPs in polynomial-time using a transmission network
model that is general enough to accommodate the AC OPF problem. The proposed multi-
objective minimum uplift problem and the proposed method of approximating CHPs serve
as main contributions of this dissertation.
The problem of designing an energy market in the absence of a market equilibrium is
well studied in the context of the day-ahead market, which centers around a Mixed Integer
Program (MIP) known as the Unit Commitment (UC) problem [72,74], assuming linearized
DC power flow approximations. Similar to the AC OPF problem, the UC problem with
DC power flow is non-convex, is NP-hard and is typically solved using heuristic algorithms
that perform well in practice but do not identify dispatch values with optimality guarantees.
Furthermore, there rarely exist uniform nodal prices that support the optimal dispatch in
the day-ahead market. To overcome this problem CHPs have been proposed, also known as
extended locational marginal prices, along with side-payments that cover lost opportunity
costs of the market participants [35,43].
CHPs represent a solution of an optimization problem that minimizes various uplift
quantities including the aforementioned side-payments, which are not directly funded by
another revenue stream of the ISO and are typically referred to as generator uplift. Refer-
ence [95] points out that the ISO may differentiate between generator uplift and all other
types of uplift, which they aggregate into a single quantity termed the settlement residual,
and thus a minimum uplift formulation should be modeled as having multiple competing ob-
jectives. Our work studies a recommended extension from [95] by incorporating FTR uplift
into a multi-objective minimum uplift formulation that generalizes the standard minimum
uplift formulation by introducing a weight constant representing the value of FTR uplift
relative to generator uplift. We also refer to FTR uplift as Potential Congestion Revenue
Shortfall (PCRS) because it represents the worst possible shortfall of congestion revenue in
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covering FTR payoffs. We will not address other types of uplift in this work, including all
reserve related uplift, pointing to this avenue as a sensible extension.
The Simultaneous Feasibility Condition (SFC) states that the FTR allocation must
represent feasible net real power injections in the transmission network. The SFC is typi-
cally defined using a linear model of the transmission network and is a sufficient condition
for ensuring FTR payoffs are fully covered by congestion revenue [92]. Under certain as-
sumptions, reference [40] extends this traditional congestion revenue adequacy guarantee to
the case where the SFC is defined by a general non-linear model of the transmission net-
work. Traditionally, congestion revenue shortfalls occur only in the event of transmission
line outages, in which case the SFC would not accurately represent the transmission network
at the time of the market clearing. However, reference [55] illustrates that there may be
congestion revenue shortfall without the occurrence of a transmission line outage if the SFC
is defined by a non-linear model of the transmission network due to a non-convex feasible
set of net real power injections. Our work contributes to this literature by relating PCRS
to locational prices using a general definition of the SFC and by comparing the standard
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) to CHPs.
Computing CHPs is generally difficult because the uplift as a function of the loca-
tional prices is computationally burdensome to evaluate and is non-smooth. Special-purpose
algorithms for computing CHPs have focused on the simple linear transmission constraints
that are typically used to formulate the UC problem. For example, references [63,80,88–90]
either use linear transmission constraints or neglect transmission constraints altogether. Al-
though [43] and [35] provide analysis of CHPs with general non-linear transmission con-
straints, they later restrict their scope by linearizing these constraints to develop computa-
tional methods. We motivate the inclusion of non-linear constraints into this literature by
reiterating that computational research pertaining to the AC OPF problem has the ultimate
goal of being implemented into ISO market software [11].
Despite utilizing simple transmission models, the aforementioned methods of com-
puting CHPs do not guarantee convergence in polynomial-time. On the other hand, refer-
ence [45] frames CHPs as optimal Lagrange multipliers of a polynomially-solvable convex
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primal counterpart of the minimum uplift problem that we refer to as the primal CHP prob-
lem. To date this approach of computing CHPs has only considered linear models of the
transmission network. This dissertation extends this work by considering a multi-objective
minimum uplift problem along with general non-linear models of the transmission network.
Unfortunately, the associated primal CHP problem is expressed in terms of the convex hull of
the feasible set of net real power injections, which may not be tractable to evaluate for gen-
eral transmission network models. In this case we suggest using state-of-the-art relaxations
initially developed for the AC OPF problem that result in a relaxed primal CHP problem
that can be approximately solved in polynomial-time.
1.2 Co-Optimization and Interdependent Reserve Types
The second non-convexity considered in this dissertation is associated with a real-time
co-optimization problem that considers both generation dispatch and reserve procurement.
Part II is particularly focused on accommodating interdependent reserve types intended to
provide primary frequency control, which are collectively referred to as Responsive Reserve
(RR) in ERCOT [25]. This dissertation will not consider other reserve types that are de-
ployed on slower time scales, such as reserve types intended to provide secondary frequency
control. The reserve types considered in this dissertation contribute to primary frequency
control in fundamentally different ways and thus should be considered as different products
in the context of an electricity market. Furthermore, the different properties of the inter-
dependent reserve types complicates the reserve requirement that ensures sufficient reserve
to accommodate specific contingencies. To better understand these complications we must
provide a brief background on frequency control in the electric power system.
Traditional synchronous generators store kinetic energy in the form of a rotating mass
called a rotor. Mechanical power is input to the rotor from the prime mover, which may vary
from generator to generator. An example of a prime mover is a steam turbine, which may
be powered by the burning of oil, gas, or coal. Electro-mechanical power is output from the
stator that is realized as electric power injected into the transmission network. When the
electric power output of the generator exceeds the mechanical power input to the generator,
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the frequency of the rotor decreases and visa versa. Notice this implies that the electrical
power output of the stator is equal to the mechanical power input from the prime mover
when the frequency is in steady state. When the frequency is not in steady state, the Rate
Of Change Of Frequency (ROCOF) depends on the size of the rotor and other mechanically
coupled rotating mass, which is referred to as inertia. For example, if the inertia is large then
the frequency of the rotor does not change much in response to a power imbalance. Most
importantly, synchronous generators can be damaged if their rotor speed is too high or too
low. Frequency control in an electric power system aims to prevent this from happening.
The electromechanical physics governing a synchronous generator requires the ro-
tational speed of the rotor to be proportional to the voltage frequency at the generator’s
terminals. Additionally, the voltage frequency seen by all generators in a transmission sys-
tem is approximately the same. Frequency control aims to maintain the voltage frequency of
a synchronous transmission network at the same nominal voltage frequency, which is 60 Hz
in the United States. Frequency control is typically split into two categories. Primary fre-
quency control has the intent of arresting frequency decline/incline in the event of a sudden
loss of generation/demand before it reaches some critical voltage frequency threshold at
which generator damage may occur. Secondary frequency control aims to return the fre-
quency to its nominal value after such a contingency event occurs. This dissertation will not
detail secondary frequency control and will instead focus on primary frequency control.
Primary frequency control is traditionally executed by synchronous generators that
provide droop control. Droop control aims to respond quickly to a contingency and as a
result is performed in a distributed manner with no centralized communication to avoid
communication delays. Droop control intends to increase/decrease the mechanical power
output of its prime mover proportionally to the locally measured voltage frequency deviation
from nominal with an associated dead-band. This proportional signal is called the droop
signal and the proportionality constant is called the droop constant. In fact, the droop
signal only serves as a reference signal that is input to a turbine governor, which acts as
the control system surrounding the prime mover. Indeed the goal of the turbine governor
is to attain a mechanical power output of the prime mover that matches the droop signal.
Recognizing that the mechanical power output of the turbine governor is the same as the
15
mechanical power input to the rotor, a frequency decline/incline will cause the mechanical
power input to each rotor from each generator in the system to increase/decrease until
the frequency decline/incline is arrested. This effectively prevents the rotor speed of each
generator from reaching dangerously high or low values.
Traditional droop control operates within Primary Frequency Responsive (PFR) re-
serve. Part II of this dissertation conservatively assumes that generators providing PFR
reserve are the only generators in the system that provide droop control. This assumption
deviates slightly from ERCOT requirements, which instead widen the droop control dead-
band for all generators not providing PFR reserve [25]. In ERCOT PFR reserve will soon be
included in a real-time co-optimization problem. In this context the co-optimization problem
must enforce a reserve requirement that ensures sufficient PFR reserve to accommodate a
specific large contingency by restoring power balance before the critical frequency threshold
is violated. For example, all reserve requirements in ERCOT aim to ensure sufficient reserve
to accommodate the simultaneous outage of the two largest generators in the system. Since
PFR reserve serves the purpose of arresting frequency decline in response to a generator
outage, this requirement necessitates that each generator is capable of deploying its PFR
reserve before the critical frequency threshold is met. For this reason, this dissertation will
distinguish between nominal PFR reserve, which represents an assigned reserve amount that
is necessarily less than the generator’s headroom, and available PFR reserve, which repre-
sents the amount of nominal PFR reserve that is capable of being deployed before the critical
frequency threshold is met. As we will see, some of the nominal PFR reserve may not be
available, particularly if the nominal PFR reserve is very large. Under the assumption that
the turbine governor identically follows the droop signal as intended, a simple linear reserve
requirement is sufficient to ensure adequate PFR reserve procurement, posing no threat to
convexity of the co-optimization problem.
In response to a loss of generation or demand, the Rate Of Change Of Frequency (RO-
COF) tends to decrease as the inertia provided by the generators increases and as the number
of generators providing droop control increases. Traditionally, wind and solar generation do
not provide inertia or primary frequency control because they are inverter-based technologies.
As wind and solar generation continue to replace traditional generators, system-wide iner-
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tia levels are dropping as are the number of generators providing droop control, effectively
increasing the ROCOF in response to a contingency. As the ROCOF increases traditional
generators will become more limited by the ramping ability of their turbine governors. In
other words, the turbine governors will no longer be able to identically follow the droop
signal and the mechanical power input to the rotor will no longer be proportional to the
local frequency deviation because the dynamics associated with the turbine governor will
restrict the mechanical power’s ramping ability. This ramping restriction complicates the
reserve requirement because available PFR reserve becomes dependent on the ROCOF.
As wind and solar generation increase and primary frequency control becomes more
difficult to perform, ISOs are looking for new technologies to improve primary frequency
control. As per Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) 581 [24], ERCOT has introduced
a new Responsive Reserve (RR) type, termed Fast Frequency Responsive (FFR) reserve,
intended to improve primary frequency control that aims to take advantage of devices capable
of changing their power output nearly instantly. Participants can include fast acting battery
storage or demand curtailment that can respond within a few voltage frequency cycles.
Rather than reacting proportionally to the locally metered frequency deviation, this new
product responds to the frequency in a discrete manner. Specifically, participating devices are
expected to fully deploy all reserve nearly instantly if the frequency violates some threshold.
For example, if the frequency falls below 59.8 Hz, then all participants providing FFR reserve
will instantaneously increase their power output to the extent of their procured FFR reserve
amount. Introducing this reserve type further complicates the reserve requirement because
FFR reserve and PFR reserve serve the same purpose of arresting frequency decline/incline,
inherently coupling these two reserve types. The following two subsections explain how these
complications are addressed by Chapters 7 and 8.
1.2.1 Reserve Requirement for Sufficient Reserve Procurement
Chapter 7 is based on [30] and provides first principle derivations of reserve require-
ments that account for the ramping restrictions of PFR reserve as well as the physical
coupling between PFR and FFR reserve. The proposed reserve requirements serve as a
sufficient condition for maintaining a minimum frequency threshold in response to the two
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largest generators being disconnected from the system, as per ERCOT requirements. To
account for ramping restrictions of the prime mover a simple piecewise linear model with a
ramp rate is adopted from previous work [15].
The proposed reserve requirements are intuitive and provide a straight forward exten-
sion to the aforementioned linear reserve requirements. Specifically, in addition to the simple
linear requirement an additional constraint on the available PFR reserve is introduced that
accounts for the generator’s ramping ability. This additional constraint limits the available
PFR reserve of a single generator and is referred to as the rate-based PFR limit. This limit
is represented as a function that increases with the ramp rate exhibited by the prime mover
of the generator, the total inertia in the system, and the total FFR reserve procured in the
system. We will see that this limit function is non-linear in the total FFR reserve procured.
Chapter 7 further explains the relationship between the proposed rate-based PFR
limit and an alternative reserve requirement previously proposed in [59] that uses equiva-
lency ratios, which intend to represent the value of FFR reserve relative to PFR reserve.
Specifically, under the assumption that the ramp rate of a generator is proportional to its
nominal PFR reserve and under the assumption that the rate-based PFR limit does not vary
with the total FFR reserve procured, the rate-based PFR limit is identical in form to the
equivalency ratio requirement. In other words, this chapter derives the equivalency ratio
reserve requirement from first principles under various assumptions. This first principles
insight into equivalency ratios is novel because previous work [59] only provided insight into
equivalency ratios using empirical results via simulation.
1.2.2 Real-Time Co-Optimization with Rate-Based PFR Limits
Chapter 8 places reserve requirements from Chapter 7 into a real-time co-optimization
problem that determines dispatched generation, procured PFR reserve, and procured FFR re-
serve. Since commitment statuses are assumed constant in myopic real-time co-optimization
problems, inertia levels are assumed fixed. With this in mind, the real-time co-optimization
problem is still non-convex due to the rate-based PFR limit constraint, which is non-linear in
the total procured FFR reserve. We suggest solving this non-convex co-optimization problem
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using interior point algorithms that are only guaranteed to converge to a local minimum.
Chapter 8 additionally addresses economic issues associated with the non-convexity of
the proposed real-time co-optimization problem. Using a straight-forward pricing structure
for reserve the market participants are shown to have zero lost opportunity cost and thus no
side-payments are required to ensure their incentives are aligned with the ISO dispatch. The
PCRS is additionally shown to be zero and thus congestion revenue adequacy is guaranteed
in the presence of FTRs. However, as is the case for all co-optimization problems, revenue
adequacy cannot necessarily be guaranteed because reserve payments may be considered
out-of-market payments not covered by another revenue stream of the ISO.
Numerical results illustrate the difference between the proposed rate-based PFR limits
and the equivalency ratio requirement proposed by previous work [59]. In comparison, the
rate-based PFR limit encourages diversity in the procured PFR reserve, effectively dispersing
the PFR reserve more evenly among all generators. Furthermore, it is shown that the rate-
based PFR limit results in FFR reserve prices that are significantly larger than those resulting
from the equivalency ratio requirement. As a result, the rate-based PFR limit results in more
out-of-market reserve payments.
1.3 Summary of Contributions
The existing real-time electricity market in ERCOT is myopic and is centered around
a convex ED problem. This dissertation studies non-convexities that could arise due to
two recently proposed market changes. The first proposed market change introduces losses
into the ED problem, resulting in an ED problem with non-linear transmission constraints.
The corresponding non-convexity is studied in detail in Part I of this dissertation. The
second proposed market change introduces interdependent reserve types for primary fre-
quency response into the ED problem. Part II of this dissertation formulates the resulting
co-optimization problem using a non-convex reserve requirement that is derived from first
principles. The main contributions of this dissertation are contained within Chapters 4-8
and are summarized as follows:
• First principles derivation of a transmission line model that generalizes the com-
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mon quadratic loss model, incorporates an FND representation of losses, and re-
sults in a convex TCED problem when using the load over-satisfaction relaxation.
This model includes transmission line limits that account for transmission losses.
(Chapter 4)
• Rigorous justification that the FND representation of transmission losses should
allocate half of the losses of each transmission line to the busses at each end of the
line. (Chapter 4)
• Characterization of the approximation errors associated with each of the three
assumptions required to accurately recover the optimal dispatch of the non-convex
TCED problem from the solution of the common LCED problem. (Chapter 5)
• Observation that the common LCED problem may have multiple minimizers, in
which case small perturbations of the base-case state may result in large dispatch
approximation error. (Chapter 5)
• Proof that there does not always exist a choice of LDFs such that the optimal
dispatch of the TCED problem is also optimal for the common LCED problem
even if the ideal base-case state is used. On the other hand, such LDFs do exist
and are identified for the special case where no line limits are binding. (Chapter 5)
• Proposal of Convex Hull Prices (CHPs) that solve a novel multi-objective minimum
uplift problem that balances a trade-off between generator uplift and Financial
Transmission Right (FTR) uplift. (Chapter 6)
• The first proposed method of approximating CHPs in polynomial-time using a
transmission network model that is general enough to accommodate the AC OPF
problem. (Chapter 6)
• The distinction between nominal PFR reserve, as determined by a generator’s
head-room, and available PFR reserve, as determined by the ramping limitations
of a generator’s turbine governor. (Chapter 7)
• First principles derivation of a rate-based PFR limit that guarantees sufficient
reserve for maintaining a minimum frequency threshold in response to an arbitrarily
large generator outage, under certain assumptions. (Chapter 7)
• First principles derivation of the reserve requirement from [59], which provides
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insight into the nature of equivalency ratios. When initially proposed, this reserve
requirement was derived empirically through simulation. (Chapter 7)
• A novel co-optimization problem formulation using the rate-based PFR limit that
is non-convex. This co-optimization problem is proven to result in zero lost op-
portunity cost for all market participants and zero PCRS when using KKT prices.
(Chapter 8)
• The proposed co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit is compared to
the existing co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement from [59].
In comparison, the proposed co-optimization problem results in higher prices for
FFR reserve, more out-of-market reserve payments, and encourages diversity among




Traditional Convex Myopic Electricity Markets
This chapter provides a high-level analysis of myopic electricity markets. A general
economic dispatch (ED) problem is presented that may or may not be convex along with
associated Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). In fact, the presented general ED problem
and LMPs encompass each of those analyzed in Part I of this dissertation. On the other
hand, Part II of this dissertation does not fit into this framework because it considers co-
optimization problems that incorporate reserve as decision variables.
The market structure in this chapter intends to encompass the current real-time mar-
ket structure used in ERCOT with the day-ahead market abstracted away. In this context
the economic dispatch problem is convex because transmission constraints are assumed to
be convex and reserve procurement is not included. This chapter will highlight important
market principles that are satisfied when the economic dispatch problem is convex including
the ease of computing a social welfare maximizing dispatch, aligned incentives for gener-
ators to follow their dispatch, and the ability to guarantee revenue adequacy of the ISO.
Part I and II of this dissertation then intend to explain the complications that arise when
introducing ERCOT’s newly proposed features into the economic dispatch problem.
We will begin by introducing notation and providing a high-level description of the
transmission network in Section 2.1. We then provide description of the market participants
in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 will then formulate a general economic dispatch problem that
does not consider reserve procurement and may or may not be convex. Locational Marginal
Prices are then defined in Section 2.4. Revenue adequacy is then discussed in Section 2.5
and revenue adequacy is proven for the specific case where the economic dispatch problem
is convex.
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2.1 Notation and Graph Model of Transmission Network
The notation provided in this chapter is consistent with the notation in Parts I and II
of this dissertation. Additional notation will be introduced in Parts I and II as needed. Due
to an abundance of notation that is required in both Parts I and II, the notation introduced
in Part I may not be fully consistent with the notation introduced in Part II and vice versa.
In particular, some symbols that are defined in Part I are redefined in Part II.
Throughout this dissertation lower case subscripts are used to index elements of
matrices/vectors. For example, Mi,j denotes the element in the i
th row and jth column of
the matrix M . The ith column of a matrix will be denoted Mi. Furthermore, a vector v
is designated a column vector and the ith element of v is denoted vi. The transpose of a
matrix or vector is denoted with a superscript dagger †. Rn denotes the set of n-dimensional
real vectors. The identity matrix, the matrix of all zeros, and the matrix of all ones are
denoted I, 0, and 1 respectively and are of appropriate dimension. Additional notation will
be introduced throughout the dissertation as necessary.
We will also provide a basic graph theoretic model of the transmission network. Al-
though we do not provide a specific model of the transmission network in this chapter, it
is important to recognize the existence of this underlying graph in order to understand the
various nodal quantities that will be introduced. Specifically, the transmission network is
modeled as a directed graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of nodes (buses) and E is the set of
edges (transmission lines). There are n buses and m transmission lines. To simplify notation
we will introduce the set of bus indices as N = [1, . . . , n], assign an arbitrary unique index to
each bus in V, and refer to each bus by its corresponding index. Similarly, we will introduce
the set of line indices as L = [1, . . . ,m], assign an arbitrary unique index to each line in E,
and refer to each line by its corresponding index. Furthermore, we will introduce the set P
such that each element of this set represents an ordered pair of bus indices corresponding to
each ordered pair of busses in E. With this notation each directed edge (i, j) ∈ P connects
bus i ∈ N to bus j ∈ N and corresponds to a unique index k ∈ L, where i and j are both
integers between 1 and n and k is an integer between 1 and m.
Associated with each node i ∈ N is a locational price λi. This price is said to be
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uniform because it is common to each market participant located at bus i. At this point the
price λi is left general and can take any value.
2.2 Market Participants
The market participants include generators, system demand and FTR holders and
they will now be described in detail. Subsequently, a market equilibrium will be defined and
the pricing problem will be formulated.
2.2.1 Modeling System Demand
The system demand is modeled as constant real power extraction Di at each node
i ∈ N. The demand at node i ∈ N is charged for its consumption in the amount λiDi. The
demand is assumed to be inelastic and is thus not modeled as a profit maximizer.
2.2.2 Modeling Generators and Generator Uplift
Without loss of generality, there is one generator located at each bus in the system
indexed by i ∈ N. The profit of generator i ∈ N is the difference between its total energy
payment and its cost of producing energy. Generator i ∈ N generates an amount of real power
denoted Gi and is modeled as having a quadratic, convex and increasing cost function Ci(·).
The constraints of an individual generator i, termed as private constraints, are represented
by the set Xi and enforce simple generation limits Xi = {Gi : Gi ≤ Gi ≤ Gi}. Each generator
is modeled as a profit maximizer whose maximum profit is a function of its corresponding
locational price and is expressed as follows:
Υi(λi) := max
Gi∈Xi
(λiGi − Ci(Gi)) . (2.1)
In the absence of a market equilibrium, some generators may be dispatched at produc-
tion levels that do not maximize their profit. If the dispatched generation for generator i ∈ N,











i − Ci(Gdi )
)
, then the generator has an incentive to deviate from its
dispatched value. If the generator follows its dispatch value, then the generator will experi-
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where Gdi ∈ R represents the dispatched generation for generator i.
As we will see later in this chapter, this issue of misaligned incentives does not occur
in todays real-time market in ERCOT, which uses a convex economic dispatch problem.
However, this dissertation will analyze non-convex economic dispatch problems that do result
in dispatch values that do not maximize generators profits. This issue of misaligned incentives
can be overcome by introducing side-payments that cover the generators’ lost opportunity
cost. In this context a side-payment would be given to a generator under the condition that
they follow the dispatched generation. The side-payment aims to neutralize their incentive
to deviate.
Side-payments to generators are also referred to as generator uplift, are private out-of-
market payments, and are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons highlighted by a recent or-
der made by the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee [70]. For example, to remain revenue
neutral, the ISO must distribute the cost of these side-payments among market participants
introducing potentially unjust tariffs. Additionally, side-payments reduce transparency in
the market making it difficult for generator investment decisions to be made. The research
in this dissertation is aimed, in part, at designing an electricity market that results in low
generator uplift. Chapter 6 will investigate situations where generator uplift is positive.
2.2.3 Modeling Financial Transmission Rights and FTR Uplift
Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) are financial contracts entitling FTR holders
to a specific revenue stream that results from price differences at system buses. FTRs are
allocated among FTR holders before prices are cleared. There are typically two types of
FTRs, Point-to-Point (PTP) obligations and PTP options [40]. For sake of brevity, we will
only consider PTP obligations in this dissertation.
Let Ξ denote the set of all FTR holders. In its most general form, a PTP obligation
for FTR holder ξ ∈ Ξ can be represented by an FTR allocation vector f (ξ) ∈ Rn where
each element f
(ξ)
k represents a megawatt value injected into the transmission system at node
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k. Each FTR holder receives an FTR payoff in the amount of −λ†f (ξ). The total FTR
payoff to all FTR holders is in the amount of −λ†f , where f := Σ
ξ∈Ξ
f (ξ) is the sum of all
FTR allocation vectors. Different energy markets may choose the allocation vectors f (ξ) in
different ways. These allocation vectors are often chosen using an FTR allocation process
that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For example, see [40] for a description of FTR
allocation processes.
To elaborate on this model of FTRs, we will provide an intuitive example. In par-
ticular, let’s see how FTRs can be used by market participants to hedge locational price
uncertainty. Consider a simple example where the generator at bus i has a bilateral contract
with the demand at bus j that has been arranged outside of the wholesale electricity market
where the generator plans to produce in the amount G∗i and the demand plans to consume
Dj. In this case the net wholesale market payment by both market participants is in the
amount λiG
∗
i − λjDj. Suppose these market participants also hold a sparse FTR allocation






j = −Dj. Then they will receive an FTR payoff
in the amount −λiG∗i +λjDj, which is the negative of their net market payment. These two
payments cancel out for any possible price vector λ and so the market participants are effec-
tively able to avoid any uncertainty in the locational prices at bus i and bus j for dispatch
and demand quantities that match their FTR allocation vector.
Energy markets typically choose FTR allocation vectors to satisfy the Simultaneous
Feasibility Condition (SFC) for reasons pertaining to revenue adequacy that will soon become
clear. For the remainder of this chapter, we assume the FTR allocation satisfies the SFC,
which states that the sum of all FTR allocation vectors represent a feasible net real power
injection in the transmission system. The set of feasible net real power injections, denoted
T ⊂ Rn, represents constraints on the net real power injections imposed by the transmission
network that are referred to as coupling constraints as they ultimately relate the demand and
generation at each node to one another. At this point we leave this set general, encompassing
both linear and non-linear power flow models of the transmission system.
Definition 2.1. The FTR allocation satisfies the simultaneous feasibility condition (SFC)
if the sum of all FTR allocation vectors lies in the feasible set of net real power injec-
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tions, e.g., f ∈ T.
Remark 2.1. The feasible set of net real power injections T is left general in the main body
of this chapter and will be further elaborated in Part I of this dissertation. The definition of
this set will include implicit variables such as voltages, net reactive power injections at buses
and power flows on transmission lines. Physical constraints in the transmission network
are enforced, which may include reactive power injection and voltage magnitude limits at
each bus i ∈ N as well as real, reactive or apparent power flow limits on each transmission
line ℓ ∈ L. This set does not place generator limits on net real power injections at buses,
effectively allowing FTRs to be allocated to any bus in the system even if no device is
connected to that bus. □
Remark 2.2. Electricity markets today require each FTR allocation vector f (ξ) to be balanced
in the sense that the elements sum to zero, e.g. 1†f (ξ) = 0. Accordingly, the aforementioned
example would have G⋆i = −Dj. Of course, requiring each FTR allocation vector to be
balanced is only sensible if the SFCs are defined using a lossless model of the transmission
network. With the goal of introducing loss modeling into the electricity market, this dis-
sertation uses a more general definition of FTRs that allow FTR allocation vectors to be
unbalanced in the sense that their elements may not sum to zero, e.g. 1†f (ξ) ̸= 0. Ac-
cordingly, the aforementioned example may have G⋆i ̸= −Dj. Unbalanced FTRs have been
studied well in the literature [37, 40] and allow FTRs to hedge locational price differences
caused by losses as well as congestion.
Once the generators (demand) are paid (charged) for producing (consuming) energy,
the ISO is left with additional revenue, called congestion revenue. Let’s denote the realized






Congestion revenue is used to fund the FTR payoffs. The congestion revenue is said to be
adequate if it is larger than the total FTR payoffs. It is important for the electricity market
to be structured in a way that encourages congestion revenue adequacy. For this reason
the prices should be chosen such that the congestion revenue covers the worst case FTR
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The Potential Congestion Revenue Shortfall or PCRS, also referred to as FTR uplift,
is written as follows and represents the maximum possible shortfall of congestion revenue:





This value can be interpreted as the maximum FTR payoff Ψ(λ) less the congestion revenue
and is non-negative. It is important to recognize that the PCRS Cs(λ,Gd) represents a
worst case shortfall over all possible FTR allocations. In fact the realized FTR allocation
may allow congestion revenue to cover FTR payoffs even if the PCRS is positive. If the PCRS
satisfies Cs(λ,Gd) = 0, then congestion revenue adequacy is guaranteed, meaning that there
does not exist an FTR allocation that causes a congestion revenue shortfall. In the event
that congestion revenue is unable to cover FTR payoffs then the ISO must allocate the
shortfall among market participants introducing an allocation problem. Proper allocation
of congestion revenue shortfall has been a point of controversy [41]. The research in this
dissertation is aimed, in part, at designing an electricity market that results in low FTR
uplift. Chapter 6 will illustrate a trade-off between achieving low FTR uplift and achieving
low generator uplift in the context of selecting optimal locational prices λ.
2.3 General Economic Dispatch Problem
The economic dispatch problem is central to the proposed market structure. This
problem is written as follows where X = {G ∈ Rn : Gi ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ N} enforces generator lim-







st : Di −Gi + Ti = 0 ∀i ∈ N (2.6a)
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Notice that this problem is written generally to accommodate any non-convexity
associated with the feasible set of net real power injections. In fact, this problem is a
generalization of each optimization problem to be derived in Part I of this dissertation. In
contrast to the specific formulations to appear in Part I, the general ED problem (2.6) is
written in a way that is conceptually convenient for analysis purposes but is not necessarily
written in a way that is convenient computationally. For example it is often possible to
eliminate the decision variable T after specifying the feasible set of net real power injections T.
A solution to this problem consists of a social welfare maximizing dispatch. This solu-
tion may be difficult to compute if the feasible set of net real power injections is non-convex.
As a result, we do not assume that dispatch values represent a social welfare maximizing
dispatch. Instead we will assume that the dispatched generation, denoted Gd, solves the
KKT conditions of the general economic dispatch problem (2.6) (See Remarks 2.3 and 2.4).
Of course, if the problem is convex, then any solution satisfying the KKT conditions is also a
global minimizer, in which case Gd would represent the social welfare maximizing dispatch.
At this point we should note that the economic dispatch problem (2.6) directly mini-
mizes generator fuel costs. However, there may be other costs that affect social welfare that
are not considered in the objective function of this problem. For example, lost opportunity
costs for generators and PCRS may be interpreted as decreasing social welfare but are not
considered in the objective function of problem (2.6).
2.4 Locational Marginal Prices (KKT Prices)
Many concepts associated with price setting are closely related to the Lagrange mul-
tipliers of the power balance constraints (2.6a). Electricity markets commonly use uniform
prices that we term KKT prices and denote by λ⋆ ∈ Rn. These prices are set by first iden-
tifying a solution of problem (2.6) that satisfies the KKT conditions and then setting the
prices to be the Lagrange multipliers of the power balance constraints (2.6a). Under certain
conditions further elaborated in the next section of this chapter, the KKT prices represent
the marginal cost of serving load at each location in the system. For this reason, KKT prices
are often referred to as Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). Furthermore, LMPs are specific
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to the identified solution of the general ED problem and as a result are algorithm depen-
dent. In other words, different algorithms may produce different LMPs. Below is a general
definition of a KKT price/dispatch pair that only introduces Lagrange multipliers for the
power balance constraints and leaves the sets T and X implicit. This definition follows from
the normal cone definition of the First Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs) as described
in Appendix A (See [71] as well as Remarks 2.4 and 2.3).
Definition 2.2. A KKT price/dispatch pair (λ⋆, G⋆) ∈ Rn×X are such that constraint (2.6a)
holds for some T ⋆ ∈ T along with the following generalized stationarity conditions.
−λ⋆ ∈ NT(T ⋆) and
0 ∈∂ (Ci(Gi)−λ⋆iGi) |G⋆i +NXi(G
⋆
i ) ∀i ∈ N
(2.7)
where NT(T
⋆) is the normal cone of the set T at the point T ⋆ and NXi(G
⋆
i ) is the normal
cone of the set Xi at the point G⋆i . The subdifferential of a general function g(x) evaluated
at a point x⋆ is denoted ∂(g(x))|x⋆ . A formal definition of the normal cone is provided in [71]
and is explained intuitively in Appendix A.
Remark 2.3. We emphasize that a KKT price/dispatch pair may not exist in our general
framework because constraint qualifications may not be satisfied within the set T. It is also
possible that an identified solution satisfying the KKT conditions could represent a saddle
point, local maximum, or local minimum. However, in practice a local minimum to the
AC OPF problem satisfying the KKT conditions is almost always attainable using standard
off-the-shelf software, as is the case for each test case in this dissertation. Furthermore, our
results regarding KKT prices hold if the solution represents a saddle point, local maximum,
or local minimum.
Remark 2.4. Appendix A provides an elaborate description of how the conditions from Defi-
nition 2.2 are related to the common KKT conditions that will be further analyzed in future
chapters. For the special case where the cost function and constraint functions are smooth,
Appendix A proves any dispatch G⋆ that satisfies the traditional KKT conditions for the
general economic dispatch problem (2.6) will also satisfy the conditions from Definition 2.2
for some Lagrange multipliers λ⋆. In fact, there may be multiple such Lagrange multipliers
λ⋆ that satisfy the KKT conditions for generation dispatch G⋆. Our results do not require
such Lagrange multipliers to be unique.
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2.5 A Revenue Adequate Market Equilibrium
In accordance with [43], a decentralized market equilibrium refers to a set of prices,
side-payments and dispatch values for which generators have no incentive to deviate from
their dispatch values. As explained in Section 2.2.2, the proposed side-payments always
ensure a decentralized market equilibrium is realized, whereas payments on the basis of
energy prices alone do not necessarily have this property. To recover the cost introduced by
these side-payments the ISO must introduce tariffs to market participants. In our context
these tariffs must also accommodate any realized congestion revenue shortfall due to FTRs.
The formal definition of a decentralized market equilibrium from [43] addresses this issue by
proposing tariffs be applied to the consumers. By modeling consumers as fixed demand as
in Section 2.2.1, their individual rationality is not compromised by imposing these tariffs.
However, this simple model of fixed demand does not consider more elastic consumers that
respond to energy prices or the long term effects these tariffs may have on consumer behavior.
Furthermore, the allocation of revenue shortfalls by the ISO has been a point of controversy
as pointed out in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
This dissertation will expand upon the notion of a decentralized market equilibrium
by additionally requiring revenue adequacy of the ISO to be guaranteed. We will refer to
such a decentralized market equilibrium as a revenue adequate market equilibrium. Note that
our definition of a revenue adequate market equilibrium is consistent with the Competitive
Equilibrium Model (CEM) 1 from [52]. Specifically, we will define a revenue adequate market
equilibrium to be a price dispatch pair (λ,G) that results in zero PCRS and zero side-
payments (or equivalently zero lost opportunity cost for generators). Intuitively, a revenue
adequate market equilibrium guarantees revenue adequacy in the form of side-payments and
FTR payoffs.
Definition 2.3. A revenue adequate market equilibrium is defined to be a price/dispatch pair
(λ,G) that result in zero side-payments and zero PCRS, e.g.
Cs(λ,G)=0 and Coi (λi,Gi)=0 ∀i ∈ N
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Reference [52] shows that a revenue adequate market equilibrium does not always exist
when defining the feasible set of net real power injections using the full AC-model of the
transmission system. Even if a revenue adequate market equilibrium does exist we still may
not achieve it. Specifically, by theorem 1 of [52] a revenue adequate market equilibrium, as
in Definition 2.3, can only occur if the dispatched generation is a social welfare maximizing
dispatch. As explained in Section 2.3, we do not assume that the dispatched generation
maximizes social welfare and so it is apparent that the market may not be operating in a
revenue adequate equilibrium in general.
Recognizing that the side-payments and PCRS are always non-negative, the lack of
a revenue adequate market equilibrium implies that at least one of these values are positive,
and thus additional costs accrue in the form of generator opportunity costs and/or FTR
underfunding that may be difficult to account for when setting prices. In fact, these costs
are not accounted for in the objective function of the general ED problem. As a result, if the
market is not operating in a revenue adequate market equilibrium, then KKT prices do not
actually represent the marginal cost of serving load at each location in the system. In fact,
this marginal price interpretation of the KKT prices only holds if a revenue adequate market
equilibrium exists, the dispatched generation represents a global minimizer of the general
ED problem, the global minimizer of the general ED problem solves the KKT conditions
with unique Lagrange multipliers, and the AC OPF problem satisfies certain constraint
qualifications [5] that allow KKT prices to exist in the first place. Despite the fact that
KKT prices do not necessarily represent the marginal cost of serving load, we will still use
this term interchangeably with the term LMPs, as is standard practice.
Traditional electricity market formulations are convenient in that the feasible set of
net real power injections is represented by a polytope and thus the general ED problem is
convex. In this case, it is easy to solve the general ED problem for a global minimizer and
KKT prices result in a revenue adequate market equilibrium allowing for the convenient
marginal pricing interpretation to hold. This is formally stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Under the assumption that the general ED problem (2.6) is convex, a KKT
price/dispatch pair (λ⋆, G⋆) as in Definition 2.2 will result in a revenue adequate market
equilibrium as in Definition 2.3.
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Proof: The generalized stationarity conditions for (2.7) include necessary conditions
for optimality of each profit-maximizing generation problem (2.1). (Note that the normal
cone definition of the FONCs are generally represented by (A.6) in Appendix A). The
generalized stationarity conditions for (2.7) include necessary conditions for optimality of
the maximum FTR payoff problem (2.4). Since each of these problems are convex, these
conditions are also sufficient for global optimality.
In contrast to Theorem 2.1, numerical results from Section 3.5 will show that a revenue
adequate market equilibrium is not always attainable if the feasible set of net real power
injections T is non-convex. It is important to recognize that approximate convex models
create problems of their own, including the need to make the dispatch satisfy the underlying
non-convex constraints. Numerical results in Section 6.5 illustrate the costs associated with
adjusting the dispatch on fast time scales to achieve feasible net real power injections.
2.6 Summary
This chapter provided a high-level overview of a myopic electricity market structure
that centers around a general ED problem. Market participants are defined to be demand
that consumes electric power, generators that produce electric power, and FTR holders.
Generators that experience lost opportunity cost are provided side-payments, also referred
to as generator uplift. PCRS is defined to be the worst possible shortfall of congestion
revenue in covering FTR payoffs and is referred to as FTR uplift. These uplift quantities
are unsatisfactory because they represent a potential revenue shortfall of the ISO and thus
revenue adequacy cannot be guaranteed when uplift is positive. The remainder of this
dissertation is aimed, in part, at designing an electricity market that results in little uplift.
The market structure presented in this chapter is general enough to encompass the
real-time market structure currently used by ERCOT, which additionally restricts the fea-
sible set of net real power injections to be a polytope. In this special case, the ED problem
becomes convex and LMPs are proven to result in zero generator uplift and zero FTR uplift.
The remainder of this dissertation will focus on two sources of non-convexity that may be
introduced by recently proposed market changes in ERCOT. Part I introduces transmission
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losses into the feasible set of net real power injections, making this set non-convex. It is shown
that revenue adequacy cannot be guaranteed in this setting. Part II introduces interdepen-
dent reserve types for primary frequency response, resulting in a co-optimization problem
with a non-convex reserve requirement. It is shown that this co-optimization problem results
in zero generator uplift and zero FTR uplift when using marginal prices; however, out-of-
market reserve payments may cause the ISO to experience revenue inadequacy. Part III





Part I of this dissertation incorporates accurate non-linear transmission models into
the myopic economic dispatch problem. This part is motivated by Texas’ recent consideration
of implementing transmission loss models into the economic dispatch problem [27]. As
explained in Chapter 1, the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) has considered
the introduction of transmission losses separately from the introduction of real-time co-
optimization. Consistent with the PUCT’s analysis, this part of the dissertation will not
consider reserve products in the economic dispatch problem.
Chapter 3 formulates the economic dispatch problem that most accurately accounts
for the equivalent-Π model of a transmission line, which is termed the Alternating Current
Optimal Power Flow (AC OPF) problem. Due to the inherent non-convexity of the AC
OPF problem it is generally difficult to solve and results in an electricity market that cannot
guarantee congestion revenue adequacy. This is one reason why ISOs today solve economic
dispatch problems that serve as convex approximations of the AC OPF problem. These
convex approximations are derived in Chapters 4 and 5. Specifically, Chapter 4 formulates
the non-convex Transmission Constrained Economic Dispatch (TCED) problem that can be
solved using a convex relaxation under the condition that prices are positive. Chapter 5
formulates the convex Linearly Constrained Economic Dispatch (LCED) problem from the
TCED problem. Finally, Chapter 6 attempts to accommodate the AC OPF problem by
using algorithms that may only identify a locally optimal solution and suggests mitigating
the congestion revenue adequacy problem using convex hull prices.
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Chapter 3
The AC OPF problem
The most accurately formulated myopic economic dispatch problem is termed the
Alternating Current Optimal Power Flow (AC OPF) problem. The AC OPF problem is
non-convex and NP-hard in general [6, 54]. With this in mind, the AC OPF problem has a
long history pertaining to the way it is formulated and solved [11]. This chapter will derive
two different formulations that are prevalent in the literature [67]. These two formulations
are derived using polar coordinates and rectangular coordinates to represent the complex
voltages at each bus in the transmission network and facilitate very accurate approximations
that will be further investigated in Chapters 4 and 6 respectively. This chapter will show
that the two formulations provided are specific cases of the general ED problem (2.6) from
Chapter 2. Numerical results will provide examples that illustrate how certain economic
principles breakdown due to the non-convexity of the AC OPF problem. Specific test cases
are studied for which there does not exist a revenue adequate market equilibrium.
This chapter will be organized as follows. Section 3.1 will introduce the equivalent-Π
model of a transmission line and derive complex power flow quantities associated with this
model from first principles. Section 3.2 will introduce a simple model for an electrical bus
in a transmission system that may experience shunt losses. Using the derived expressions
from Sections 3.1 and 3.2 two different forms of the AC OPF problem will be derived in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Section 3.3 formulates an AC OPF problem using polar coordinates to
express the complex voltages at each bus. This form of the AC OPF problem is convenient
for utilizing standard approximations such as fixed voltage magnitudes and small voltage
angle approximations as will be illustrated in Chapter 4. Section 3.4 formulates the AC
OPF problem in rectangular coordinates, which will ultimately be used to derive a relaxed
version of the AC OPF problem in Chapter 6.
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3.1 Generalized Equivalent Π-Model of a Transmission Line
This section derives complex power flow quantities along an arbitrary transmission
line (i, j) ∈ P using the equivalent-Π model of a transmission line. Figure 3.1 provides
a circuit diagram of the general equivalent-Π model of a transmission line operated at a
nominal frequency. The transmission line (i, j) ∈ P connects bus i ∈ N to bus j ∈ N and is
indexed by ℓ ∈ L. The series impedance of the line is denoted zℓ = 1yℓ where yℓ is the series
admittance. The complex voltage at bus i is denoted vi. An ideal transformer is located
near bus i with complex off-nominal turns ratio of aℓ. Shunt admittances are denoted y
(c)
ℓ
where the c superscript indicates that this shunt admittance is largely capacitive. In fact,
this shunt admittance is typically assumed to be purely imaginary; however, in this chapter
we will allow y
(c)



















Figure 3.1: Circuit diagram of transmission line (i, j)∈P indexed by ℓ ∈ L.
The current flowing into the line can be derived using Kirchhoff’s Current Law (KCL)
by summing the currents into the nodes on both sides of the series impedance. The current
flowing into the line from bus i is denoted Ii,j and the current flowing into the line from bus





































where superscript ∗ denotes complex conjugate (and should be distinguished from super-
script ⋆, which will denote optimal quantities).
37
Notice that the two terms in the middle expression represent the current flowing
through the series impedance and the current flowing through the shunt element. The ex-
pression on the far right-hand side (RHS) simply groups like terms in vi and vj. Furthermore,
the current flowing into the line from bus i traverses a transformer yielding a factor of a∗ℓ
in (3.1).
The complex power flowing into the line can then expressed using Ohms law. Using
the expressions from (3.1) and (3.2) the complex power flowing into the line from bus i and
from bus j are respectively written as follows:

































To simplify this expression it is common to introduce admittance matrices. With this
in mind we will now introduce a branch admittance matrix Y (i,j) ∈ Cn×n.


















where Ii is the i
th column of the identity matrix, which also represents the ith standard unit
vector. The complex power flow expressions (3.3) and (3.4) can now be consolidated into a
single expression that is valid for both directions. Notice that the second of the following
two expressions simply reverses i and j compared to the first and so they will be collectively
referred to as expression (3.7):


















The expression (3.7) can be easily shown to be equivalent to (3.3) and (3.4) algebraically.
The expression (3.7) can then be placed in matrix form by treating v ∈ Cn as a vector of com-
plex voltages. Notice that the second of the following two expressions again simply reverses
i and j compared to the first and so they will be collectively referred to as expression (3.8):
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Pi,j + iQi,j = v
†Y (i,j)∗v∗ (3.8a)
Pj,i + iQj,i = v
†Y (j,i)∗v∗ (3.8b)
where we interpret superscript ∗ for a vector to mean the complex conjugate of the vector.
The complex power expressions (3.7) and (3.8) will be used to formulate the AC OPF problem
in polar coordinates and rectangular coordinates respectively.
3.2 Bus Model with Shunt Losses
A bus i ∈ N is a connection point at which generators or demand can inject or
extract complex power from the transmission network. The sum of complex power injected
into bus i is termed the net complex power injection. This subsection derives net complex
power injection quantities for an arbitrary bus i ∈ N that may experience complex power
loss due to shunt admittance. With this in mind the net complex power injection at each
bus represents the sum of the complex powers flowing out of the bus through transmission







i . The net complex power injection at each bus is written as follows:
Ti + iUi =
∑
(i,j)∈P
(Pi,j + iQi,j) +
∑
(j,i)∈P
(Pj,i + iQj,i)− vi(viy(s)i )∗ (3.9)
where the third term on the RHS represents the real power loss through the shunt element
located at bus i. With this in mind the value viy
(s)
i represents the complex current flowing
through the shunt element.
Once again, admittance matrices will be introduced to simplify notation. The network
admittance matrix Y ∈ Cn×n will now be defined in terms of the branch admittance matrices







Y (i,j) − diag(y(s)) (3.10)
where diag(y(s)) ∈ Cn×n a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements represented by the vector
of bus shunt admittances y(s) ∈ Cn. The net complex power injection expression (3.9) can
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now be simply written as follows:






The expression (3.11) can be easily shown to be equivalent to (3.9) algebraically. The
expression (3.11) can then be placed in matrix form by treating v ∈ Cn as a vector of
complex voltages and by introducing the bus admittance matrix as Y (i) := IiI
†
iY . The net
complex power injections can now be expressed as follows:
Ti + iUi = v
†Y (i)∗v∗ (3.12)
The complex power expressions (3.11) and (3.12) will be used to formulate the AC
OPF problem in polar coordinates and rectangular coordinates respectively.
3.3 AC OPF Problem in Polar Coordinates
First use polar coordinates to formulate the AC OPF problem. In this case the
complex voltage at bus i is denoted vi = Vi∠(θi), where Vi is the voltage magnitude and θi
is the voltage angle. Using polar coordinates the feasible set of net real power injections is
defined by constraints that are sinusoidal in the voltage angle variables and quadratic in the
voltage magnitude variables.
The complex power flow in a transmission line expressed in terms of voltage angle
and voltage magnitude follows from the expression (3.7). With this in mind, denote the ad-









i,j |∠ϖi,j. Multiplying the complex quantities in polar coordinates and using
Eulers formula the complex power flowing into the line from bus i and bus j can be rewritten
as follows:
Pi,j = |Y (i,j)i,i |V 2i cos(−ςi,j) + |Y
(i,j)
i,j |ViVj cos(θi − θj −ϖi,j) ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (3.13)
Qi,j = |Y (i,j)i,i |V 2i sin(−ςi,j) + |Y
(i,j)
i,j |ViVj sin(θi − θj −ϖi,j) ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (3.14)
Similarly, an expression for the net complex power injection into a bus in terms
of the voltage angle and voltage magnitude follows from expression (3.11). With this in
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mind, denote the admittance quantities in this expression using polar coordinates as follows:
Yi,j = |Yi,j|∠φi,j. Multiplying the complex quantities in polar coordinates leads to the








|Yi,j|Vj sin(θi − θj − φi,j) ∀i ∈ N (3.16)
These expressions are written in terms of real valued variables and so they can then be
placed in an economic dispatch problem that is suitable for standard optimization software.
This economic dispatch problem is termed the AC OPF problem and optimizes over the
vector of nodal generation G ∈ Rn as well as the voltage magnitude and voltage angle






st : Di −Gi = Vi
n∑
j=1
|Yi,j |Vj cos(θi − θj − φi,j) ∀i ∈ N (3.17a)
U i ≤ Vi
n∑
j=1
|Yi,j |Vj sin(θi − θj − φi,j) ≤ Ūi ∀i ∈ N (3.17b)




i,j |ViVj cos(θi−θj−ϖi,j) ≤ P̄i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (3.17c)

















i cos(θi−θj) ≤ S̄2i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (3.17e)
0 ≤ Vi ≤ V̄i ∀i ∈ N (3.17f)
Gi ≤ Gi ≤ Ḡi ∀i ∈ N (3.17g)
This AC OPF problem bears resemblance to the economic dispatch problem (2.6).
Generation costs are being minimized in the objective function. The constraint (3.17a) en-
forces real power balance at each node, where the RHS of the constraint is the net real
power injection as expressed in (3.15). Constraint (3.17b) enforces limits on the net reactive
power injection at each bus, where the net reactive power quantity is written as in (3.16).
41
Constraints (3.17f) and (3.17g) enforce nodal generation and nodal voltage magnitude con-
straints.
Constraints (3.17c)-(3.17e) enforce line limits where each line limit is assumed sym-
metric in that each flow quantity has the same limit regardless of flow direction. Constraints
(3.17c) and (3.17d) limit the real and reactive power flows on each transmission line and
use the expressions from (3.13) and (3.14). Constraint (3.17e) enforces apparent power con-
straints on each transmission line. With this in mind the squared apparent power flow is
represented by the expression P 2i,j + Q
2
i,j. The left-hand side (LHS) of constraint (3.17e) is
derived by first substituting the expressions for Pi,j and Qi,j from (3.13) and (3.14) and then
applying the angle difference trigonometric identity, which allows for the following equiva-
lence:
cos(θi − θj) = cos(−ϖi,j) cos(θi − θj −ϖi,j) + sin(−ϖi,j) sin(θi − θj −ϖi,j)
The AC OPF problem can be written in the form presented as the general ED problem
(2.6) from Chapter 2. In this context the AC OPF problem uses a feasible set of net real
power injections written as follows:
T = {T ∈ Rn : ∃(V, θ) where (3.15), (3.17b), (3.17c), (3.17d), (3.17e), (3.17f), (3.17g)} (3.18)
It should be apparent that this feasible set of net real power injections is non-convex due
to the sinusoidal and high-order polynomial terms. However, this AC OPF problem has
constraints defined by smooth functions in the decision variables and is able to be solved
to a local minimizer by use of standard iterative algorithms. Also notice that the AC OPF
problem does not enforce contingency constraints as stated in Remark 3.1.
Remark 3.1. Economic dispatch problems used in practice define the feasible set of net real
power injections in a way that ensures the system is capable of operating within short-
term or emergency limits in the event of any single line outage. We do not consider these
contingency constraints in any of the considered problems in this dissertation. In fact, such
contingency constraints are typically not studied in the context of the AC OPF problem
because they would require the introduction of voltage decision variables V and θ for each
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of the m possible line outages, making the AC OPF problem intractable to solve. Such
contingency-constrained problems could be approximated within the framework we develop
by representing the detailed AC equations for the expected non-contingency case, and using
linearized constraints to represent the conditions in the contingency cases. It is typical to
use such linearized constraints in practice.
3.4 AC OPF Problem in Rectangular Coordinates
Let us now use rectangular coordinates to formulate the AC OPF problem. In this
case the complex voltage at bus i is denoted vi = vRe,i+ ivIm,i. Using rectangular coordinates
the feasible set of net real power injections is defined by constraints that are quadratic in
the real and imaginary parts of the voltage variables.
The complex power flow in a transmission line expressed in terms of the real and
imaginary parts of the complex voltage follows from the expression (3.8). With this in mind,
denote the admittance quantities in this expression using rectangular coordinates as follows:
Y (i,j) = G(i,j) + iB(i,j). Multiplying the complex quantities in rectangular coordinates leads
to the following expressions, which hold for each transmission line in both directions, eg.






















i,j (vRe,ivRe,j + vIm,ivIm,j) +B
(i,j)
i,j (vIm,ivRe,j − vRe,ivIm,j) (3.20)
Similarly, an expression for the net complex power injection into a bus in terms of
the real and imaginary parts of the complex voltage follows from expression (3.12). With
this in mind, denote the admittance quantities in this expression using polar coordinates as
follows: Y (i) = G(i) + iB(i). Multiplying the complex quantities in rectangular coordinates
leads to the following expressions for the net real and reactive power injections into bus i:
Ti =G
(i)
i,j(vRe,ivRe,j + vIm,ivIm,j) +B
(i)





i,j (vRe,ivRe,j + vIm,ivIm,j) (3.22)
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Table 3.1: Admittance related matrices used to express the constraints of the AC OPF problem
in a standard quadratic form.
Power Flow Matrices Power Injection Matrices Voltage Matrix






































matrices can now be defined as shown in Table 3.1. The expressions (3.19)-(3.22) can now









The RHS of the expressions (3.23)-(3.26) are written in standard quadratic form and can be
easily placed into an AC OPF problem that optimizes over w ∈ R2n. This AC OPF problem






st : Di −Gi = w†H(i)w ∀i ∈ N (3.27a)
U i ≤ w†Z(i)w ≤ Ūi ∀i ∈ N (3.27b)
−P̄i,j ≤ w†Z(i,j)w ≤ P̄i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (3.27c)







≤ S̄2i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (3.27e)
0 ≤ w†Miw ≤ V̄i ∀i ∈ N (3.27f)
Gi ≤ Gi ≤ Ḡi ∀i ∈ N (3.27g)
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Similarly to the polar formulation in (3.17), this rectangular formulation of the AC
OPF problem bears resemblance to the economic dispatch problem (2.6). Generation costs
are being minimized in the objective function. The constraint (3.27a) enforces real power
balance at each node, where the RHS of the constraint is the net real power injection as
expressed in (3.25). Constraint (3.27b) enforces limits on the net reactive power injection at
each bus, where the net reactive power quantity is written as in (3.26). Constraint (3.27f)




(i) is defined in Table 3.1. Constraint (3.27g) enforces nodal generation
constraints.
Constraints (3.27c)-(3.27e) enforce line limits where each line limit is assumed sym-
metric in that each flow quantity has the same limit regardless of flow direction. Constraints
(3.27c) and (3.27d) limit the real and reactive power flows on each transmission line and
use the expressions from (3.24) and (3.23). Constraint (3.27e) enforces apparent power con-
straints on each transmission line. With this in mind the squared apparent power flow is
represented by the expression P 2i,j + Q
2
i,j. The LHS of constraint (3.17e) is derived by first
substituting the expressions for Pi,j and Qi,j from (3.24) and (3.23).
Under the assumption that the cost is quadratic, this is very nearly a Quadratically
Constrained Quadratic Program (QCQP), which is a common class of optimization problem
that is well studied and may be easier to solve than general smooth non-convex optimiza-
tion problems. Unfortunately, the apparent power flow constraint (3.27e) is fourth order.
However, this constraint can be made quadratic by introducing intermediate variables and
constraints Qi,j = w
†Z(i,j)w and Pi,j = w
†H(i,j)w. In this case the apparent power flow
constraint (3.27e) can be introduced to the formulation in order to make the apparent power
flow constraint quadratic, in which case this constraint appears as P 2i,j + Q
2
i,j ≤ S̄2i,j. As a
result, this problem can indeed be written as a QCQP with the drawback of introducing
additional optimization variables.
This problem is written similarly to the economic dispatch problem (2.6) from Chapter 1.
In this context the feasible set of net real power injections is written as follows:
T={T ∈ Rn : ∃w∈Rn where (3.25), (3.27b), (3.27c), (3.27d), (3.27e), (3.27f), (3.27g)} (3.28)
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It should be noted that this definition of the feasible set of net real power injections is
equivalent to the definition from (3.18) in that a vector T exists in one of these sets if and
only if it exists in the other. The difference between the two definitions lies in the way the
AC OPF problem is formulated. Either form may see benefits as compared to the other.
For example, the rectangular coordinate version of the AC OPF problem yields a very tight
semi-definite programming relaxation that will be discussed in Chapter 6. On the other
hand, the polar coordinate version of the AC OPF problem yields very accurate simplifying
approximations that make the problem easier to solve. These simplifying approximations
will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.5 Numerical Results
This section will study situations where a revenue adequate market equilibrium is not
achieved. In Chapter 6 these test cases will be reinvestigated in the context of convex hull
prices, which aim to minimize the worst case revenue shortfall of the ISO.
3.5.1 Simple 3-bus System
This section studies a simple 3-bus power system similar to that in [66] that can be
visualized by the one-line diagram shown in Figure 3.2. This three bus test case will be
revisited in Chapter 6. The net real power injection at buses 1, 2, and 3 are denoted T1, T2,
and T3. The net reactive power injections at buses 1 and 2 are unconstrained. The voltage
magnitudes at buses 1 and 2 are fixed to V1 = 1p.u. and V1 = 1.21p.u. respectively. Bus 3 is
a null bus whose net real and reactive power injection, denoted T2 and U2, are fixed to zero
and has no voltage magnitude constraint. A real power flow limit of 3.5p.u. is placed on the
line connecting bus 1 and bus 2. The maximum feasible voltage angle difference between
bus 1 and bus 2 is approximately 40 degrees and occurs when the system is operating at the
limit of line 1-2.
Notice that the feasible set of net real power injections T is three dimensional; however,
the system will physically operate on a slice of this set along the plane T3 = 0 because there





z13 = 0.1216 + 0.0512i z23 = 0.0010 + 0.0512i
z12 = 0.1226 + 0.1023i
|v2| = 1.21p.u.|v1| = 1p.u.
G1
D2
T3 = 0 U3 = 0
Figure 3.2: One-line diagram of the 3-bus test case with positive PCRS. Impedance values are
given in p.u.
real power injections does not enforce constraints on the net real power injections at buses.
(Note: these constraints are accommodated by the feasible set of each generator Xi in the
economic dispatch problem (2.6)). This means that FTRs can be allocated to bus 3 even
though its net real power injection is physically restricted to zero.
The consumption at bus 2 is fixed to 1p.u., so the net real power injection at bus two
is T2 = −1p.u. In this case there is only one feasible point that represents the solution to




3 ) ≈ (5.4077,−1, 0) and therefore Gd1 = 5.4077p.u. Notice
this operating point accrues large line losses of approximately 4.5p.u. Bus 1 consists of one
generator whose cost in dollars is represented by the following piece-wise linear cost function:
C1(G1) =
{
0.5G1 if G1 ≤ 2
G1 if G1 > 2
Remark 3.2. We assume that the load is valuable enough to maintain operation of the grid
at such high line losses (as opposed to opening a circuit breaker on the transmission line to
terminate grid operation). □
Let’s now identify the LMPs as described in Section 2.4. These prices were found by
solving the AC OPF problem in MATLAB using an interior point method available in the
function ‘fmincon.’ The feasible voltages at buses 1, 2, and 3 are v1 = 1, v2 = 1.0026−0.6774i,
and v3 = 0.8381 − 0.5356i respectively in units of per unit (p.u.). The solver provided the
Lagrange multipliers for the real power balance constraint (6.5a) that solve the KKT condi-
tions for this point. The LMPs for bus 1, 2 and 3 are λ⋆1 = $1/p.u., λ
⋆
2 = $9.455/p.u., and
λ⋆3 = $9.461/p.u. respectively. The congestion revenue can be easily computed as CR = $4.05.
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The side-payment to the only generator in the 3-bus system (or equivalently the
lost opportunity cost) as defined in Section 2.2.2 is numerically found to be zero. This is
illustrated in Table 3.2. Specifically, the marginal cost of the generator and the LMP seen
by the generator are both equal to $1/p.u.. As a result the generator’s profit will always
be zero and it will not experience any lost opportunity cost. In fact, it can be proven that
side-payments to generators are always zero when using a KKT price-dispatch pair. This is
proven explicitly in Chapter 6 by Theorem 6.1.
Table 3.2: Evaluating lost opportunity cost for the only generator rounding to nearest cent.







1 − C1(Gd1) Υ1(λ⋆1) Coi (λ⋆1, Gd1)
5.41 0 0 0
The PCRS using the identified LMPs as defined in Section 2.2.3 is numerically found
to be $0.26 with an optimal FTR allocation f ⋆ = [5.5929, 6.3464,−7.3892] in units of p.u..
The optimal FTR allocation is computed by solving the FTR payoff maximization problem
(2.4). Typically, in high-dimension, it is not easy to identify the optimal FTR allocation
vector that falls in the non-convex feasible set of net real power injections. However, in
our simple example this can be done by randomly sampling feasible points to initialize a
Newton-Raphson algorithm. The PCRS computation is illustrated in Table 3.3. Specifically,
the congestion revenue is easily found to be $4.05 and the maximum FTR payoff can be
computed as −λ⋆†f ⋆ = 4.31. The PCRS is the difference between the two, amounting to
$0.26.
Table 3.3: Evaluating PCRS for the 3-bus test case rounding to the nearest cent.
Demand Charge ($) Congestion Revenue($) Max. FTR Payoff ($) PCRS ($)
λ⋆2D2 λ
⋆
2D2 − λ⋆1Gd1 Ψ(λ⋆) = −λ⋆†f ⋆ Cs(λ⋆, Gd)
9.46 4.05 4.31 0.26
Since we are using LMPs the lost opportunity cost of generators is zero as expected
from Chapter 2. However, the PCRS is non-zero, illustrating that a revenue adequate market
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equilibrium does not exist for this simple test case. Furthermore, the PCRS is approximately
five percent of the total operating cost and is therefore non-negligible.
3.5.2 Examples on Standard Test Cases
The example in the previous section is contrived to show extreme characteristics. To
see whether similar results might occur in more practical systems, consider the much larger
test cases available from the NESTA archive [17]. The AC OPF problem in polar coordinates
is solved using the PowerModels package in Julia [16] along with the interior point solver
IPOPT [87]. It is important to recognize that the interior point algorithm is only capable of
converging to a local minimum, so the identified dispatch may not be a global minimum of
the AC OPF problem. As stated in Section 2.5, the PCRS must be positive if the dispatch
is not globally optimal for the AC OPF problem.
Table 3.4 provides a comparison of side-payments and PCRS when using LMPs. We
provide results for six systems with 162 buses, 189 buses, 300 buses, 2224 buses, 2383 buses,
and 3012 buses. Computing the PCRS for a given set of prices requires solving the non-
convex max FTR payoff problem (2.4). The provided PCRS values are computed using an
interior point solver in Julia that identifies a local maximum of problem (2.4). Since we are
only guaranteeing a local maximimum of the FTR maximization problem, the PCRS values
provided in the table underestimate the true PCRS value.
As expected, LMPs result in zero side-payments to generators and positive PCRS. The
PCRS may be very large with respect to the total operating cost as in test case 162 ieee dtc
(approximately 32%) or very small as in test case 3012wp mp (approximately 0.07%). Aside
from the test cases studied in this dissertation, many of the test cases in the NESTA archive
result in PCRS values that are greater than 0.1% of total operating cost. On the other hand,
very few test cases in the NESTA archive result in PCRS values that are greater than 1%
of total operating cost.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter derived the AC OPF problem using both rectangular and polar coor-
dinates from first principles. Both versions are non-convex but are significantly different in
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Table 3.4: Results for NESTA Test Cases. All amounts are in dollars per hour. Computational
time is determined using a computer with a 2.7 GHz processor.
LMPs
(for AC OPF) Total
Test Side Operating Computational
Case Payments PCRS Cost Time (sec)
162 ieee dtc ∼ 0 1,352.92 4,230.23 0.66
189 edin ∼ 0 1.22 849.29 0.59
300 ieee ∼ 0 36.87 16,891.27 1.14
2224 edin ∼ 0 520.76 38,127.69 17.23
2383wp mp ∼ 0 13,681.00 1,868,511.77 15.42
3012wp mp ∼ 0 1,815.44 2,600,842.72 33.47
form. Chapters 4 and 5 will show that the polar coordinate formulation is convenient for
deriving simplifying approximations. Chapter 6 will show that the rectangular coordinate
formulation is convenient for deriving a convex relaxation that results in a semi-definite
program.
Numerical results illustrate two problems associated with the AC OPF problem. First
is the difficulty in solving the AC OPF problem. Interior point algorithms seem to work well;
however, they are only guaranteed to converge to local minima. The second problem is the
general lack of a revenue adequate market equilibrium. Specifically, the test cases studied in
this section result in positive PCRS.
Since the PCRS is positive for each test case in this chapter the ISO is not guaranteed
revenue adequacy because congestion revenue may not cover FTR payoffs. Now that we
have identified a problem associated with revenue adequacy for the ISO, we should naturally
consider how to fix this problem. Chapter 6 directly addresses this problem by proposing a
different pricing structure called convex hull pricing that aims to minimize the weighted sum
of PCRS and generator side-payments. Chapter 6 will explain how to approximate convex
hull prices using relaxations and will revisit these examples to illustrate the improvement in
PCRS when using convex hull prices.
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Chapter 4
Non-Linear Approximations of the AC OPF Problem
Standard economic dispatch problems that consider line losses are linear approxima-
tions of a non-convex economic dispatch problem formulated by fixing voltage magnitudes
and assuming the decoupling of real and reactive power, which we term the Transmission
Constrained Economic Dispatch (TCED) problem. This chapter formulates and analyzes
a general form of the TCED problem, incorporating and generalizing the Fictitious Nodal
Demand (FND) model [57], resulting in a slack bus independent formulation that provides
insight into standard formulations by pointing out commonly used but unnecessary assump-
tions and by deriving proper choices of “tuning parameters.” The proper choice of loss
allocation is derived to assign half of the losses of each transmission line to adjacent buses,
justifying approaches in the literature. Line constraints are proposed in the form of voltage
angle difference limits and are proven equivalent to various other line limits including cur-
rent magnitude limits and mid-line power flow limits. The formulated TCED problem with
marginal losses consistently models flows and loss approximations, results in approximately
correct outcomes and is proven to be reference bus independent. Various approximations of
this problem are compared using realistically large transmission network test cases.
This chapter is an extension of the work in [32] and is organized as follows. Section 4.1
provides a model of a transmission line using the assumption that voltage magnitudes are
fixed. We explain how this model is a generalization of other models used in the literature
and outline various common approximations. Section 4.2 uses a general transmission line
model to formulate the non-convex TCED problem that utilizes line constraints in the form
of voltage angle difference limits across each transmission line. The relaxed TCED problem
is then formulated using the load over-satisfaction relaxation. The relaxed TCED problem
is shown to have the same global minimizer as the TCED problem under the condition
that the LMPs are positive and is shown to be convex when using specific approximations.
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Section 4.2 continues to explain how the voltage angle limit parameters can be chosen to
indirectly enforce limits on various physical parameters associated with a transmission line.
Section 4.3 provides empirical results analyzing the error of the various approximations as
well as their relation to the AC OPF problem.
4.1 Transmission Line Model
Figure 4.1 provides a circuit diagram of the general equivalent-Π model of a trans-
mission line (i, j) ∈ P that is operated at a nominal frequency. The transmission line is
indexed by ℓ ∈ L and connects bus i ∈ N to bus j ∈ N. This circuit is similar to that
in Figure 3.1 but differs from it in the treatment of the series element. In particular, to
facilitate discussion of loss models, the series impedance of the line is divided into two parts
and separated by an intermediate node c located at a fractional distance d from from bus j.
The total series impedance is denoted zℓ = rℓ + ixℓ where rℓ is the series resistance and xℓ
is the series reactance. The series impedance separating node c from bus j is in the amount
dzℓ. We assume that the shunt conductances are zero, ie. the real part of y
(c)
ℓ is zero, and
thus no real power flows through the shunt elements. As in Chapter 3, the complex voltage
at bus i is denoted vi = Vi∠(θi) in polar coordinates, where Vi is the voltage magnitude and
θi is the voltage angle. An ideal transformer is located near bus i with complex off-nominal















Figure 4.1: Circuit diagram of an arbitrary line ℓ connecting bus i to bus j.
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4.1.1 Real Power Flow on a Transmission Line
We consider the flow of real power in the series element of the equivalent-Π model
of a transmission line. Assuming fixed voltage magnitudes, the real power flowing through
node c in the series element in the direction of bus j at an arbitrary fractional distance d is




V 2i − (1− d)V 2j )− bℓτℓViVj sin(Θℓ−ψℓ)−
gℓ
τℓ
ViVj(2d− 1) cos(Θℓ−ψℓ), (4.1)
where yℓ = 1/zℓ = gℓ + ibℓ and Θℓ = θi − θj. This model is a generalization of that in [84]
and is derived explicitly in Appendix C.1. Notice that this function requires knowledge of
the fixed voltage magnitudes. Reference [84] suggests different ways of choosing the fixed
voltage magnitudes including using the state estimated values or a local minimizer of the
AC OPF problem.
4.1.2 Loss Function and Approximations
From (4.1), the real power flowing into the line from bus i and from bus j are respec-
tively expressed as F̂ℓ(Θℓ, 1) and −F̂ℓ(Θℓ, 0). The loss function for the line represents the






V 2i )− 2
gℓ
τℓ
ViVj cos(Θℓ − ψℓ). (4.2)
ISOs may desire a simpler quadratic approximation in order to utilize quadratic programming
software. A very accurate approximation uses a third order Taylor expansion of the cosine
function in (4.2) around Θℓ = ψℓ. This approximation results in a quadratic model of losses









ViVj(2− (Θℓ − ψℓ)2). (4.3)
Note that this approximation does not rely on any assumption that the line resistance is small
compared to the reactance. Though very accurate, using this approximation in practice still
requires some knowledge of how to fix the voltage magnitudes and tap ratios. An ISO may
desire a simpler model that fixes voltage magnitudes to 1 p.u. and tap ratios to aℓ = 1.
Fixing these values results in the following approximation:
L̂ℓ(Θℓ) ≈ gℓΘ2ℓ . (4.4)
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Perhaps the most commonly used approximation equates the line losses to the product of
resistance of the line and squared DC power flow across the line. We can arrive at this
approximation from (4.4) by additionally assuming rℓ ≪ xℓ:
L̂ℓ(Θℓ) ≈ rℓ( 1xℓΘℓ)
2. (4.5)
This final approximation of the loss function is by far the simplest and carries the inter-
pretation that losses are equal to the resistance times the squared DC power flow where
the DC power flow is given by 1
xℓ
Θℓ. This interpretation is often used naively without an
understanding of the several approximations used to get to this point.
4.1.3 Fictitious Nodal Demand Representation
An FND representation of our transmission line model can be derived from (4.1) and
(4.2). Notice that we can express the real power flowing into the line from adjacent buses as
follows, for an arbitrary fractional distance d:
F̂ℓ(Θℓ, 1) =F̂ℓ(Θℓ, d) + (1− d)L̂ℓ(Θℓ), (4.6)
−F̂ℓ(Θℓ, 0) =− F̂ℓ(Θℓ, d) + dL̂ℓ(Θℓ). (4.7)
These expressions lead to an FND model depicted in Figure 4.2 that is similar to that shown
in [84]. Specifically, a lossless transfer of real power from bus i to bus j occurs in the
amount F̂ℓ(Θℓ, d). Losses are then represented as fictitious demand at bus i in the amount
(1 − d)L̂ℓ(Θℓ) and at bus j in the amount dL̂ℓ(Θℓ). This FND model is equivalent to (4.1)





Figure 4.2: One-line diagram of the FND representation of the proposed transmission line model.
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4.1.4 Mid-line Power Flows and Approximations
A crucial observation is that d can be chosen to simplify the form of the resulting
model. When d = 1
2
the cosine term in (4.1) drops out, simplifying the expression for the
lossless real power flow F̂ℓ(Θℓ,
1
2
) in the FND model (4.6) and (4.7). This value is termed












V 2i − V 2j )− bℓτℓViVj sin(Θℓ − ψℓ). (4.8)
We will see that with this choice of d, a linear approximation to F̂ℓ is accurate to second
order in Θℓ. This choice of d is also convenient because of the symmetry of losses that occur
around the mid-point of the line. Specifically, the second term on the RHS of (4.6) and (4.7)
are identically 1
2
L̂ℓ(Θℓ). This expression for the mid-line power flow is also in [84].
Unfortunately, the exact expression for the mid-line power flow (4.8) is not convex
in the vicinity of Θℓ ≈ 0. However, a very accurate linear approximation can be attained
through a second order Taylor expansion at Θℓ = ψℓ. This approximation results in a linear















V 2i − V 2j )− bℓτℓViVj(Θℓ − ψℓ). (4.9)
Fixing the voltage magnitudes to 1p.u. and off-nominal tap ratios to aℓ=1 further simplifies








Similar to the derivation of loss approximations in Section 4.1.2, a final approximation often










With respect to the FND representation of our model, this approximation can be interpreted
as the combination of lossless DC power flow and line losses distributed equally to adjacent
buses. In fact, this interpretation is also consistent with with the FND formulation from [57]
and [40], which suggest half losses of each line be allocated to both adjacent buses. Our
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derivation shows that the allocation resulting from the choice d = 1
2
is particularly advan-
tageous in that it results in a simple expression for the flow that is well approximated by a
linear function. This observation does not appear to have been recognized previously in the
literature; however, the authors of [40,57] may have had this advantage in mind in proposing
FND.
4.1.5 Squared Current Magnitude and Approximations
The squared magnitude of the current flowing into the transmission line from bus i and
bus j can be represented as functions of the voltage angle difference Θℓ and will be denoted
Îij(Θℓ) and Îji(Θℓ) respectively. These functions are explicitly derived in Appendix C.2 and





























where χℓ and ϕℓ are defined to be the magnitude and angle of the complex number
zℓ(y
(c)
ℓ + yℓ) respectively, so that zℓ(y
(c)
ℓ + yℓ) = χℓ∠(ϕℓ). Notice that this complex number
is approximately 1 because the shunt admittance is typically much smaller than the series
admittance. As a result χℓ ≈ 1 and ϕℓ ≈ 0. In the following, we consider Îij(Θℓ). The
function Îji(Θℓ) can be handled similarly.
Similar approximations to those in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.4 can be used for the squared
current magnitude function. The first approximation uses a third order Taylor expansion
of the cosine function in (4.12) around Θℓ = −ϕℓ + ψℓ. This approximation results in a
quadratic function, with quartic error on the order of
2χℓ|yℓ|2ViVj
24τ3
















In the case where shunt admittance y
(c)
ℓ is negligible we have χℓ = 1 and ϕℓ = 0. Additionally
fixing the voltage magnitudes to 1p.u. and the off-nominal tap ratio to a= 1 simplifies the
previous approximation as follows:
Îij(Θℓ) ≈ |yℓ|2Θ2ℓ . (4.15)
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In the case where rℓ ≪ xℓ we have yℓ ≈ ibℓ. The approximation (4.15) then simplifies
to the following:
Îij(Θℓ) ≈ ( 1xℓΘℓ)
2. (4.16)
This final approximation of the squared current magnitude is the simplest and carries
the interpretation that the per unit current magnitude is equal to the per unit magnitude of
the DC power flow.
4.1.6 General Transmission Line Model
We have now introduced multiple approximations of the loss function L̂ℓ(·), the mid-
line power flow function F̂ℓ(·, 12), and the squared current magnitude function Îij(·). We now
introduce definitions of more general functions that encompass all outlined approximations.
We begin with the general loss function Ľℓ(·) that encompasses exact expressions for losses
and any realistic loss function approximation, including any one of the forms on the RHSs
of (4.2)-(4.5). Consistent with properties of losses, the general loss function is required to
be convex in the vicinity of the origin as well as symmetric about the point ψℓ. Resistances
are realistically assumed to be positive, resulting in strict convexity. Note that a function
with a check mark ˇ represents an approximation to its exact counterpart denoted with a
hat symbol ˆ.
Definition 4.1. A general loss function of angles, denoted Ľℓ : R → R, is a function with




ously differentiable, non-negative, symmetric about the point ψℓ and strictly monotonically




Similarly, the general mid-line power flow function F̌ℓ(·) encompasses all functional
forms on the RHSs of (4.8)-(4.11). This general function highlights the monotonic property
of the mid-line power flow function for angle differences near the origin. Although the mid-
line power flow function is typically monotonically increasing this definition is left general
to accommodate potentially positive susceptance values (or equivalently negative reactance
values), in which case the function would be monotonically decreasing.
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Definition 4.2. A general mid-line power flow function of angles, denoted F̌ℓ : R → R, is
strictly monotonic on the subdomain Dℓ and is continuously differentiable.
The general squared current magnitude function Ǐij(·) encompasses all functional
forms outlined by (4.12)-(4.16). This general function highlights the convexity of the squared
current magnitude function near the origin as well as its symmetry about the point −ϕℓ+ψℓ.
Definition 4.3. A general squared current magnitude function of angles, denoted Ǐij : R → R,
is a function with the following properties: convex on the subdomain
D̃ℓ := [−π2 − ϕℓ + ψℓ,
π
2
− ϕℓ + ψℓ], strictly monotonically increasing on the subdomain
D̃ℓ+ := [−ϕℓ + ψℓ, π2 − ϕℓ + ψℓ], symmetric about the point −ϕℓ + ψℓ, and continuously dif-
ferentiable.
The remainder of this chapter provides results using these more general functions and
is therefore pertinent to typical dispatch formulations that utilize the simplest functional
forms outlined by (4.5), (4.11), and (4.16) and also pertinent to the exact functional forms
outlined by (4.2), (4.8), and (4.12).
4.2 Transmission Constrained Economic Dispatch
This section formulates a non-convex economic dispatch problem using the general
transmission line model from the previous section that we refer to as the Transmission
Constrained Economic Dispatch (TCED) problem. This problem formulation enforces line
limits using simple bounds on the voltage angle difference across each transmission line.
We then explain that this TCED problem can be represented as a convex relaxed TCED
problem under the condition that prices are positive and an affine approximation of the
mid-line power flow function is used. Finally, we explain how the voltage angle difference
bounds can be chosen to enforce limits on a variety of line related quantities.
4.2.1 Real Power Injections and Loss Distribution Factor Approximation
The net real power injections at each bus can be expressed by summing the associated
injections into each transmission line incident to it. To express the net real power injections
as a function of voltage angles we will utilize the FND model (4.6) and (4.7) evaluated at the
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midpoint of each line d = 1
2
along with arbitrary approximations for the loss function and
mid-line power flows outlined in Section 4.1. For convenience, we introduce a vector valued
function L : Rm → Rm that maps voltage angle differences to line losses. The ℓth element
of this vector valued loss function is defined as Lℓ(Θ) := Ľℓ(Θℓ) where Θ ∈ Rm is a vector
of voltage angle differences, consistent with the established notation. Similarly, the vector
valued function F : Rm → Rm maps voltage angle differences to mid-line power flows. The
ℓth element of this vector valued function is defined as Fℓ(Θ) := F̌ℓ(Θℓ).
The net real power injections at each bus in the system can be represented as a vector
valued function of voltage angle differences, denoted T : Rm → Rn:
T (Θ) := 1
2
|A|† L(Θ) + A†F (Θ), (4.17)
where the branch-bus incidence matrix of the graph G is denoted A ∈ Rm×n. Specifically, A
is sparse and the row representing line ℓ connecting bus i to bus j has element i equal to
1 and j equal to −1. The element-wise absolute value of the branch-bus incidence matrix
is denoted |A|, also known as the unoriented incidence matrix of graph G. Intuitively, the
function T (·) can be interpreted at each bus as being the sum of net real injections into
incident lines due to lossless real power transfers together with half of the losses of each
incident line.
Since the voltage angles θ ∈ Rn only enter each equation through the differences Θℓ,
one degree of freedom can be removed by assigning an arbitrary angle reference bus ρ ∈ N
and setting θρ = 0. The vector of voltage angle differences can now be written as Θ = Ȧθ̇
where θ̇ ∈ Rn−1 is the vector of voltage angles with element ρ removed and the matrix
Ȧ ∈ Rm×(n−1) is the incidence matrix A with column ρ removed.
Reference [58] introduced loss distribution factors to distribute losses throughout the
transmission system. Loss distribution factors can be thought of as an approximation to the
function of net real power injections T (Θ). A vector of distribution factors denoted η ∈ Rn+
sum to one and represent the fraction of total system losses allocated to each bus. The
associated approximation to the function representing net real power injections is written as
follows:
T (Θ) ≈ η1†L(Θ) + A†F (Θ). (4.18)
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At a particular operating point, it is possible to choose η so that the left and RHS
of (4.18) match exactly. However, it is not generally possible to choose η to make this true
generally and not possible to make partial derivatives of the LHS and RHS of (4.18) match
exactly (See Section 5.2.5). In particular, notice that the rank of η1† is one and the rank of
the unoriented incidence matrix |A| is at least n−1 under the assumption that the system
graph is fully connected [86]. That is, we cannot choose η to satisfy η1† = 1
2
|A|†. Thus the
approximation on the RHS of (4.18) is never an exact representation of the function T (Θ).
Instead, the proper choice of loss distribution factors will change with state θ̇. The proper
choice of loss distribution factors is further addressed in Section 5.2.5.
4.2.2 Transmission Constrained Economic Dispatch Problem
The TCED problem optimizes over the nodal generation represented by vector G∈Rn
and the voltage angle vector θ̇ ∈ Rn−1. The cost of generation is represented by the function
C(G) := Σ
i∈N
Ci(Gi) where C : Rn → R is assumed convex. The nodal demand is considered





st : T (Ȧθ̇) = G−D (4.19a)
¯
G ≤ G ≤ Ḡ (4.19b)
Θ ≤ Ȧθ̇ ≤ Θ (4.19c)
Constraint (4.19a) is a vector equality constraint that represents real power balance
at each node. Constraints (4.19b) enforce generator output limits and constraints (4.19c)
represent limits on voltage angle differences across each transmission line. Section 4.2.4
will explain how to choose the voltage angle difference limits to indirectly enforce limits on
various line related quantities including current magnitude and mid-line power flow.
Remark 4.1. Throughout this chapter we will assume that any vector of voltage angle dif-
ferences Θ satisfying (4.19c) also satisfies the constraint Θℓ ∈ Dℓ ∩ D̃ℓ for each line ℓ, where
Dℓ and D̃ℓ are from Definitions 4.1 and 4.3. This assumption effectively enforces limits on
the voltage angle differences Θ that should hold for any practical power system.
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Note that there is no explicit slack bus in this formulation, since real power balance
is represented at each bus, so the formulation is independent of choice of slack bus. There is
an explicit reference bus and Theorem 4.1 below shows that the formulation is independent
of choice of reference bus.
Theorem 4.1. Consider two instances of the TCED problem (4.19) defined using different
reference buses. The reduced voltage angle vectors associated with the first and second in-
stances of the problem are defined to be θ̇∈Rn−1 and θ̈∈Rn−1 respectively. Let (G⋆, θ̇⋆) be a
solution to the first instance of the problem. There exists some θ̈⋆∈Rn−1 such that (G⋆, θ̈⋆)
is a solution to the second instance of the problem.
Proof: Let Ȧ and Ä be the reduced brach-bus incidence matrices for the first and
second instances of the problem respectively. The matrices Ȧ and A have the same range
space because any given row of A can be written as a linear combination of the other rows in
A (ie. A1 = 0). Similarly Ä and A have the same range space. Thus Ȧ and Ä have the same
range space. As a result, there must exist some θ̈⋆ such that Äθ̈⋆ = Ȧθ̇⋆. It follows that there
exists a θ̈⋆ such that (G⋆, θ̈⋆) is feasible for the second instance of the problem. Notice that
this implies the second instance of the problem has an optimal value no greater than the
optimal value of the first instance. Furthermore, there does not exist a feasible point of the
second instance of the problem that achieves a lower optimal value than the first instance,
else a similar argument shows that a feasible point can be constructed for the first instance
that has a lower cost than (G⋆, θ̇⋆). Thus both instances have the same optimal value and
there exists a θ̈⋆ such that (G⋆, θ̈⋆) is optimal for the second instance of the problem.
The Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), denoted λ⋆ ∈ Rn, represent the sensitivity
of the optimal value of the TCED problem (4.19) with respect to the demand vector D,
assuming such sensitivities exist. In fact, the LMPs are independent of the choice of reference
bus because the optimal value of the TCED problem (4.19) is independent of the choice of
reference bus for any D ∈ Rn as stated in Theorem 4.1. Of course this simple analysis
assumes that LMPs are well defined. Section 5.1.4 explicitly defines LMPs and decomposes
the LMP into energy, loss and congestion components.
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Remark 4.2. A clear relationship must be established between the TCED problem and the
gold standard AC OPF problem, as specified in Chapter 3. Under the assumption that
shunt conductances are negligible, the exact TCED problem defined by (4.2), (4.8), and
(4.12) can be derived from the AC OPF problem by fixing the voltage magnitudes and
removing all constraints that involve reactive power quantities, including reactive power
balance constraints at buses. Thus, if the voltage magnitudes are fixed to values that match
the solution of the AC OPF problem, then the TCED problem formulated here will act as a
relaxation of the AC OPF problem, obtaining a lower optimal objective value. Of course, in
practice the solution to the AC OPF problem will not be available when fixing the voltage
magnitudes, so these quantities must be approximated.
4.2.3 Load Over-Satisfaction Relaxation
A relaxed version of the TCED problem that uses the load over-satisfaction relaxation
can be obtained from problem (4.19) by replacing the real power balance equality constraints
(4.19a) with inequality constraints that permit the delivery of excess generation [75]. With




st : T (Ȧθ̇) ≤ G−D (4.20a)
¯
G ≤ G ≤ Ḡ (4.20b)
Θ ≤ Ȧθ̇ ≤ Θ (4.20c)
If this relaxed TCED problem results in positive LMPs, then its solution also solves the
TCED problem (4.19). To understand this intuitively, first assume that the optimal solution
of this problem solves the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and then recognize that
the LMPs of the relaxed TCED problem are represented by the optimal Lagrange multipliers
of constraint (4.20a). If these Lagrange multipliers are positive, then constraint (4.20a) must
be binding at optimality by the complementary slackness condition [5]. As a result, the
optimal solution of the relaxed TCED problem (4.20) is feasible and thus optimal for the
TCED problem (4.19).
The relaxed TCED problem (4.20) is convex under the condition that an affine ap-
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proximation of the mid-line power flow function F (·) is used as is the case for approximations
(4.9), (4.10), and (4.11). To see this, first notice that the objective function is convex by
assumption and constraints (4.20b) and (4.20c) are convex because they are linear. Finally,
the function T (·) is convex as defined in (4.17) because the mid-line power flow function is
affine and the vector valued loss function L(·) is convex on the domain of the TCED prob-
lem (4.20) as follows from Definition 4.1 and Remark 4.1. Constraint (4.20a) is additionally
convex because the function T (·) is convex and appears on the LHS of the inequality.
The relaxed TCED problem (4.20) is written similarly to the general economic dis-
patch problem (2.6) from Chapter 1. In this context the feasible set of net real power injec-
tions is written as follows:
T={T (Ȧθ̇) : ∃θ̇∈Rn−1 where (4.20a), (4.20b), (4.20c)} (4.21)
It should be emphasized that this definition of the feasible set of net real power injections
is convex when using approximations (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11) of the mid-line power flow
function F (·) and thus LMPs achieve a revenue adequate market equilibrium as follows from
Theorem 2.1. Similar results regarding revenue adequacy using the load over-satisfaction
relaxation appear in previous work [77].
4.2.4 Characterizing Line Limits
The TCED problem (4.19) should enforce line limits that represent the physical abili-
ties of the transmission line. For this reason it is appropriate to limit a real power quantity or
current quantity using approximations outlined in the previous section. Unfortunately, such
constraints are non-linear and may even be non-convex. This subsection explains how to
enforce such limits by reformulating them to be in the standard form of constraints (4.19c),
which place bounds on the voltage angle difference across each transmission line.
We will consider three types of line limits. Namely, limits on the real power flow
enforced at the mid-point of the transmission line, limits on the squared current magnitude
flowing into either side of the transmission line, and limits on the real-power loss across
the transmission line. Remark 4.3 additionally explains that the apparent power flowing
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into either side of a transmission line can be enforced using limits on the squared current
magnitude flowing into either side of the transmission line. By reformulating these line limits
to the same form as constraints (4.19c) this section implies that the TCED problem (4.19)
encompasses all such limits without loss of generality.
4.2.4.1 Mid-Line Power Flow Limits
First consider real power flow limits enforced at the mid-point of the transmission
line. Interpreted as lossless real power flow limits in the FND model from Section 4.1.3,
these constraints are written as follows.
−F̄ℓ ≤ F̌ℓ(Θℓ) ≤ F̄ℓ (4.22)
We assume F̄ℓ is in the image of F̌ℓ(·) on the subdomain Dℓ, denoted F̌ℓ[Dℓ]. As a result,
limits on the mid-line power flow are easy to enforce because the function F̌ℓ(·) is strictly
monotonic on the specified subdomain. Define the function F̌−1ℓ : F̌ℓ[Dℓ] → Dℓ as the inverse
of F̌ℓ(·) on the specified subdomain. This inverse function is strictly monotonic on F̌ℓ[Dℓ],
allowing constraints (4.22) to be written as follows. Notice that these constraints are in the
same form as (4.19c).
F̌−1ℓ (−F̄ℓ) ≤ Θℓ ≤ F̌
−1
ℓ (F̄ℓ) (4.23)
4.2.4.2 Real Power Loss Limits
Line limits are typically chosen to prevent transmission lines from overheating. The
production of heat is a direct result of the real-power loss across the line. For this reason
it may be appropriate to limit the real-power loss across the transmission line. Such a
constraint would be of the following form for a given line indexed by ℓ.
Ľℓ(Θℓ) ≤ L̄ℓ (4.24)
where L̄ℓ is the constant real-power loss limit and is assumed to lie in the image of Ľℓ(·) on
the subdomain Dℓ, denoted Ľℓ[Dℓ]. In fact, this constraint is convex because the function
Ľℓ(∆θℓ) is convex on the subdomain Dℓ and can be directly implemented into an economic
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dispatch problem. However, this limit can also be enforced using simple bounds on the
voltage angle difference across the line, as in constraints (4.19c).
Recall that Ľℓ(·) is symmetric about the point ψℓ and so constraint (4.24) can be writ-
ten as Ľℓ(|Θℓ−ψℓ|+ψℓ) ≤ L̄ℓ. From definition 4.1, Ľℓ(·) is strictly monotonically increasing
on the subdomain Dℓ+ and so it is invertible on this subdomain. Define Ľ
−1
ℓ : Ľℓ[Dℓ+] → Dℓ+
to be the inverse of the function Ľℓ(·) restricted to the subdomain Dℓ+. This inverse function
is also strictly monotonically increasing on Ľℓ[Dℓ+], allowing constraints (4.24) to be written
as follows. Notice that this constraint can be easily placed in the same form as (4.19c).
|Θℓ − ψℓ|+ ψℓ ≤ Ľ−1ℓ (L̄ℓ) (4.25)
4.2.4.3 Current Magnitude Limits
It may be more appropriate to limit the magnitude of the current flowing into the
transmission line. A limit on the squared magnitude of the current flowing into the line is
represented by the following constraint.
Ǐij(Θℓ) ≤ Ī2ℓ (4.26)
where Īℓ is the constant current magnitude limit and Ī
2
ℓ is assumed to lie in the image of Ǐij(·)
on the subset D̃ℓ, denoted Ǐij[D̃ℓ]. Notice that Ǐij(·) is symmetric about the point −ϕℓ + ψℓ
and is strictly monotonically increasing on the domain D̃ℓ+ and so it is invertible on this
subdomain. Define Ǐ−1ij : Ǐij[D̃ℓ+] → D̃ℓ+ to be the inverse of the function Ǐij(·) restricted
to the subdomain D̃ℓ+. This inverse function is also strictly monotonically increasing on
Ǐij[D̃ℓ+], allowing constraint (4.26) to be rewritten as constraint (4.27).
|Θℓ + ϕℓ − ψℓ| − ϕℓ + ψℓ ≤ Ǐ−1ij (Ī2ℓ) (4.27)
This constraint can be easily placed in the same form as (4.19c).
−Ǐ−1ij (Ī2ℓ) + 2ψℓ − 2ϕℓ ≤ Θℓ ≤ Ǐ−1ij (Ī2ℓ) (4.28)
65
Remark 4.3. Since voltage magnitudes are assumed fixed, the magnitude of current flowing
into either side of a transmission line is proportional to the magnitude of the apparent power
flowing into that side of the transmission line. Thus limits on the magnitude of apparent
power flow (MVA limits) can be enforced using squared current magnitude limits (4.26) and
(4.27).
4.3 Numerical Results
This section provides an empirical analysis of three realistically large test cases pro-
vided by version 6.0 of the MATPOWER toolbox in MATLAB [98]. The 3375wp test case
is a 3,375 bus representation of the Polish power system during the winter 2007-2008 winter
evening peak with a total fixed demand of 48, 362 MW. The 2869pegase test case is a 2,869
bus representation of the European high voltage transmission network with a total fixed
demand of 132, 437 MW. The 6515rte test case is a 6,515 bus representation of the French
transmission network with a total fixed demand of 107, 264 MW. The two larger test cases
are fully described in [47]. For each test case the MVA rating of each transmission line is
interpreted as a current magnitude limit and line limits are enforced as in Section 4.2.4.3.
We consider six different optimization problems for each test case: the AC OPF prob-
lem, the exact TCED problem and four approximations to the exact TCED problem. Each
optimization problem is solved by the interior-point algorithm provided by the MATLAB
function FMINCON with user supplied analytical gradients/Hessians using a standard lap-
top with a 2.7 GHz processor. Due to the non-convexity of each problem, global optimality
cannot be guaranteed in general and the interior point algorithm may converge to a local
minimizer. That being said, we are able to verify that a global minimizer was identified for
each of the four approximations for test cases 6515rte and 2869pegase by use of the load
over-satisfaction relaxation.
The AC OPF problem fully captures the coupling of real and reactive power and
optimizes over voltage magnitudes. At the optimal dispatch of the AC OPF problem, the
operating cost of test cases 6515rte, 2869pegase, and 3375wp are $109, 767, $133, 993, and
$7, 404, 635 respectively. The exact TCED problem (4.19) is defined by the exact expressions
of each function provided earlier in this chapter (4.2), (4.8), (4.12) and (4.17) and is formu-
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lated by fixing voltage magnitudes to the identified local minimizer of the AC OPF problem.
As described in Remark 4.2, this problem should act as an approximation to the AC OPF
problem but should obtain a lower optimal objective value. The identified local minimizer
of the AC OPF problem is used to initialize the interior point algorithm for the exact TCED
problem. The dispatch approximation error ∆G ∈ Rn represents the difference between the
identified optimal dispatch of the TCED problem of interest and that of the exact TCED
problem. Similarly the objective approximation error ∆C represents the difference between
C(G) evaluated at the identified optimal dispatch of the TCED problem of interest and that
of the exact TCED. Finally, ∆λ represents the difference between the identified price vector
associated with the problem of interest and that of the TCED problem.
As explained in Section 4.2.3, the TCED problem and the relaxed TCED problem
have the same global minimizer if the LMPs are positive. Furthermore, the relaxed TCED
problem is convex when using any of the approximations to the mid-line power flow function
in Section 4.1.4. This allows us to verify that the interior point methods identified global
Table 4.1: This table compares the solution of multiple different TCED problems to that of the
exact TCED problem using three realistically large test cases. The error quantities are denoted
with ∆ and represent the difference between identified optimal quantities of the problem of interest
and those of the exact TCED problem. The reported time is an average over 10 runs. The total
dispatched generation for each problem is denoted 1†G.





Case Num. F̌ℓ / Ľℓ / Ǐij / T ($) (MW) (MW) (MW) ($/MW) ($/MW) (rad) (sec)
Exact (4.2)/(4.8)/(4.12)/(4.17) 0 109764 0 0 1.08 0.87 / 2.52 0 0.3822 10
1 (4.3)/(4.9)/(4.14)/(4.17) 2.36 109762 159.29 31.06 1.08 0.87 / 2.53 0.0891 0.3730 8
6515 2 (4.4)/(4.10)/(4.15)/(4.17) -184.57 1099498622.52 658.90 1.07 0.97 / 1.43 0.4306 0.4255 8
rte 3 (4.5)/(4.11)/(4.16)/(4.17) -72.21 1098378793.72 664.70 1.07 0.97 / 1.41 0.4394 0.4254 24
4 (4.5)/(4.11)/(4.16)/(4.18) 47.92 1097178012.29 679.46 1.07 0.96 / 1.55 0.3829 0.4255 27
AC OPF -3.38 109768 908.16 103.87 1.08 0.56 / 2.48 0.5257 0.3822 152
Exact (4.2)/(4.8)/(4.12)/(4.17) 0 133982 0 0 1.02 0.99 / 1.12 0 0.2429 4
1 (4.3)/(4.9)/(4.14)/(4.17) 2.14 133980 58.06 5.21 1.02 0.99 / 1.12 0.0011 0.2422 3
2869 2 (4.4)/(4.10)/(4.15)/(4.17) -167.57 1341502124.47 190.99 1.02 0.98 / 1.14 0.0330 0.2780 3
pegase 3 (4.5)/(4.11)/(4.16)/(4.17) -134.32 1341171971.91 188.48 1.02 0.98 / 1.13 0.0177 0.2743 7
4 (4.5)/(4.11)/(4.16)/(4.18) -94.62 1340773739.75 972.89 1.02 0.98 / 1.12 0.0132 0.2710 10
AC OPF -11.29 133993 581.57 22.25 1.02 0.99 / 1.11 0.0222 0.2438 6
Exact (4.2)/(4.8)/(4.12)/(4.17) 0 49190 0 0 146.70 0.00 / 454.89 0 0.2639 8
1 (4.3)/(4.9)/(4.14)/(4.17) 344.10 49188 32.79 16.58 146.66 0.00 / 454.58 0.9604 0.2624 5
3375 2 (4.4)/(4.10)/(4.15)/(4.17) -33629.36 49266 2267.75 309.97 151.26 0.00 / 971.06 5.7514 0.2625 6
wp 3 (4.5)/(4.11)/(4.16)/(4.17) -13737.40 49228 1011.08 245.73 149.27 0.00 / 460.28 1.6180 0.2726 6
4 (4.5)/(4.11)/(4.16)/(4.18) -7382.55 49184 911.03 244.28 148.55 0.00 / 459.67 539.2388 0.2612 7
AC OPF -8.43 49188 118.84 54.03 147.42 0.00 / 469.40 0.9943 0.2629 180
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optima for test cases 6515rte and 2865pegase when using each of the four approximations
to the exact TCED problem. However, we emphasize that this approach cannot always be
taken in the case where there exists an LMP that is non-positive as in test case 3375wp.
See [77] for a description of the problems that may arise when LMPs are non-positive. In
fact, the identified optimal dispatch for test case 3375wp using the relaxed TCED problem
results in a generation dispatch that does not satisfy real power balance with equality as in
(4.19a). We found no large test cases with any strictly negative LMPs.
The remainder of this section analyzes Table 4.1, which provides detailed information
about the six aforementioned optimization problems solved for each test case. The identified
local minimizers of the AC OPF problem and the approximations 1-4 are directly compared
to that of the exact TCED problem. Approximation 1 uses Taylor expansions to obtain a very
accurate quadratically constrained program. Approximation 2 additionally assumes voltage
magnitudes are nominal, tap ratios are nominal and shunt susceptances are much smaller
than series susceptances. Approximation 3 additionally assumes that series resistances are
much smaller than series reactances. Approximation 4 additionally uses the load distribution
factor approximation with the LDFs chosen to allocate all losses to the slack bus, which is
designated by each individual test case description. The third column of the table explicitly
states the equations used in each approximation.
Remark 4.4. From Table 4.1, the voltage angle difference across each line falls well within the
limits from Remark 4.1, which approximately constrains |Θℓ| to be lower than π2 ≈1.5707.
4.3.1 TCED Problem vs. AC OPF
We begin by comparing the TCED problem (4.19) to the AC OPF problem provided
by MATPOWER. Each test case follows the trend outlined in Remark 4.2. Specifically, the
exact TCED problem acts as a relaxation to the AC OPF problem as it attains a lower
optimal value. However, the optimal values of both problems are close to each other relative
to the total system cost.
It is perhaps more important to analyze the difference in the generation dispatch
between the exact TCED problem and the AC OPF problem. The 1-norm of the nodal
dispatch approximation error, denoted ∥∆G∥1, is relatively small, realizing values of no more
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than 1% of total system demand. In contrast, the infinity norm of the nodal dispatch error is
potentially significant because it represents a MW value that is seen entirely by a single bus.
In fact, marginal generators see the largest change in dispatch. The sum of all dispatched
generation is denoted 1†G and is similar across all approximations.
A similar conclusion can be drawn for the LMPs identified by both problems. In
general LMPs are very similar for both problems, illustrated by nearly identical mean LMPs.
However, the LMP at an individual bus may be significantly different between the problems




this value is very small for test case 2869pegase, at least one bus in test case 3375wp has an
LMP change of over 99% in magnitude.
4.3.2 Approximations of the Exact TCED Problem
Table 4.1 quantifies how well the solution of each TCED formulation approximates the
solution of the exact formulation. Approximation 1 is the most accurate in terms of nodal
dispatch and LMP approximation error. This is expected because only accurate Taylor
expansion approximations are used.
Approximation 2 experiences a drastic increase in approximation error because it
introduces multiple assumptions including nominal tap ratios, negligible shunt susceptances
and nominal voltage magnitudes.
Approximation 3 additionally assumes rℓ ≪ xℓ and the resulting approximate loss
function tends to underestimate real power losses as compared to approximation 2. This can
be seen by noticing that the total dispatched generation is lower for approximation 3.
Approximation 4 is equivalent to approximation 3 but with all losses allocated to
the slack bus. Notice that the nodal dispatch error has a large infinity norm, ∥∆G∥∞,
because the load profile changes significantly. For this reason approximation 4 can be very
inaccurate. For example the 1-norm of the nodal dispatch error is nearly doubled in test case
2869pegase. This underlines the concern about loss formulations having potentially adverse
affect on particular generators due to the location of the slack bus.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter derives a generalized non-convex TCED problem with marginal losses
that consistently models flow and loss approximation, results in approximately correct out-
comes and is proven to be reference bus independent. A hierarchy of approximations for
this problem are outlined and common unnecessary assumptions are identified along with
proper choices of “tuning parameters.” For example, nodal loss allocation is derived from
first principles to assign half losses of each line to its adjacent buses. Additionally, line limit
constraints are derived in the form of current magnitude limits and mid-line power flow limits
and are enforced as simple bounds on the voltage angle difference on each transmission line.
Empirical results are provided that illustrate the general trend of increasing approximation
error as more approximations are used. Furthermore, the identified local minimizer of the
exact TCED problem is shown to very closely match the certified global minimizer of an
approximate TCED problem solved via the load over-satisfaction relaxation. Certain ap-
proximations increase the error in price and dispatch outcomes; however, the approximation
that allocates losses to the slack bus is very inaccurate and results in significant dispatch
and LMP errors.
Each of the formulations in this chapter have been nonlinear and have been solved
using a general interior-point method intended for nonlinear problems. The numerical results
illustrated that these problems can be solved quickly (less than 30 seconds) even at large
scale. In the next chapter, we consider linearized approximations that can be solved by
large-scale linear programming software, which converges an order of magnitude faster than
the solvers used for the nonlinear problems. Although easier to solve, these linear programs




Linearly Constrained Economic Dispatch Problems
The underlying TCED problem derived in Chapter 4 is non-convex. Although the
TCED problem can be represented as a convex problem when LMPs are positive using the
load over-satisfaction relaxation, this technique cannot be used if LMPs are generally non-
positive. For this and other reasons the non-convex TCED problem is typically approximated
by the convex problem obtained by linearizing the constraints around some base-case state.
Electricity prices and dispatch decisions are then chosen based on the resulting linearly-
constrained economic dispatch (LCED) problem. Different LCED problems have been sug-
gested in the literature and they are all derived using one of two linearization techniques,
which we call direct and indirect linearization, respectively. Various formulations in the lit-
erature use Loss Distribution Factors (LDFs), as introduced in Section 1.1.2 and discussed
in Section 4.2.1. An LCED problem often used in practice that uses LDFs as reported in [22]
and [58] is derived using indirect linearization and is termed the common LCED problem.
This chapter studies the assumptions required to recover the optimal dispatch of the non-
convex TCED problem from the solution of the common LCED problem. We show that the
common LCED problem may have multiple minimizers, in which case small perturbations of
the base-case state may result in large dispatch approximation error. Furthermore, even if
the base-case state matches a minimizer of the non-convex TCED problem, it is proven that
there does not always exist a choice of LDFs such that the optimal dispatch of the TCED
problem is also optimal for the common LCED problem. On the other hand, such LDFs do
exist and are identified for the special case where no line limits are binding.
This chapter is based on the following publication to which the coauthors contributed equally: Manuel
Garcia and Ross Baldick. “Approximating economic dispatch by linearizing transmission losses.” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, (Accepted 2019).
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Despite the prevalence of the common LCED problem, no previous work has es-
tablished a set of assumptions required to recover the optimal dispatch of the non-convex
TCED problem from the common LCED problem. To establish such assumptions this
chapter derives the common LCED problem from the non-convex TCED problem in Chap-
ter 4 restricted to linear approximations of the mid-line power flow function, which we
label as the TCED problem with angles or Optimization A (Opt. A). To illustrate the as-
sumptions used to attain the common LCED problem, four intermediate problems, namely,
Opt. B, C, D, and E, are also derived that are not individually novel but constitute a conve-
nient route for the derivation. Figure 5.1 outlines the sequence of problems derived to attain
the common LCED problem or Opt. F. This derivation ultimately proves that a specific
dispatch that is optimal for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) is also optimal for
the common LCED problem (Opt. F) under two key assumptions. This specific dispatch
can be efficiently recovered from the common LCED problem (Opt. F) under the additional










































Figure 5.1: Diagram outlining the derivation structure of Chapter 5. Vertical connections with
arrows pointing in both directions indicate equivalence of the two connected problems, meaning
any dispatch that is optimal for one is also optimal for the other. Horizontal connections pointing
in only one direction indicate that both problems share an optimal dispatch, namely the base-case
dispatch, under the appropriate assumptions.
The derivation begins in Section 5.1 by eliminating voltage angles from the TCED
problem with angles (Opt. A) yielding an ED problem that optimizes over generation dis-
patch and nodal loss allocation variables. This problem is termed the TCED problem without
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angles (Opt. B) and is shown to be equivalent to the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A),
where two problems are said to be equivalent if any dispatch that is optimal for one is also
optimal for the other.
The fundamental linearization theory in [40] uses a first order Taylor expansion of
the constraints with respect to all optimization variables about the base-case state and
its associated base-case dispatch. We call this direct linearization. Section 5.2.2 derives
the direct LCED problem (Opt. C) by applying direct linearization to the TCED problem
without angles (Opt. B). The first key assumption, termed Assumption 5.1, requires the
base-case dispatch to satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and represent an
optimal dispatch of the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B). A result from [40] can then
be applied to show that the same base-case dispatch is optimal for the direct LCED problem
(Opt. C). A related practical question is how close does the base-case state need to be to
a minimizer of the underlying non-convex problem for the approximate LCED problem to
result in a good dispatch approximation (See Remark 5.5).
Another approach is to linearize with respect to only the net real power injections
using total derivatives of implicit functions. We call this indirect linearization. In fact, the
common LCED problem (Opt. F) is derived using indirect linearization as in [21] and [58].
Section 5.2.3 derives the intermediate indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) by applying indi-
rect linearization to the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B). Section 5.2.3 establishes
equivalence of the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) and the direct LCED problem (Opt. C),
showing any dispatch that is optimal for one of these problems is also optimal for the other.
Section 5.2.4 then explains how to compute the LMPs from Lagrange multipliers of the indi-
rect LCED problem (Opt. D), which differ from those of the direct LCED problem (Opt. C).
We additionally emphasize that the indirect linearization technique requires loss sensitivities
to be computed as the solution of equations with a large Jacobian matrix during each market
interval, e.g. every 5-15 minutes for the real-time market, which may be computationally
burdensome.
Section 5.2.5 introduces LDFs to the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) to obtain the
LDF LCED problem (Opt. E). Section 5.2.5 additionally explains that under Assumption 5.1
73
there do not generally exist LDFs that allow the base-case dispatch to solve the LDF LCED
problem. However, under the assumption that no line limits are binding such LDFs do exist
and are identified in Section 5.2.5. The second key assumption, termed Assumption 5.2,
effectively asserts that no line limits are binding.
Finally, Section 5.2.6 formulates the common LCED problem (Opt. F) by eliminating
the loss allocation variables and introducing a single loss variable in their place. The LDF
LCED problem (Opt. E) is shown to be equivalent to the common LCED problem (Opt. F).
Furthermore, the derivation outlined in Figure 5.1 shows that the base-case dispatch is opti-
mal for the common LCED problem under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. However, Section 5.2.7
emphasizes that the common LCED problem (Opt. F) may have multiple optimal dispatches,
some of which may not be feasible for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A). As a re-
sult, it may be difficult to recover an optimal dispatch of the TCED problem with angles
(Opt. A) by solving the common LCED problem (Opt. F) using standard off-the-shelf op-
timization software. The third and final key assumption, termed Assumption 5.3, requires
the common LCED problem (Opt. F) to have a unique optimal dispatch. Under Assump-
tions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 the base-case dispatch, which is optimal for the TCED problem with
angles (Opt. A), is the unique optimal dispatch of the common LCED problem (Opt. F),
and can be easily recovered.
Section 5.3 provides numerical results intended to illustrate two key findings that
point out significant dispatch approximation errors may occur when certain assumptions are
violated. The first key finding states that very small perturbations to the ideal base-case state
can result in significantly large dispatch approximation error if the common LCED problem
(Opt. F) has multiple minimizers. This is illustrated in Section 5.3.1 using an intuitive
2-bus example as well as a larger more realistic test case. The second key finding states
that significant dispatch approximation error may occur when Assumption 5.2 is violated,
even if Assumptions 5.1 and 5.3 hold. This is illustrated in Section 5.3.2 using an intuitive
3-bus example that is highly resistive and heavily congested. However, a larger more realistic
test case is used to illustrate that violating Assumption 5.2 typically results in insignificant
dispatch approximation error.
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5.1 Transmission Constrained Economic Dispatch
We begin by reiterating previously established notation from Chapter 2. Lower case
subscripts are used to indicate elements of matrices. For example the element in the ith row
and jth column of matrix M is denoted Mi,j. The i
th column of matrix M is denoted Mi.
The transpose of a matrix is denoted with a superscript †, for exampleM †, and a superscript
−† represents the inverse transpose of a matrix. The set of n dimensional real numbers is
denoted Rn. A vector v ∈ Rn is designated a column vector and its ith element is denoted
vi. The element-wise absolute value of a matrix or vector is denoted |M | or |v| respectively.
The identity matrix, the matrix of all zeros, and the matrix of all ones are denoted I, 0,
and 1 respectively and are of appropriate dimension. The branch-bus incidence matrix of
the graph G is denoted A ∈ Rm×n. Specifically, A is sparse and the row representing line k
connecting bus i to bus j has element i equal to 1 and element j equal to −1. In this context
bus i is arbitrarily assigned to be the sending bus and power flow is designated positive when
flowing from bus i to bus j.
5.1.1 Transmission-Constrained Economic Dispatch with Angles
The Transmission-Constrained Economic Dispatch (TCED) problem (4.19) from Sec-
tion 4.2.2 with a linear form of the mid-line power flow function F (·) is adopted. This problem
optimizes over the nodal generation dispatch vector G ∈ Rn and the vector of voltage angles
excluding the known angle at the bus ρ ∈ N, which will be termed the angle reference bus.
A dot over a vector represents that vector with element ρ removed. For example the vector
of voltage angles is denoted θ ∈ Rn and the vector of voltage angles excluding the angle at
the angle reference bus is denoted θ̇ ∈ Rn−1. Similarly, a dot over a matrix represents that
matrix with column ρ removed. For example, the matrix Ȧ ∈ Rm×(n−1) is equivalent to A
with column ρ removed.
The TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) is written as follows. Voltage magnitudes
are assumed constant and all equal to one per unit. The nodal demand is considered fixed
and is represented by D ∈ Rn. The cost of generation is represented by the function
C(G) := Σ
i∈N







|A|† L(Ȧθ̇) +H†θ̇ = G−D (A1)
¯
G ≤ G ≤ Ḡ (A2)
¯
F ≤ BȦθ̇ ≤ F̄ (A3)
Constraint (A1) represents the real power balance at each bus in the system as in
constraint (4.19a). The vector valued loss function is denoted L : Rm → Rm and maps
voltage angle differences to line losses. This function is assumed to be convex on the domain
of the problem and is assumed to be continuously differentiable. Half of each line’s losses
are assigned to its incident buses as Fictitious Nodal Demand (FND) as in Chapter 4. In
the interest of deriving a linearly-constrained economic dispatch problem, we assume a linear
approximation of the mid-line power flow function described in Section 4.1.4 and represented
by H†θ̇, where H := Ȧ†BA is termed the reduced weighted Laplacian matrix and represents
the weighted Laplacian matrix of the underlying system graph with row ρ removed. In
the expression for H, the matrix B ∈ Rm×m is full rank and diagonal where the diagonal
elements represent the edge weights of the underlying system graph and can be interpreted
as transmission line susceptances. Constraint (A2) enforces generator output limits and
constraint (A3) enforces line limits in the form of mid-line power flow limits as described in
Section 4.2.4.1.
Remark 5.1. The lossless DC OPF problem is identical to the TCED problem with angles
(Opt. A) if the loss function L(·) is replaced by the zero vector 0. This lossless DC OPF
problem is linearly constrained, convex, and easy to solve.
5.1.2 General TCED Problem without Angles
Many references, e.g. [21] and [58], analyze the energy market with respect to an
economic dispatch problem that optimizes over dispatch and loss variables. We will derive
four such problems that optimize over the nodal dispatch vector and a nodal loss allocation
vector N ∈ Rn. These four problems, Opt. B, C, D, and E respectively, can each be expressed
as the following general TCED problem without angles. The price reference bus (or slack
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bus) is designated as bus σ ∈ N. Throughout this chapter a ring over a vector represents
that vector with element σ removed. Similarly, a ring over a matrix represents that matrix




st : 1†(G−D −N) = 0 (j1)
Λj(P̊, N ; D̊) = 0 (j2)
¯
G ≤ G ≤ Ḡ (j3)
¯
F ≤ S(G̊− D̊ − N̊) ≤ F̄ (j4)
Constraint (j1) represents real power balance. Constraint (j3) represents generator
output limits. Constraint (j4) represents limits on the mid-line power flow on each transmis-
sion line expressed in terms of shift factors S := BȦH̊−†. Note that the matrix H̊ is invertible
under the standard assumption that the system graph is fully connected. The nodal loss
allocation constraint (j2) incorporates a general function Λj( · , · ;D̊) :Rn−1×Rn→Rn, which
takes the constant parameter D̊ ∈ Rn−1 as an additional argument. This general function
will be defined differently for each of the next four optimization problems formulated in this
chapter. These four problems will be differentiated by j taking values B, C, D, and E.
Remark 5.2. Opt. j has one more decision variable and equality constraint than Opt. A. Opt. j
is also conveniently formulated because there is one linear overall real power balance con-
straint and all non-convexity is concentrated to constraint (j2).
The Lagrangian function is central to the First Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs)
for optimality. The Lagrangian function of Opt. j is written as follows. The arguments of
this function are partitioned into three categories, namely: primal variables, dual variables,








+ κ1†(−G+D +N) (5.1b)






+ β̄†(G− Ḡ) (5.1e)
+ µ̄†
(








F − S(G̊− D̊ − N̊)
)
. (5.1g)
Here the Lagrangian function is defined with: κ ∈ R representing the Lagrange mul-
tiplier of the overall real power balance constraint (j1); γ ∈ Rn representing the Lagrange
multipliers of the nodal loss allocation constraint (j2); (β̄,
¯
β) ∈ Rn×Rn representing the La-
grange multipliers of the generator output constraint (j3); and (µ̄,
¯
µ) ∈ Rm×Rm representing
the Lagrange multipliers of the line limit constraint (j4).
The KKT conditions for some pair of primal variables (G,N) require the existence of
corresponding Lagrange multipliers that jointly satisfy the primal feasibility, dual feasibil-
ity, complementary slackness, and stationarity conditions [5]. Primal feasibility requires the
primal variables to satisfy constraint (j1)-(j4). Dual feasibility requires the dual variables




µ to be non-negative. Complementary
slackness requires each of the terms (5.1d)-(5.1g) to equate to zero. The stationarity con-
dition requires the partial derivative of the Lagrangian function to be zero with respect to
the primal variables G and N . The stationarity condition is as follows, where the partial
derivatives of Φj with respect to Nσ, Gσ, N̊ , and G̊ are represented by (5.2), (5.3), (5.4),
and (5.5) respectively:
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0=κ+∇NσΛj(G̊,N ; D̊)γ, (5.2)
0=∇GσC(G)− κ+ β̄σ −
¯
βσ, (5.3)










5.1.3 Transmission-Constrained Economic Dispatch without Angles
By choosing the function Λj appropriately Opt. j can be made equivalent to the
TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) in that any optimal dispatch for one of these problems
is also optimal for the other. In particular, Sections 5.1.3.1-5.1.3.3 show that Opt. A is
equivalent to the following TCED problem without angles.
Optimization B. The TCED problem without angles is defined to be Opt. j with Λj specified
by:






Sections 5.1.3.1 through 5.1.3.3 derive the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B)
from the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A). Each step taken in the reformulation preserves
the set of feasible dispatch variables G, implying any dispatch that is optimal for one of these
problems is also optimal for the other. Both problems additionally have the same optimal
objective value and as a result the sensitivity of the optimal objective value with respect to
D is the same for both problems under the assumption that the sensitivity is well defined.
5.1.3.1 Loss Allocation Vector
We first introduce the nodal loss allocation vector N ∈ Rn as a decision variable





5.1.3.2 Real Power Balance Constraint
By (5.7), we can replace the first term in the real power balance constraint (A1) in
Section 5.1.1 by N to obtain:
N +H†θ̇ = G−D. (5.8)
Note that H1 = 0, left multiply the LHS and RHS of (5.8) by the full rank matrix
[1,̊I]† and re-arrange to obtain:
0 = 1†(G−D −N), (5.9)
H̊†θ̇ = G̊− D̊ − N̊. (5.10)
Since [1,̊I]† is full rank, constraints (5.9) and (5.10) hold if and only if constraint (5.8) holds.
Since H̊ is invertible, constraint (5.10) can be re-arranged to:
θ̇ = H̊−†(G̊− D̊ − N̊). (5.11)
5.1.3.3 Eliminate Voltage Angles
In summary, we first introduced constraint (5.7) along with variable N . We then re-
placed the real power balance constraint (A1) from Section 5.1.1 with equivalent constraints
(5.11) and (5.9). We now substitute the expression for θ̇ from constraint (5.11) into con-
straints (5.7) and (A3). The resulting optimization problem is equivalent to Opt. B but with
additional constraint (5.11). Since θ̇ is otherwise unconstrained, constraint (5.11) can be
removed resulting in Opt. B.
Definition 5.1. Let the generation dispatch G⋆ and the nodal loss allocation N⋆ represent
a local minimizer of the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B) with associated Lagrange




β⋆ that solve the KKT conditions for the TCED problem
without angles (Opt. B) under the assumption that such a local minimizer exists.
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5.1.4 Locational Marginal Prices
The Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), denoted λ⋆, are defined to be the partial
derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to the demand vector D:





where ΦB represents the Lagrangian function (5.1) for the TCED problem without angles
(Opt. B). The LMP can be decomposed as λ⋆ := e+ l+ c, where e is the energy component
associated with Lagrange multiplier κ, l is the loss component associated with Lagrange
multipliers γ, and c is the congestion component associated with Lagrange multipliers (µ̄,
¯
µ).
The congestion and loss components of the LMP at the price reference bus are zero, that is




H̊−1Ȧ†∇L(Ȧθ̇⋆) |A| γ⋆, (5.14)
c̊ :=S†(
¯
µ⋆ − µ̄⋆). (5.15)
where θ̇⋆ = H̊−†(G̊⋆ − D̊ − N̊⋆).
Remark 5.3. As explained in Section 5.1.3 the sensitivity of the optimal objective value with
respect to D is the same for Opt. A and Opt. B under the assumption that the sensitivity
is well defined. This implies that the LMPs for both problems are the same. Furthermore,
Opt. A is a special case of the TCED problem (4.19), with the mid-line power flow function
restricted to a linear form. As a result, Opt. B and the TCED problem (4.19) have the same
LMPs when the mid-line power flow function is restricted to a linear form.
Remark 5.4. The loss and congestion components of the LMP are zero at the price reference
bus highlighting the dependency of these components of the LMP on the choice of price
reference bus. On the other hand, the LMP is not dependent on the choice of price reference
bus as explained in Section 4.2.2 with respect to the TCED problem (4.19).
5.1.5 FTRs and Congestion Revenue Adequacy
The TCED problem without angles (Opt. B) is non-convex. ISOs governed by FERC
intend to solve this problem by linearizing the non-linear constraints of the TCED problem
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without angles (Opt. B) around some base-case state resulting in a convex LCED problem as
will be discussed elaborately in the next section. It is important to note that the congestion
revenue adequacy guarantee from Section 2.5 does not apply to the TCED problem without
angles (Opt. B) or to the LCED problems in the next section. Specifically, the revenue
adequacy guarantee from Section 2.5 does not hold for Opt. B because it is non-convex.
Furthermore, the revenue adequacy guarantee from Section 2.5 does not apply to the LCED
problems in the next section because the base-case state changes on a day-to-day basis
and the SFCs must be fixed at the time of the FTR auction, which may occur months or
even years in advance of market clearing. For this reason and others, ISOs governed by
FERC do not consider losses when defining the SFCs. Specifically, the SFCs are defined
by the following polytope, which matches the line limit constraints (j4) and power balance
constraints (j1). Notice that this definition of the SFCs is convex and does not depend on
the base-case state, allowing it to be fixed far in advance of the market clearing.
T :=
{
f ∈ Rn :
¯
F ≤ Sf̊ ≤ F̄ and 1†f = 0
}
. (5.16)
As explained in Remark 2.2, electricity markets today require each FTR allocation vector f (ξ)
to be balanced in the sense that the elements sum to zero, e.g. 1†f (ξ) = 0. This requirement
is possible to enforce because the SFCs are lossless as in (5.16), which requires 1†f = 0.
ISOs in the US typically price FTRs based on the congestion component c of the LMP
defined by (5.15) as opposed to the LMP λ⋆ defined by (5.12). In this case, the payoff received
by the FTR holder will be very close to the value −λ⋆†f (ξ) under the assumption that the
loss component of the LMP l is very small. To see this, notice that −λ⋆†f (ξ) = −(c+ l)†f (ξ)
because e†f (ξ) = 0 when the FTR allocation vector is balanced 1†f (ξ) = 0. For this reason,
FTRs can still be used to approximately hedge the LMP uncertainty as described intuitively
in Section 2.2.3. More specifically, FTRs in practice can only be used to hedge the congestion
component of the LMP c and not the loss component of the LMP l.
In this section, the congestion revenue remains λ⋆†(D−G) as previously stated in (2.3);
however, the total FTR payoff now differs from Section 2.2.3 and is now written as −c†f .
As a result, we must give a congestion revenue adequacy guarantee that differs from the
guarantee provided in Section 2.5. This subsection will provide a different revenue adequacy
82
guarantee that accommodates this alternative payoff. Specifically, the following theorem
states that the total FTR payoff is upper bounded by the congestion revenue under the
condition that the LMPs are non-negative. This theorem can be applied when using the
SFCs defined in (5.16) along with FTR payoffs defined by −c†f . Reference [40] provides a
similar revenue adequacy guarantee and also explains intuitively why the potential congestion
revenue shortfall (PCRS) is typically small when prices are negative.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the FTR allocation satisfies the SFCs so that f ∈ T where T is defined
in (5.16). Let the point (G⋆, N⋆) satisfy the KKT conditions of the TCED problem without
angles (Opt. B). If the LMPs λ⋆ as defined in (5.12) are all non-negative, then the congestion
revenue λ⋆†(D−G⋆) is greater than or equal to the FTR payoff c†f , where c is the congestion
component of the LMP as defined in (5.15).
f ∈ T and λ⋆ ≥ 0 ⇒ λ⋆†(D −G⋆) ≥ c†f
Proof: See Appendix B.
It also is important to recognize that FTR payoffs −c†f (ξ) do not depend on the
choice of angle reference bus ρ or slack reference bus σ if the FTR allocations vectors f (ξ)
are balanced. Proof of this is not provided in this dissertation, see [58] for a discussion of
this issue. Reference [58] explains that the congestion component of the LMP c at any given
bus will depend on the choice of slack reference bus σ; however, the differences across busses,
e.g. Ac, will not.
5.2 Linearly Constrained Economic Dispatch
The economic dispatch problems formulated in the previous section are non-convex
and may be difficult to solve. For this reason it is typical for ISOs to use approximations
that result in a convex problem. Today ISOs use linearization techniques to simplify non-
convex economic dispatch problems into convex linearly-constrained problems. In this section
we present a sequence of four linearly-constrained economic dispatch problems, respectively,
Opt. C, D, E, and F, ultimately resulting in the common LCED problem (Opt. F) used in [21]
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and [58]. Presenting the sequence of problems highlights the nature of the approximations
used in practice.
Section 5.2.1 describes linearization about a base-case state, which is fundamental to
all of the linearization approaches. Section 5.2.2 derives the direct LCED problem (Opt. C),
which serves as an approximation to the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B) as explained
by a result from [40]. Section 5.2.3 introduces the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) and
proves that it is equivalent to Opt. C. Section 5.2.4 then explains how to compute the loss
component of the LMP from Lagrange multipliers of the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D).
LDFs are then introduced to the indirect LCED problem in Section 5.2.5 to obtain the LDF
LCED problem (Opt. E). This problem is shown to be a good approximation of the indirect
LCED problem under the additional assumption that no line limits are binding. The common
LCED problem (Opt. F) is derived in Section 5.2.6 and is shown to be equivalent to the LDF
LCED problem (Opt. E). Section 5.2.7 then introduces a uniqueness assumption required
to efficiently recover an optimal dispatch of the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A).
5.2.1 Linearization about Base-Case State
The linearization procedure will use a first order approximation around a base-case
state θ̇0. Associated with the base-case state are the base-case nodal loss allocation vec-
tor N0 := 1
2
|A|†L(Ȧθ̇0) and the base-case generation dispatch vector G0 := H†θ̇0 +N0 +D.
Note that by construction the base-case values θ̇0 and G0 satisfy all equality constraints
in Opt. A and the base-case values N0 and G0 satisfy all equality constraints in Opt. B.
In the real-time market the base-case state is often chosen to match the output of
the state estimator. Similarly, in the day ahead market the base-case state is often chosen
by predicting the future system state based on historical data. However, other choices of
base-case state are used in practice. For example, another common method constructs a
base-case state from the optimal dispatch of an alternative form of the economic dispatch
problem [21]. A simple example of an alternative form of the economic dispatch problem
is the lossless DC OPF problem. Note that previous work has concluded that a minimizer




Reference [40] suggests directly linearizing the nodal loss allocation constraint
ΛB(G̊,N ; D̊) = 0 with respect to decision variables G̊ and N using a first order Taylor
expansion. The gradient of the LHS with respect to G̊ is −1
2
H̊−1Ȧ†∇L(Ȧθ̇0)|A| and the
gradient of the LHS with respect to N̊ is I̊† + 1
2
H̊−1Ȧ†∇L(Ȧθ̇0)|A|. With this in mind, the
direct LCED problem is defined as follows.
Optimization C. The direct LCED problem is defined to be Opt. j with Λj specified by:








Note that with the specification of ΛC as in (5.17), Opt. C has linear constraints.
With cost function C(·) assumed convex, Opt. C is a convex problem. If the cost function
C(·) is linear, then Opt. C is a linear program.
The following assumption provides conditions under which an optimal dispatch of
the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B) is also optimal for the direct LCED problem
(Opt. C).
Assumption 5.1. The base-case dispatch and nodal loss allocation vectors (G0,N0) represent a
local minimizer of the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B) and solve the KKT conditions






We will employ this assumption for the remainder of this section. Notice that the
LMPs are well defined under Assumption 5.1 and are expressed as in Section 5.1.4. Under





β0 satisfy the KKT conditions for the direct LCED problem (Opt. C), implying that the
base-case dispatch P 0 is optimal for the direct LCED problem, which is a convex program
with linear constraints as mentioned above. This result is easy to verify by noting that
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these values satisfy the stationarity condition and the primal feasibility condition for both
problems. Additionally note that the dual feasibility condition and complementary slackness
conditions are identical for both problems.
Remark 5.5. A base-case state θ̇0 satisfying Assumption 5.1 is termed an ideal base-case
state. However, in practice Assumption 5.1 will only be approximately true and the base-case
values (G0, N0) will fall in the vicinity of a minimizer of the TCED problem without angles
(Opt. B). Section 5.3 explains the conditions under which this is a reasonable approximation.
Specifically, Section 5.3.1 studies test cases where this approximation does not work well and
Section 5.3.2 studies test cases where this approximation does work well.
5.2.3 Indirect Linearization
In this section we take another approach, similar to that of [21] and [58], by deriving
loss sensitivities with respect to nodal net real power injections about the base-case state.
To do this we must first define the nodal loss allocation as an implicit vector valued function
of the net real power injections at the non-price reference buses Ñ : Rn−1 → Rn. The vector
of net real power injections is denoted T ∈ Rn and is interpreted as the generation dispatch
vector less the demand vector G−D. The function Ñ is defined implicitly by the relationship
between N and G̊− D̊ in the constraint ΛB(G̊,N ; D̊) = 0 from the TCED problem without
angles (Opt. B), and therefore satisfies:




ȦH̊−†(T̊ − ˚̃N(T̊ ))
)
. (5.18)
The loss sensitivity matrix is denoted∇Ñ : Rn−1→R(n−1)×n and is defined to be the Jacobian
of Ñ with respect to its argument. The nodal loss allocation vector can then be approximated
using a simple first order Taylor expansion of the function Ñ(T̊ ) evaluated at the base-case
net real power injections T̊ 0 := G̊0−D̊. The indirect LCED problem is as follows.
Optimization D. The indirect LCED problem is defined to be Opt. j with Λj specified by:
ΛD(G̊,N ; D̊) :=N−Ñ(G̊0−D̊)−∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊)†(G̊−G̊0). (5.19)
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We derive the loss sensitivity matrix ∇Ñ in Theorem 5.2 below. Theorem 5.2 al-
lows us to prove equivalence of linear constraints ΛC(G̊,N ; D̊) = 0 and ΛD(G̊,N ; D̊) = 0.
Specifically, these constraints are equivalent in that one constraint holds if and only if the
other holds. This can be proven algebraically by substituting the expression for the loss
sensitivity matrix, ∇Ñ , from Theorem 5.2 into the expression for ΛD(G̊,N ; D̊) from (5.19).
As a result, the direct LCED problem (Opt. C) and the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D)
are equivalent in that any optimal dispatch of one of these problems is also optimal for the
other. Also notice that computing the loss sensitivity matrix, ∇Ñ , requires the inversion of
a large Jacobian matrix.
Theorem 5.2. Assuming the matrix I+1
2
H̊−1Ȧ†∇L(Ȧθ̇0)|Å| is invertible, the columns of the







The column of the loss sensitivity matrix evaluated at T̊ 0 corresponding to the price reference
bus is expressed as:
∇Ñσ(T̊ 0) =12(I−∇
˚̃N(T̊ 0))H̊−1Ȧ†∇L(Ȧθ̇0)|Aσ|.
Proof: Differentiating all rows of (5.18) excluding the price reference bus around the













Differentiating the row of (5.18) corresponding to the price reference bus yields the
expression for ∇Ñσ(T̊ 0).
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5.2.4 Equivalent Loss Component of LMP
The expression for the loss component of the LMP in terms of the Lagrange multipliers
of the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) evaluated at the base-case point (G0, N0) is as follows:
l̊ = ∇D̊ΛD(G̊
0, N0; D̊)γ′ = ∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊)γ′, (5.20)
where lσ = 0 and (G





KKT conditions for the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D). Of course this expression is slightly
different than the expression given for the loss component of the LMP from (5.14). This is
because the Lagrange multipliers γ′ corresponding to the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) do
not match the Lagrange multipliers γ0 corresponding to the direct LCED problem (Opt. C).
For the remainder of this chapter γ′ will denote the optimal Lagrange multiplier for the
constraint ΛD(G̊,N ; D̊) = 0 of the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D).
The following theorem derives a relationship between the Lagrange multipliers of the
direct LCED problem (Opt. C) and the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D). By Theorem 5.3
below, the KKT point from Assumption 5.1, with γ0 replaced by γ′, solves the KKT con-
ditions for the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D). As a result, the base-case dispatch G0 is
optimal for the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D). In addition, the expressions of the loss
component of the LMP from (5.14) can be obtained from the expression (5.20) by substitut-
ing γ′ and ∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊) using the expressions from Theorems 5.2 and 5.3.





KKT conditions for the direct LCED problem (Opt. C). Then (G0, N0) along with Lagrange




β0 satisfy the KKT conditions for the indirect LCED problem








Proof: Notice that the primal feasibility, dual feasibility, and complementary slackness
conditions do not include γ and are identical for Opt. C and Opt. D. Therefore, by hypothesis
these conditions also hold for Opt. D. It remains to show that the stationarity conditions
(5.2)-(5.5) hold for Opt. D. Notice that the stationarity conditions for Opt. C and Opt. D
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differ only by their loss terms and so we need only show equivalence of the partial derivatives
of the loss terms for both problems.
1) Stationarity Condition w.r.t. Nσ
For Opt. D we have ∇NσΛD(G̊0, N0; D̊)γ′=γ′σ. Replacingγ′σ with its given expression
yields γ0σ =∇NσΛC(G̊0, N0; D̊)γ0, matching Opt. C.
3) Stationarity Condition w.r.t. N̊
For Opt. D we have ∇N̊ΛD(G̊0, N0; D̊)γ′ = γ̊′. Substituting the given expression for
γ̊′ results in ∇N̊ΛC(G̊0, N0; D̊)γ0, matching Opt. C.
2) Stationarity Condition w.r.t. G̊
For Opt. D we have
∇G̊ΛD(G̊
0, N0; D̊)γ′ =−∇ ˚̃N(G̊0−D̊)̊γ′−∇Ñσ(G̊0−D̊)γ′σ.
Substituting the expression for ∇ ˚̃N(G̊0−D̊) from Theorem 5.2, substituting the given
expressions for γ̊′ and γ′σ, and rearranging the expression algebraically results in the following:
∇G̊ΛC(G̊






again matching Opt. C.
5.2.5 Loss Distribution Factor LCED Problem
To reduce the number of optimization variables many references, including [21] and [58],
introduce Loss Distribution Factors (LDFs) in the form of a vector η ∈ Rn where 1†η = 1
and typically η ∈ Rn+. Each LDF represents the fraction of total system losses allocated to
node i. Recognizing that the total system losses are represented by the function 1†Ñ(G̊−D̊),
the LDF LCED problem is defined as follows.







References [21] and [58] only provide intuitive choices of LDFs that are not proven
optimal. In fact, there may not exist LDFs that allow the base-case dispatch to be optimal
for the LDF LCED problem (Opt. E). To see this notice that the constraint ΛE(G̊,N;D̊) = 0
reduces to N0 = η1†N0 when evaluated at the base-case values (G0, N0). For this constraint




Remark 5.6. References [21] and [58] suggest the use of LDFs according to (5.22). However,
these references do not prove if or when such LDFs are optimal. Section 5.3.2 illustrates that
the LDFs from (5.22) are not always optimal but typically result in very small approximation
error.
Unfortunately, the LDFs in (5.22) do not generally allow the stationarity condition
for the LDF LCED problem (Opt. E) to be satisfied at the KKT point from Assumption 5.1.
To see this notice that the stationarity conditions for the LDF LCED problem (Opt. E)
and the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) differ only by their loss terms. In order for these
problems to be equivalent, the partial derivative of the loss term in the Lagrangian function
from Opt. E with respect to G̊ must be equivalent to that of Opt. D. This partial derivative






In general this partial derivative does not match that of the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D),
which is expressed as ∇G̊ΛD(G̊,N ; D̊)γ′ = −∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊)γ′. A sufficient condition for the
base-case dispatch to be optimal for the LDF LCED problem (Opt. E) requires that γ′ be
proportional to the vector of ones as embodied in Assumption 5.2 below. We will employ
Assumption 5.2 for the remainder of this section and we will consider some test cases for
which it is also satisfied; however, it is important to note that this assumption is not generally
true.
Assumption 5.2. The optimal Lagrange multipliers γ′ associated with the indirect LCED
problem (Opt. D) are uniform. E.g. there exists some α ∈ R such that γ′ = 1α.
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To understand Assumption 5.2 it is useful to analyze the stationarity condition for
the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) with respect to N as defined by (5.2) and (5.4), which
is as follows:
κ0 + γ′σ = 0 and 1κ
0 + γ̊′ + S†(
¯
µ0 − µ̄0) = 0
This shows that the Lagrange multipliers γ′ = −1κ0 − c are indeed uniform if and
only if the congestion component of the LMP c is zero as defined in Section 5.1.4, in which
case γ′ = −1κ0. In turn, the congestion component of the LMP is zero if no line limits
from constraint (j4) are binding at the base-case values (G0, N0), leading to the statement
in Remark 5.7. This is because non-binding line limits require that
¯
µ0 = µ̄0 = 0 by the
complementary slackness condition.
Remark 5.7. Assumption 5.2 holds if no line limits from constraint (j4) are binding at the
base-case values (G0, N0).
The following theorem states that the base-case dispatch G0 is optimal for the LDF
LCED problem (Opt. E) under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2.





the KKT conditions for the indirect LCED problem (Opt. D) where γ′ = 1α. Then (G0, N0)
along with the same Lagrange multipliers also satisfy the KKT conditions for the LDF LCED
problem (Opt. E).
Proof: Notice that the primal feasibility, dual feasibility, and complementary slackness
conditions are identical for Opt. D and Opt. E and by hypothesis these conditions therefore
hold for Opt. E. It remains to show that the stationarity conditions (5.2)-(5.5) hold for
Opt. E. Notice that the stationarity conditions for Opt. D and Opt. E differ only by their
loss terms and so we need only show equivalence of the partial derivatives of the loss terms
for both problems. First, the partial derivatives with respect to N and Gσ are equivalent for
both problems:
∇NΛj(G̊0, N0; D̊)1α = 1α and ∇GσΛj(G̊0, N0; D̊)1α = 0.
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Furthermore, the partial derivative with respect to G̊ is equivalent for both problems.
This is shown as follows:
∇G̊ΛE(G̊




5.2.6 Common LCED Problem
The commonly formulated economic dispatch problem represents the total system
losses as a single decision variable ν ∈ R as opposed to representing the loss allocation to
each node as individual decision variables. This effectively eliminates n−1 decision variables
and n− 1 constraints, making the problem much easier to solve. Using notation similar




st : 1†(G−D − ην) = 0 (F1)
ν = LF †(G−D) + q (F2)
¯
G ≤ G ≤ Ḡ (F3)
¯
F ≤ S(G̊− D̊ − η̊ν) ≤ F̄ (F4)
This formulation is similar to the general TCED problem without angles (Opt. j).
In fact, the objective function and the generation output limit constraint are identical to
those of Opt. j. The power balance constraint (F1) and line limit constraint (F4) represent
constraints (j1) and (j4) after replacing the nodal loss allocation vector N with the expres-
sion ην. Constraint (F2) represents the total system losses where q ∈ R is an offset constant
and LF ∈ Rn represents the sensitivity of the total system losses with respect to the net real
power injections. Notice this formulation enforces transmission line limits despite the use of
Assumption 5.2, which effectively assumes no line limits are binding.
References [21] and [58] observe that different approximations of LF can be used and
they derive three different versions of LF using total derivatives and implicit functions. With
respect to our formulation the loss sensitivity vector is defined based on the loss sensitivity
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matrix as L̊F = ∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊)1 and LFσ = 0. Our formulation also uses a constant offset
term of q = 1†Ñ(G̊0−D̊) + 1†∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊)†(D̊ − G̊0). Using these definitions of LF and q
the loss constraint (F2) is as follows:
ν =1†Ñ(G̊0−D̊)+1†∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊)†(G̊−G̊0). (5.24)
Using this proposed definition of the loss sensitivity vector LF and offset constant q, it
should now be apparent that the common LCED problem (Opt. F) is equivalent to the LDF
LCED problem (Opt. E) in that any optimal dispatch of one problem is also optimal for the
other. This is because both problems have the same feasible set of dispatch variables G. In
fact, a feasible solution of the common LCED problem (G, ν) can be constructed from any
feasible solution of the LDF LCED problem (G,N) where ν = 1†N . Similarly, a feasible
solution of the LDF LCED problem (G,N) can be constructed from any feasible solution of
the common LCED problem (G, ν) where N = ην.
Remark 5.8. Although we do not prove this explicitly, the base-case values G0 and ν0 = 1†N0
indeed satisfy the KKT conditions of the common LCED problem (Opt. F) along with




β0 under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. Furthermore, in
agreement with (5.20) the loss price can now be expressed as l = LFα. It is interesting
to note that this expression of the loss price can also be derived from the common LCED
problem (Opt. F) when considering the loss sensitivity matrix LF and the offset constant q to
be constant parameters independent of the demand vector D. This may be counter-intuitive
because LF and q are indeed (implicitly) defined in terms of the demand vector D.
5.2.7 Recovering a Locally Optimal Dispatch
Recall that, by Assumption 5.1, the base-case values (G0, N0) represent a local mini-
mizer of the TCED problem without angles (Opt. B). Thus far we have shown that the
base-case generation dispatch G0 is locally optimal for the TCED problem with angles
(Opt. A) and is globally optimal for the common LCED problem (Opt. F) under Assump-
tions 5.1 and 5.2. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the common LCED problem
(Opt. F) may have multiple optimal dispatch vectors, some of which may not be optimal or
even feasible for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A). This is an issue because standard
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off-the-shelf optimization software used to solve the common LCED problem (Opt. F) only
identifies one of potentially multiple optimal dispatch vectors. An additional assumption is
required to guarantee the identified dispatch matches the base-case dispatch G0.
Assumption 5.3. The common LCED problem (Opt. F) has a unique minimizer (G, ν).
Remark 5.9. The common LCED problem (Opt. F) is said to have a unique optimal dispatch
if Assumption 5.3 holds true. Similarly, the common LCED problem (Opt. F) is said to have
multiple minimizers or multiple optimal dispatch vectors if Assumption 5.3 does not hold
true.
Assumption 5.3 ensures that the common LCED problem has a unique optimal
dispatch. Under Assumptions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 the unique optimal dispatch for the com-
mon LCED problem (Opt. F) is indeed locally optimal for the TCED problem with angles
(Opt. A) and represents the base-case dispatch G0. Under these three assumptions a locally
optimal dispatch for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) can be identified by solving
the common LCED problem (Opt. F) using standard off-the-shelf optimization software.
The numerical results section investigates errors associated with relaxing each of these three
assumptions.
5.3 Numerical Results
This section provides numerical results intended to illustrate two key findings that
point out significant dispatch approximation errors may occur when certain assumptions
are violated. Section 5.3.1 illustrates the first key finding that small perturbations to
the ideal base-case state can result in significantly large dispatch approximation error if
Assumption 5.3 fails to hold. Associated errors are illustrated using an intuitive 2-bus test
case as well as a realistically large test case with 2383 buses, neither of which enforce line
limits so that Assumption 5.2 holds. Section 5.3.2 then illustrates the second key finding
that significant dispatch approximation error may occur when Assumption 5.2 fails to hold
even if Assumptions 5.1 and 5.3 hold. Associated errors are illustrated using an intuitive
3-bus test case as well as the same 2383 bus test case as in Section 5.3.1 but with line limits
enforced. In this specific example, introducing transmission line limits to the 2383 bus test
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case causes the common LCED problem (Opt. F) to have a unique optimal dispatch and we
show that there is no dispatch approximation error despite the presence of transmission con-
gestion. This suggests that realistic systems may not experience significant approximation
error when Assumption 5.2 fails to hold. Section 5.3.2 continues to select different base-case
states that introduce dispatch approximation error into the 2383 bus test case when enforc-
ing line limits. Since the uniqueness Assumption 5.3 holds for this specific test case, small
perturbations to the ideal base-case state result in little dispatch approximation error.
In this section the kth diagonal element of B is Bkk=
1
xk
and the kth element of the
vector valued loss function is Lk(Θ) =
rk
x2k
Θ2k where the impedance of line k ∈ L is rk + ixk
and Θ ∈ Rm represents the voltage angle difference across each transmission line Ȧθ̇. The
LDFs η are chosen as in (5.22). A computer with a 2.0 GHz processor is used.
5.3.1 Multiple Minimizers of the Common LCED Problem
This subsection studies two test cases that satisfy Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2; however,
the common LCED problem (Opt. F) has multiple minimizers for these two test cases,
violating Assumption 5.3. In this context small perturbations to the ideal base-case state
are shown to result in a common LCED problem (Opt. F) with a unique optimal generation
dispatch; however, this unique optimal generation dispatch differs significantly from the
desired generation dispatch G⋆ that solves the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A), resulting
in large generation dispatch approximation error. This is shown using an intuitive 2-bus test
case as well as a large test case with 2383 buses. In this subsection neither test case enforces
line limits so that Assumption 5.2 holds (See Remark 5.7).
5.3.1.1 2-Bus Test Case
A one-line diagram of the 2-bus test case is provided in Figure 5.2 along with various
parameters of the test case. Notice that the transmission line is highly resistive and has no
transmission limit. All system demand is located at bus 2 and is fixed to D2=100p.u. The
demand is co-located with expensive generation with cost function C2(G2)=G2. The gener-
ation at bus 2 is unlimited so that 0≤G2≤∞. Inexpensive generation is located remotely at
bus 1 as the cost of this generator is C1(G1)=0.6G1. The inexpensive generation is limited
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as 0≤G1≤60p.u. The total system cost C(G) is the sum of the individual generator costs.
Bus 1 is designated the angle reference bus and the price reference bus so that σ = ρ = 1.





Figure 5.2: 2-bus system one-line diagram. The demand is fixed atD2 =100p.u. The generators
have cost functionsC1(G1)=0.6G1 andC2(G2)=G2. The line has per-unit impedance of 0.01+i0.01
and has no limit so that F̄1=−
¯
F1=∞.
Figure 5.3 plots the set of all feasible generation dispatch vectors for the TCED
problem with angles (Opt. A) as a black curve. The gray arrows in this figure repre-
sent the objective descent direction. The unique optimal generation dispatch vector is
G⋆ = [28.125, 78.125]†p.u., is represented by the star in the figure, and is intuitively the
feasible generation dispatch vector that is furthest downstream in the descent direction.
The associated optimal vector of voltage angles is θ̇⋆ = θ⋆2 = −0.25 radians.
The black dashed line represents the set of all feasible generation dispatch vectors for
the common LCED problem (Opt. F) when using the ideal base-case state θ̇0 = θ̇⋆. Notice
that the descent direction is perpendicular to the black dashed line and as a result all feasible
generation dispatch vectors are optimal. Since the common LCED problem (Opt. F) has
multiple minimizers, Assumption 5.3 does not hold. Additionally, only one of the infinitely
many minimizers of Opt. F is feasible for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A).
In practice the ideal base-case state is typically estimated. To emulate this, linearize
around the base-case state θ̇⋆+δ where δ = 0.07 radians represents a small perturbation.
The resulting linear feasible set of generation dispatch vectors is represented by the dashed
gray line. Furthermore, the common LCED problem (Opt. F) now has a unique optimal
generation dispatch vector G ≈ [60, 55.559]†p.u. that is represented by the black circle and
also significantly differs from the desired generation dispatch vector G⋆. The dispatch ap-
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the feasible set of dispatch vectors G for various ED problems associated
with the 2-bus test case.
proximation error vector is ∆G = G−G⋆ ≈ [31.875,−22.566]†p.u., which is large compared
to G⋆.
Perturbing the ideal base-case state in the other direction also results in large dispatch
approximation error. Specifically, linearizing around the base-case state θ̇⋆−δ results in the
linear feasible set of generation dispatch vectors represented by the solid gray line. In this
case the common LCED problem (Opt. F) has a unique optimal generation dispatch vector
G ≈ [0, 92.242]†p.u. that is represented by the black diamond and also significantly differs
from the desired generation dispatch vector G⋆. The dispatch approximation error vector is
∆G = G−G⋆ ≈ [−28.125, 14.117]†p.u., which is again large compared to G⋆.
Remark 5.10. Similarly large approximation error remains for an arbitrarily small pertur-
bation δ > 0. Alternatively, similarly large approximation error remains after adding slight
curvature to the objective descent direction that might arise from a small positive quadratic
coefficient in the cost function.
Remark 5.11. The lossless DC OPF problem yields a unique optimal generation dispatch
vector of G = [60, 40]†p.u. for the 2-bus test case. In fact, the lossless DC OPF problem
and the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) both have unique optimal generation dispatch
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vectors; however, the common LCED problem (Opt. F) has multiple optimal generation
dispatch vectors when the base-case state matches its ideal value θ̇⋆.
Remark 5.12. Reference [21, section V-A] makes a similar observation regarding a different
2-bus test case. In their example the common LCED problem (Opt. F) also has multiple
minimizers when the ideal base-case state is chosen. Rather than perturbing the base-case
state, as is done in this chapter, they perturb the bids of the generators. Keeping the
base-case state fixed, they show that a small perturbation in generator bids can result in
significant dispatch approximation error. This observation is consistent with the observations
made here.
5.3.1.2 Test Case 2383wp without Line Limits Enforced
Now consider the test case 2383wp from the NESTA archive, which represents the
Polish power system during the 1999-2000 winter evening peak [17]. Line limits are not en-
forced to ensure that Assumption 5.2 holds. The identified minimizer of the TCED problem
with angles (Opt. A) is found using the interior point algorithm provided by the MATLAB
function FMINCON and takes 17.10sec. to converge. The optimal objective value of this
problem is C(G⋆)=$1865459.40.
Let’s first analyze the common LCED problem (Opt. F) with the base-case state
chosen to match the identified minimizer of the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) θ̇0 = θ̇⋆
in order to satisfy Assumption 5.1. In this case the loss sensitivity matrix ∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊) takes
26.13sec. to compute due to the inverse computation. There exist multiple optimal dispatch
vectors G for the common LCED problem (Opt. F), some of which are not feasible for the
TCED problem with angles (Opt. A). To illustrate this we use an interior point algorithm
provided by Artelys KNITRO software to solve the common LCED problem (Opt. F) with
different supplied initial guesses [10]. Table 5.1 compares the identified minimizers of both
problems where ∆G ∈ Rn represents the difference between G⋆ and the identified optimal
dispatch of the common LCED problem (Opt. F) and ∆C represents the difference between
C(G⋆) and the optimal objective value of the common LCED problem (Opt. F).
Turning to the first row of Table 5.1, the main body of this chapter proves that
98
G = G⋆ and ν = 1†N⋆ is a minimizer of the common LCED problem (Opt. F). When
supplying this as the initial guess, the algorithm immediately converges to a dispatch that
nearly matches G⋆. Notice that the associated errors, ∆G, are very small relative to the total
dispatch generation ∥G⋆∥1 = 49231.67MW and the optimal objective values of both problems
are nearly identical. However, ∆G is not identically zero due to insignificant computational
error.
Table 5.1: Results for test case 2383wp without line limits enforced and with the ideal base-
case state θ̇0= θ̇⋆. The error quantities are denoted with ∆ and represent the difference between
identified optimal quantities of Opt. A and Opt. F.
Initial Guess for the ∥∆G∥1 ∥∆G∥∞ |∆C| Solver
Interior Point Algorithm (MW) (MW) ($) Time (s)
G = G⋆ and ν = 1†N⋆ 1.73 0.88 0.00 5.52
Typical Operating Point 21.65 10.70 0.00 5.33
Minimizer of lossless DC OPF 308.77 152.77 0.00 7.61
To demonstrate that Opt. F has multiple minimizers, two alternative initial guesses
were supplied as shown in the second and third rows of Table 5.1. The first alternative
was constructed from the typical operating point provided by the test case description. The
second alternative was constructed from the minimizer of the lossless DC OPF problem,
which was solved using the DC OPF function available in MATPOWER [98]. When using
these alternative initial guesses the algorithm converges to dispatch values that do not match
G⋆ but do attain the same optimal objective value C(G⋆). Furthermore, these identified
dispatch values are not feasible for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A).
Similar to the simple 2-bus example, a small perturbation of the base-case state
results in significantly large dispatch approximation error. To illustrate this we perturb
the ideal base-case state θ̇⋆ by a perturbation vector δ ∈ Rn−1 that was sampled from a
normal distribution with zero mean and a diagonal covariance matrix of 10−10 × I. The
specific sample drawn from this distribution has the properties ∥δ∥∞ = 3.6× 10−5 radians
and ∥δ∥1 = 0.018 radians. The resulting common LCED problem appears to have a unique
optimal dispatch because the same dispatch is identified when using any initial guess for
99
the interior point algorithm. The dispatch approximation error is ∥∆G∥1 = 314.70 MW and
∥∆G∥∞ = 156.19 MW. This dispatch approximation error is significant compared to the
small perturbation δ.
5.3.2 LDF Approximation Error with Congestion
This subsection studies test cases that satisfy Assumptions 5.1 and 5.3; however,
transmission line congestion causes Assumption 5.2 to be violated. A highly resistive 3-bus
test case with significant transmission congestion is used to illustrate the potential dispatch
approximation errors associated with Assumption 5.2. Although associated errors are large
for this extreme 3-bus test case, they are typically very small in practice as is illustrated
by the 2383 bus test case with line limits enforced. In fact, this test case exhibits no error
despite having transmission congestion. To illustrate error associated with Assumption 5.1
alternative choices of base-case state are investigated that introduce dispatch approximation
error into the 2383 bus test case.
5.3.2.1 3-Bus Test Case
Figure 5.4 provides the details of the 3-bus test case in a one-line diagram. The
generation dispatch values G have no upper limit but are restricted to be non-negative, e.g.
¯
G = 0. The system is highly resistive as the impedance of each line is rk + ixk = 0.01 + i0.01
in units of p.u. The cost function is given by C(G)=C1(G1)+C2(G2)+C3(G3). Bus 1 is













Figure 5.4: 3-bus system one-line diagram. The line limits F̄=−
¯
F are such that F̄2=F̄3=∞ and








The minimizer of the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) isG⋆ ≈ [82.38, 6.81, 123.61]†
and θ̇⋆ ≈ [−0.690, 0.110]† in units of p.u. and radians respectively. The ideal base-case state
is chosen θ̇0 = θ̇⋆ and thus the base-case dispatch isG0 =G⋆. The line limit for line 1 is binding
and the congestion component of the LMP is non-zero, taking the value c=[0, 137.26,−137.26]†
in units of dollars per p.u. Notice that Section 5.2.5 draws no conclusion regarding whether
or not G0 is optimal for the LDF LCED problem (Opt. E).
As expected the base-case point G0 and ν0 :=1†N0 is feasible for the common LCED
problem (Opt. F); however, this point is not optimal. An alternative unique optimal dispatch
G of Opt. F is identified that is not feasible for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A). The
optimal objective value for the common LCED problem (Opt. F) is $11512.63, which is $62.36
lower than the optimal objective value for the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A). The
optimal dispatch for the common LCED problem (Opt. F) is G=[86.96, 6.17, 122.41]†p.u.
and the dispatch approximation error is G⋆−G=[−4.58, 0.64, 1.20]†. This highly resistive
network exhibits small error, suggesting this approximation is typically accurate.
5.3.2.2 Test Case 2383wp with Line Limits Enforced
Consider the same test case as Section 5.3.1 but with line limits enforced. The
identified minimizer of the TCED problem with angles (Opt. A) is found using the interior
point algorithm provided by FMINCON and takes 18.81sec. to converge. The optimal
objective value of this problem is C(G⋆)= $1890940.57. There are 4 congested lines with
binding limits, which is a small amount relative to the 2896 total transmission lines.
When using the ideal base-case state θ̇0 = θ̇⋆ the common LCED problem (Opt. F)
appears to have a unique minimizer because the interior point algorithm converges to the
same point with any choice of initial guess. Notice that test case 2383wp has the unusual
property that its common LCED problem (Opt. F) has a unique minimizer when enforcing
line limits but has multiple minimizers when line limits are not enforced. This property is
not typical as many other test cases in the NESTA archive do not have this property.
We consider four different base-case states when formulating the common LCED
problem (Opt. F). Each of the four versions of this problem appear to have a unique
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minimizer because the interior point algorithm converges to the same point for any choice
of initial guess. Since there is a unique minimizer, we are able to take advantage of the
much faster dual simplex algorithm provided by MOSEK, which does not allow for a user
supplied initial guess [4]. Table 5.2 provides numerical results for each of the four choices
of base-case state. Notice that the solver times are much faster and the optimal generation
dispatch vector G⋆ is exactly recovered when setting the base-case state to its ideal value
θ̇0 = θ̇⋆. Note that the loss sensitivity matrix ∇Ñ(G̊0−D̊) requires approximately 28 seconds
of computation time for each base-case state.
Since the common LCED problem (Opt. F) now has a unique optimal dispatch when
using the ideal base-case state, small perturbations of the base-case state should result in
small approximation errors. This is illustrated by using the same perturbed base-case state
θ̇⋆ + δ as in Section 5.3.1.2. Notice that the dispatch approximation error is very small as
compared to the error witnessed in Section 5.3.1.2. In fact, we should expect the dispatch
approximation error to disappear as the perturbation becomes smaller, e.g. ∥δ∥ → 0.
Table 5.2: Results for test case 2383wp with line limits enforced. The error quantities are denoted
with ∆ and represent the difference between identified optimal quantities of Opt. A and Opt. F.
Choice of ∥θ̇⋆− θ̇0∥1 ∥∆G∥1 ∥∆G∥∞ |∆C| Solver
Base-Case State, θ̇0 (radians) (MW) (MW) ($) Time (s)
Local Min. of Opt. A, θ̇⋆ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26
Small Perturbation, θ̇⋆+ δ 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.95 1.33
Min. of Lossless DC OPF 34.15 73.95 29.67 1061.11 1.10
Typical Operating Point 257.68 501.37 306.58 24007.79 1.37
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the ideal base-case state θ̇⋆ is not known in practice.
We now consider two alternative choices of base-case state θ̇0. First, is the minimizer of
the lossless DC OPF problem. The second alternative is determined by solving power flow
equations at the typical operating point provided by the test case description. The power flow
equations and the lossless DC OPF problem are solved using MATPOWER. Table 5.2 shows
that the generation dispatch error is small relative to the total generation, which satisfies
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∥G⋆∥1 = 25108.74MW. Furthermore, the minimizer of the lossless DC OPF problem serves
as a better base-case state in terms of the generation dispatch error.
5.4 Summary
Using first-order Taylor expansions, this chapter derived several convex linearly con-
strained approximations to the non-convex economic dispatch problem from Chapter 4. A
sequence of four linearly constrained approximations are derived, ultimately resulting in the
common Linearly Constrained Economic Dispatch (LCED) problem, which is characterized
with respect to the underlying non-convex economic dispatch problem. Throughout the
chapter various approximation errors are identified including errors pertaining to the choice
of base-case state and errors pertaining to the common LCED problem having multiple solu-
tions. This chapter also highlights that there may not exist LDFs that recover the solution
to the underlying non-convex economic dispatch problem under congested conditions even
if the base-case state matches the solution to the underlying non-convex economic dispatch





The previous two chapters provided convex approximations of the non-convex AC
OPF problem for which there exist algorithms that provably converge to a globally optimal
solution. On the other hand, the there exist algorithms to solve the non-convex AC OPF
problem that perform well in practice but do not identify a generation dispatch with general
optimality guarantees. Over the past decade a significant amount of research has focused
on developing such algorithms. With this in mind, many recent works have developed relax-
ations to tightly approximate the AC OPF problem, e.g. [18,49,51,60–62,67,85]. Although
these methods identify a dispatch that is not guaranteed to be feasible, a nearly optimal
feasible dispatch along with corresponding LMPs can be recovered via primal-dual interior
point methods.
This chapter investigates the use of a potentially sub-optimal dispatch that is feasible
for the AC OPF problem and may be identified using any of the aforementioned algorithms.
However, as explained in Section 2.5, reference [52] shows that a revenue adequate market
equilibrium does not always exist for the AC OPF problem. Furthermore, by theorem 1
of [52] a revenue adequate market equilibrium, as in Definition 2.3, can only occur if the
globally optimal dispatch is identified for the AC OPF problem. For this reason our proposed
pricing structure should account for costs associated with generator uplift and FTR uplift.
Convex Hull Prices (CHPs) are proposed and are defined to solve a novel multi-
objective minimum uplift problem that captures the trade-off between generator side-payments
This chapter is based on the following publication: Manuel Garcia, Harsha Nagarajan, and Ross Baldick.
“Convex hull pricing for the AC optimal power flow problem.” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network
Systems, (Accepted 2019). The first author designed the model, designed and implemented the computational
studies, and wrote the manuscript with support from the coauthors.
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and potential congestion revenue shortfall. A convex primal counterpart of this multi-
objective minimum uplift problem, termed the primal CHP problem, is formulated in terms
of the convex hull of the set of feasible net real power injections. Indeed the term Convex
Hull Price derives from the result that the CHPs are equivalent to the optimal Lagrange
multipliers of the primal CHP problem. However, depending on the chosen model of the
transmission network, the convex hull of the feasible set of net real power injections may be
intractable to evaluate. In this case CHPs are approximated using state-of-the-art convex
relaxations that are efficiently solvable. This is the first proposed method of approximating
CHPs in polynomial-time that is general enough to accommodate the non-linear transmis-
sion constraints in the AC OPF problem. In our abstract myopic market setting we show
that tight relaxations of the AC OPF problem can be used to effectively approximate CHPs
that decrease potential congestion revenue shortfall significantly with little effect to side-
payments.
This chapter serves as an initial effort to incorporate non-linear models of the trans-
mission network into a general convex hull pricing framework. As mentioned in Section 1.1.4,
all special-purpose algorithms for computing CHPs have focused the Unit Commitment (UC)
problem with linear transmission constraints. In an initial effort to incorporate non-linear
transmission models, this chapter focuses on an abstract myopic market that considers only a
single time period, consistent with the entirety of this dissertation. In other words, we focus
on the non-convexity of interest by analyzing CHPs associated with the AC OPF problem,
which does not incorporate integer decision variables representing generator commitment
statuses. However, similar relaxation techniques can be used to approximate a solution of
a multi-objective minimum uplift problem in a more general setting that includes generator
commitment (See Remark 6.1).
In the context of the AC OPF problem, we show that standard LMPs always result in
zero generator uplift and non-negative FTR uplift because the generator models are convex
and the transmission network model is non-convex. Using LMPs, the total FTR uplift reaches
over 32% of the total operating cost for an IEEE test case with 162 buses and over 13% of
the total operating cost for a NESTA test case with 2224 buses [17]. This implies that the
consideration of non-linear transmission constraints may be significant in the context of FTR
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uplift. Since generator uplift is zero when using LMPs, CHPs will actually increase generator
uplift as compared to LMPs, which is starkly different from the typical observations made
in the context of the UC problem. We also find that CHPs can be effectively approximated
using the Semi-Definite Programming (SDP) relaxation. In fact, if the weight parameter
representing the relative value of FTR uplift to generator uplift is set lower than 0.72, then
approximate CHPs for the 162 bus test case reduce the total uplift by over 30% of the total
operating cost without introducing any generator uplift. This promising result is dampened
by noting that the SDP relaxation is unable to be solved efficiently for large test cases
with over 1000 buses. We emphasize the difficulty of solving large SDPs and point out
that SDPs are only approximately solvable in polynomial-time, with arbitrarily small fixed
approximation error [2]. Two other state-of-the-art convex relaxations are also analyzed that
are more computationally efficient, but tend to result in higher uplift payments for the test
cases analyzed.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 explains that LMPs may result in
positive FTR uplift and proves that LMPs always result in zero side-payments to generators.
Section 6.2 formulates the CHP optimization problem as a multi-objective minimum uplift
problem and shows that CHPs support a revenue adequate market equilibrium if such prices
exist. Section 6.3 then derives the primal CHP problem from a general form of the AC OPF
problem and CHPs are proven to be the optimal Lagrange multipliers of the primal CHP
problem. A general relaxation technique is then proposed to approximate the primal CHP
problem. Throughout the main body of this chapter, the model of the transmission network is
left general. In fact, many of the results may be general enough to apply to other systems that
are subject to non-linear transportation constraints, provided the respective relaxations well
approximate the feasible regions. Section 6.5 then focuses on the fully detailed AC model of
the transmission network, provides examples where a revenue adequate market equilibrium
does not exist and illustrates many of the concepts discussed. Section 6.6 concludes and
provides directions to pursue in future work.
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6.1 LMPs and Revenue Inadequacy
The following theorem states that a KKT price/dispatch pair as in Definition 2.2
always results in zero side-payments to generators, which is a byproduct of the private
constraint sets Xi being convex. This highlights a fundamental difference between LMPs
and CHPs in the context of the AC OPF problem. While CHPs minimize the sum of side-
payments and PCRS, LMPs result in zero side-payments. As a result CHPs tend to increase
side-payments and decrease PCRS as compared to LMPs. This tendency of CHPs in the
context of the AC OPF problem is starkly different from from the tendency that has been
observed in previous work. Specifically, CHPs tend to lower side-payments to generators in
the context of the Unit Commitment (UC) problem with a linear model of the transmission
network, as in [80] and [45]. The difference is due to the fact that the private constraints Xi
are the source of non-convexity in the UC problem, whereas the network constraints are the
source of the non-convexity in the AC OPF problem.
Theorem 6.1. A KKT price/dispatch pair as in Definition 2.2 results in zero side-payments




i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N.
Proof: The generalized stationarity conditions (2.7) include necessary conditions for
optimality of each profit-maximizing generation problem (2.1). Since each problem (2.1) is
convex, these conditions are also sufficient for global optimality.
6.2 Multi-objective Minimum Uplift Problem
To reduce deficit it is in the interest of the ISO to have low side-payments and PCRS.
CHPs are defined as an optimal solution to a pricing problem that minimizes the weighted
sum of these values and is referred to as the CHP problem or the multi-objective minimum
uplift problem.
Definition 6.1. The Convex Hull Prices (CHPs) minimize the weighted sum of potential
congestion revenue shortfall and total side-payments, are denoted λ̂, and are defined using













Recalling that side-payments and PCRS are always non-negative and recognizing
that the weight parameter α is defined to be positive, it is apparent that CHPs must form a
revenue adequate market equilibrium, as in Definition 2.3, with any given dispatch values Gd
if such prices exist. Furthermore, the ISO may prefer PCRS over side-payments because the
PCRS only represents a potential shortfall whereas the side-payments represent an actual
shortfall. For this reason, the weight parameter will likely be chosen to be less than one.
The CHP problem (6.1) is similar to the multi-objective minimum uplift problem
from [95], but explicitly incorporates FTR uplift into the formulation as suggested in their
future work section. Our formulation also includes non-linear transmission constraints, which
has not been investigated in a multi-objective setting. When the weight parameter is set
to α = 1 the CHP problem (6.1) is consistent with the formulation in [43] and [35], which
provide a high-level analysis that is capable of accommodating non-linear transmission mod-
els. However, the special-purpose algorithm designed to solve the minimum uplift problem
in [43] and [35] is restricted to linear transmission models.
The objective function of the CHP problem (6.1) is intuitively convex in the price
variables λ because it is the sum of individual functions that represent the maximum of affine
functions in λ. However, despite convexity, this problem is still difficult to solve in general
because its objective function is difficult to evaluate and is non-smooth. In fact, references [6]
and [54] show that it is generally NP-hard to identify a feasible point of the maximum FTR
payoff problem from (2.4), which must be solved to evaluate the PCRS function from (2.5)
denoted Cs(λ,Gd).
6.3 Approximating Extended Locational Marginal Prices
This section explains how CHPs can be approximated as the optimal Lagrange mul-
tipliers of a convex optimization problem. We begin by formulating the convex primal CHP
problem. The CHPs are then proven equivalent to optimal Lagrange multipliers of the con-
vex primal CHP problem. We then explain how to approximate the convex primal version
of the CHP problem using convex relaxations. This section leaves the feasible set of net real
power injections T general.
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6.3.1 Primal Formulation of the CHP Problem
The primal CHP problem is very similar in form to the general ED problem. This
formulation incorporates the dispatched net real power injections T d := Gd − D and the
weight parameter α into the real power balance constraints. Notice that the this generalized
version of the real power balance constraints reduces to the standard real power balance






st : Di −Gi + αTi + (1− α)T di = 0 ∀i ∈ N (6.2a)
where conv(T) is the convex hull of T.
A key insight that helps in computing CHPs is that any optimization problem with a
linear objective function and a compact feasible set has the same optimal value after relaxing







This fact allows for the partial Lagrangian dual function of the primal CHP problem,












The following Theorem 6.2 establishes CHPs as a maximizer of this partial Lagrangian
dual function. Though similar to results in other work regarding CHPs, e.g. [80], this result
accounts for weight constant α and general non-linear transmission models assumed by the
set T. If the weight parameter is set to α = 1 then the partial Lagrangian dual function
is independent of the dispatched generation Gd, and thus CHPs do not depend on the
dispatched generation. As opposed to LMPs, this is a potential benefit using CHPs with
α = 1. It should be noted that there are analogous observations in the context of the
UC problem, where CHPs are also independent of, for example, sub-optimality of the UC
solution.
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Theorem 6.2. A maximizer of the partial Lagrangian dual function L(λ) from (6.4) is also
a minimizer of the CHP problem (6.1) and thus represents CHPs.
Proof: A maximizer of the partial Lagrangian dual function (6.4) is unchanged by









that T di = G
d













By (2.5) and (2.2), this expression is equivalent to the negative of the objective function of
the CHP problem (6.1). The result directly follows.
As summarized in the following theorem, a maximizer of the partial Lagrangian dual
function L(λ) from (6.4) can be recovered as the optimal Lagrange multipliers of constraints
(6.2a). Indeed the term Convex Hull Price is derived from this key result, which is similar
to results in other work, e.g. [45].
Theorem 6.3. Optimal Lagrange multipliers of constraints (6.2a) minimize the CHP problem
(6.1) and thus represent CHPs.
Proof: Equation (6.3) implies that the function L(λ) from (6.4) represents the partial
Lagrangian dual function for problem (6.2). Furthermore, strong duality holds for problem
(6.2) when dualizing only linear constraints because it is a convex problem with a non-empty
feasible set. The result follows from Theorem 6.2.
6.3.2 Approximating CHPs
Unfortunately, the convex hull of the set of feasible net real power injections conv(T)
may be intractable to evaluate, as is the case when using the fully detailed AC model of
the transmission network [53]. In this case the primal CHP problem must be relaxed using
a conservative convex set relax(T) ⊇ conv(T) that can be expressed in closed form. The
relaxed primal CHP problem is written as follows and the approximate CHPs, denoted λ̄, are






st : Di −Gi + αTi + (1− α)T di = 0 ∀i ∈ N (6.5a)
The Lagrange multipliers of constraint (6.5a) can be recovered from a slightly reformulated
110
problem that represents a general convex relaxation of the AC OPF problem. To see this,
reformulate the relaxed primal CHP problem by dividing the real power balance constraint
by α to yield an equivalent problem that can be interpreted as a general convex relaxation of
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function of C̃i(G̃i)=Ci(αG̃i), and private constraints of X̃





resulting reformulation will produce Lagrange multipliers that differ from those of constraint
(6.5a) by a factor of α. This allows CHPs to be approximated using algorithms initially
developed to approximately solve convex relaxations of the AC OPF problem that are proven
to converge in polynomial-time.
Intuitively, approximate CHPs minimize a function that represents an upper bound
on the weighted sum of side-payments and PCRS. The conservative nature of this upper
bound is dependent on the how well the convex relaxation represents the convex hull and on
the magnitude of the weight parameter α. The following theorem makes this result explicit.
Theorem 6.4. Approximate CHPs, denoted λ̄ and defined as the optimal Lagrange multipliers












where Ψr(λ) := max
f∈relax(T)
− λ†f (6.7)
and Ψc(λ) := max
f∈conv(T)
− λ†f (6.8)






i−Ci(Gdi )−Υi(λi))−α(λ†T d +Ψr(λ)) (6.9)
By substituting the expression for generator uplift Coi (λi,G
d
i ), adding and subtracting the





i )−α(λ†T d +Ψ(λ))+ α(Ψc(λ)−Ψr(λ))
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This is the negative of the objective function of (6.6).
From Theorem 6.4, the objective function minimized by approximate CHPs is similar
to that of CHPs from Definition 6.1. When the relaxed set relax(T) accurately represents
the convex hull conv(T), CHPs match approximate CHPs because Ψr(λ) = Ψc(λ). Also
notice that the upper bound being minimized will be tighter if the weight parameter α > 0
is smaller. Fortunately, as we discussed in Section 6.2, this weight parameter should be less
than one. Of course approximate CHPs may match CHPs even if the relaxed set of feasible
net real power injections does not match the convex hull. Future work will identify sufficient
conditions for exactness.
Remark 6.1. Further studies should generalize Theorems 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 to accommodate
the UC problem over a 24 hour period. Such a generalization requires problems (6.2) and
(6.5) to be restated such that the private constraint set of each generator Xi is replaced by
its convex hull conv(Xi) and the cost function of each generator is replaced by its convex
envelope, both of which are explicitly characterized in [45].
6.4 Shor’s Rank Relaxation
This section provides a specific relaxation that will be used to approximate CHPs in
Section 6.5. This relaxation is derived from the AC OPF problem in rectangular coordinates
as described in Section 3.4 and is similar to other formulations in the literature [51,68]. First
recognize that the decision variable w ∈ R2n in problem (3.27) only appears in quadratic
terms of the form w†Mw, where M is an appropriately chosen quadratic coefficient ma-
trix. Using properties of the trace operator, each of these quadratic terms can be generally
rewritten as w†Mw = Tr(Mww†). Subsequently, the decision variable w will only appear in
the form of ww† and can thus be replaced by a matrix W restricted to be positive definite
and rank 1. These restrictions are written as W ∈ S2n×2n+ and rank(W ) = 1 where S2n×2n+
represents the set of symmetric positive semi-definite 2n × 2n matrices. With this in mind







st : Di −Gi = Tr(H(i)W ) ∀i ∈ N (6.10a)
U i ≤ Tr(Z(i)W ) ≤ Ūi ∀i ∈ N (6.10b)
−P̄i,j ≤ Tr(Z(i,j)W ) ≤ P̄i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (6.10c)
−Q̄i,j ≤ Tr(H(i,j)W ) ≤ Q̄i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (6.10d)
Tr(Z(i,j)W )2 + Tr(H(i,j)W )2 ≤ S̄2i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (6.10e)
0 ≤ Tr(MiW ) ≤ V̄i ∀i ∈ N (6.10f)
Gi ≤ Gi ≤ Ḡi ∀i ∈ N (6.10g)
rank(W ) = 1 (6.10h)
Shor’s rank relaxation is attained by removing the rank constraint. This relaxation
results in a convex optimization problem; however, the problem still must be placed in
standard SDP form, which requires a linear objective function and constraints that are only
linear and semi-definite. With this in mind we will assume that the cost function for each
generator takes the quadratic form Ci(Gi) = ci,2G
2
i + ci,1Gi + ci,0. To make the objective
function linear we will enforce the constraint Ci(Gi) ≤ ti for each generator i ∈ N and
minimize the value Σ
i∈N
ti. The final step required to attain an SDP in standard form uses
Schur’s complement to reformulate the convex quadratic constraints. The SDP relaxed AC







st : Di −Gi = Tr(H(i)W ) ∀i ∈ N (6.11a)
U i ≤ Tr(Z(i)W ) ≤ Ūi ∀i ∈ N (6.11b)
−P̄i,j ≤ Tr(Z(i,j)W ) ≤ P̄i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (6.11c)
−Q̄i,j ≤ Tr(H(i,j)W ) ≤ Q̄i,j ∀(i, j)∈P and ∀(j, i)∈P (6.11d) S̄2i,j −Tr(Z(i,j)W ) −Tr(H(i,j)W )−Tr(Z(i,j)W ) 1 0
−Tr(H(i,j)W ) 0 1
 ⪰ 0 (6.11e)
0 ≤ Tr(MiW ) ≤ V̄i ∀i ∈ N (6.11f)
Gi ≤ Gi ≤ Ḡi ∀i ∈ N (6.11g)[





⪰ 0 ∀i ∈ N (6.11h)
This problem is written in standard SDP form. In fact, it can also be expressed in
the form provided in (6.5) recognizing that the net real power injections are expressed as
follows:
Ti = Tr(H
(i)W ) ∀i ∈ N. (6.12)
In this case the relaxed feasible set of net real power injections is written as follows:
relax(T)={T∈Rn : ∃Wwhere (6.12), (6.11b), (6.11c), (6.11d), (6.11e), (6.11f), (6.11g)}(6.13)
It should be apparent that this relaxed feasible set of net real power injections is convex
because it is described by linear and semi-definite constraints. However, this set also requires
a large number of variables to be introduced to the problem, increasing the dimension of the
search space, and making the problem difficult to solve.
6.5 Numerical Results
This section extends the examples from Section 3.5. Specifically, Section 3.5 identifies
positive PCRS for various test cases when using the fully detailed non-convex feasible set of
net real power injections T defined in Chapter 3, which models real and reactive power as well
as voltage magnitude. We will begin with the simple 3-bus example from Section 3.5.1 and
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we will compute approximate CHPs by applying the standard Semi-Definite Programming
(SDP) relaxation to obtain the convex relaxed set relax(T) as described in Section 6.4. We
then move onto larger, more realistic networks, to which we apply three different relaxations
including the SDP relaxation, the Quadratic Convex (QC) relaxation, and the Second-Order
Cone (SOC) relaxation. The standard LMPs from Section 3.5 are compared to approximate
CHPs for each relaxation. The weight parameter α from Definition 6.1 is set to one for all
examples except the final example that illustrates the effect of varying α for a test case with
162 buses.
The loss-less DC approximation of the feasible set of net real power injections will be
denoted TDC. This section will additionally analyze prices, termed DCLMPs, that are found
as the Lagrange multipliers of the real power balance constraint of the DC OPF problem,
which is equivalent to problem (2.6) with T = TDC where TDC is defined by the loss-less DC
approximation from Chapter 4.
The optimal dispatch as determined by the DC OPF problem should be dispatched
along with DCLMPs; however, this dispatch may not be feasible for the true transmission
network, whose feasible set of net real power injections is represented by the set T. For this
reason control action must be taken on fast time scales to attain a feasible dispatch. This
section will assume that fast control action adjusts generator outputs to attain the optimal
dispatch from the AC OPF problem T ⋆. This assumption idealizes fast time scale control,
which typically does not minimize cost.
In this section the SFC is defined using the true set of feasible net real power injections
T; however, when using the DC OPF problem the SFC is typically defined using the DC
approximation TDC. This alternative definition of the SFC would not allow all financial
transactions to achieve a full hedge because it does not consider losses. This is out of
the scope of this dissertation. See [41] for a more detailed description of FTRs. To avoid
confusion the remainder of this section will not specify PCRS when using DCLMPs.
6.5.1 Simple 3-bus System
This section studies the simple 3-bus power system described in detail in Section 3.5.1.
The one-line diagram of this system is provided in Figure 6.1. The feasible set of net real
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power injections at buses 1 and 2 form an elliptical shape illustrated in Figure 6.2. Notice
that the feasible set of net real power injections T is now three dimensional; however, the
elliptical shape in Figure 6.2 represents a slice of this set at the plane T3 = 0. As explained
in Remark 2.1, the feasible set of net real power injections does not enforce constraints on
the net real power injections at buses. (Note: these constraints are accommodated by the
feasible set of each generator Xi in the general ED problem (2.6)). This means that FTRs





z13 = 0.1216 + 0.0512i z23 = 0.0010 + 0.0512i
z12 = 0.1226 + 0.1023i
|v2| = 1.21p.u.|v1| = 1p.u.
G1
D2
T3 = 0 U3 = 0
Figure 6.1: One-line diagram of the 3-bus test case. Repeated from Figure 3.2.
The consumption at bus 2 is fixed to 1p.u., so the net real power injection at bus
two is T2 = −1p.u. In this case the only feasible point is the green dot in Figure 6.2. This




3 ) ≈ (5.4077,−1, 0).
Notice this operating point accrues large line losses of approximately 4.5p.u. Bus 1 consists




0.5G1 if G1 ≤ 2
G1 if G1 > 2
6.5.1.1 DCLMPs
The loss-less DC approximation of the feasible set of net real power injections TDC is
represented by the red line in Figure 6.2a. The black dot represents the optimal dispatch
produced by the DC OPF problem; however, this point is not feasible for the true system.
We assume that control on a fast time scale is able to adjust the generator dispatch values
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(a) Feasible Set of Net Real Power Injections









(b) Zoomed version of Fig.6.2a
Figure 6.2: This figure illustrates the feasible set of net real power injections along with its
rank relaxed counterpart and its approximate DC counterpart. Figure 6.2a illustrates the feasible
set of net real power injections in black along with its SDP relaxed version in grey and its DC
approximated version in red. This feasible set is represented in two dimensions because bus three
is a null-bus. Figure 6.2b is a zoomed in version of Figure 6.2a. Contours of the objective function
in problem (2.4) are shown for the case of approximate CHPs and LMPs.
to attain the solution to the AC OPF problem, which is represented by the green dot in
Figure 6.2.
The DCLMPs can be recovered as the Lagrange multipliers of the real power balance
constraints of the DC OPF problem. Since no line limits are binding these prices are the same




3 =$0.5/p.u.. These prices along with the optimal dispatch of the




1 )=(1−λDC1 )T ⋆1 =$2.7.
6.5.1.2 LMPs
The LMPs were identified in Section 3.5.1, as described in Section 2.4. The LMPs
for bus 1, 2 and 3 are λ⋆1 = $1/p.u., λ
⋆
2 = $9.455/p.u., and λ
⋆
3 = $9.461/p.u. respec-
tively. The congestion revenue can be easily computed as CR = $4.05. The side-payments
to the generator is zero as proven by Theorem 6.1 and the payment to the generator is
in the amount $5.41. We found the PCRS to be $0.26 with an optimal FTR allocation
f = [5.5929, 6.3464,−7.3892] in units of p.u.
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The contour lines represented by the objective function of the FTR payoff maximiza-
tion problem (2.4) are shown in Figure 6.2. The contour lines associated with the LMPs
are represented by black dotted lines and are parallel to the tangent line at the green dot.
The optimal FTR allocation occurs at the point where the contour lines are tangent to the
feasible set of net real power injections T. This point coincides with the dispatched set point
represented by the green dot. Furthermore, at this point the Congestion Revenue Shortfall
(CRS) is zero. This means that there does not exist an FTR allocation in the plane plotted
in Figure 6.2 that results in congestion revenue shortfall. However, this plane restricts the
FTR allocation for bus 3, f3, to be zero. Since the set of net real power injections T is
three dimensional, we need to expand our analysis to three dimensional FTR allocation vec-
tors. In fact, Section 3.5.1 identified the PCRS to be $0.26 with an optimal FTR allocation
f = [5.5929, 6.3464,−7.3892] in units of p.u..
6.5.1.3 Approximate CHPs
Let’s now identify the approximate CHPs using the SDP relaxation from [66]. These
prices were found by solving the relaxed primal CHP problem (6.5) with α = 1 using the
CVX package in MATLAB [34]. The solver provides the optimal Lagrange multipliers for the
real power balance constraint (6.5a), which are equivalent to the approximate CHPs. The
approximate CHPs for bus 1, 2 and 3 are λ̄1=$1/p.u., λ̄2=$5.890/p.u., and λ̄3=$5.920/p.u..
Since λ̄1 = λ̂1 the generator side-payment remains zero and the generator payment remains
$5.41.
The contour lines associated with the FTR payoff maximization problem (2.4) when
using approximate CHPs are represented by gray dashed lines in Figure 6.2 and are parallel
to the tangent line at the blue dot. The optimal FTR allocation when using the approximate
CHPs occur at the point where the contour lines are tangent to the feasible set of net real
power injections T. This point is represented by the red dot. Since the red dot does not
coincide with the green dot, the FTR payoff at this point will be larger than the congestion
revenue. We can conclude that the approximate CHPs introduce the possibility of positive
CRS in the plane of FTR allocation vectors where f3 = 0. As mentioned previously, this
analysis should be extended to the three dimensional SFCs.
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The PCRS using the identified CHPs is numerically found to be $0.21 with an optimal
FTR allocation f ⋆ = [4.7284,−9.2816, 8.3189] in units of p.u.. The optimal FTR allocation is
computed by solving the FTR payoff maximization problem (2.4). The PCRS computation
is illustrated in Table 6.1. Specifically, the congestion revenue is easily found to be $0.48 and
the maximum FTR payoff can be computed as −λ⋆†f ⋆ = $0.69. The PCRS is the difference
between the two, amounting to $0.21.
Table 6.1: Evaluating PCRS for using approximate CHPs rounding to the nearest cent.
Demand Charge ($) Congestion Revenue($) Max. FTR Payoff ($) PCRS ($)
λ⋆2D2 λ
⋆
2D2 − λ⋆1Gd1 Ψ(λ⋆) = −λ⋆†f ⋆ Cs(λ⋆, Gd)
5.89 0.48 0.69 0.21
6.5.2 Examples on Standard Test Cases
Let’s now consider the much larger NESTA test cases that were studied in Sec-
tion 3.5.2 [17]. We consider three different relaxations of the feasible set of net real power
injections when formulating the relaxed primal CHP problem (6.5). First is the SDP re-
laxation, which is implemented using the MATPOWER toolbox in MATLAB [68]. Some
of the NESTA test cases can be solved exactly using the SDP relaxation. Such test cases
yield zero side-payments and zero PCRS when using LMPs. Instead, we focus on test cases
that cannot be solved exactly using the SDP relaxation and yield positive PCRS when using
LMPs. We also consider the QC relaxation described in [18] and the SOC relaxation de-
scribed in [46]. Both the QC and SOC relaxations are implemented using the PowerModels
package in Julia [16].
Table 6.2 provides a comparison of side-payments and PCRS when using LMPs,
approximate CHPs and DCLMPs. We provide results for six systems with 162 buses, 189
buses, 300 buses, 2224 buses, 2383 buses, and 3012 buses. When computing approximate
CHPs we set the weight parameter to α=1. By varying the weight parameter 0 < α < 1
we would expect to achieve PCRS and side-payments that fall between the two extremes
produced by approximate CHPs and LMPs. Computing the PCRS for a given set of prices
requires solving the non-convex max FTR payoff problem (2.4). The provided PCRS values
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Table 6.2: Results for NESTA test cases. All amounts are in dollars per hour. For large test
cases, a penalty is added to the objective function in the SDP-relaxed problem, associated values
are denoted with an asterisk. The side-payments when using DCLMPs are ideal, assuming that
fast control action optimizes cost, associated values are denoted with a triangle. PCRS values are
omitted for DCLMPs to avoid confusion regarding the definition of the SFC. The weight parameter
is α = 1. The results pertaining to LMPs and total operating costs match those in Table 3.4
LMPs DCLMPs Approximate CHPs Approximate CHPs Approximate CHPs
(for AC OPF) (for DC OPF) with SDP Relaxationwith QC Relaxationwith SOC Relaxation Total
Test Side Side Side Side Side Operating
Case Payments PCRS PaymentsPCRSPayments PCRS Payments PCRS Payments PCRS Cost
162 ieee dtc ∼ 0 1,352.92 6.66△ - 0.11 42.55 127.48 26.87 127.33 28.94 4,230.23
189 edin ∼ 0 1.22 4.66△ - 0.05 0.74 0.25 0.77 0.25 0.77 849.29
300 ieee ∼ 0 36.87 257.40△ - 0.03 14.77 3.12 128.18 3.15 130.88 16,891.27
2224 edin ∼ 0 520.76 75.92△ - 79.26∗ 343.47∗ 1,392.20 738.48 1,838.29 430.59 38,127.69
2383wp mp ∼ 0 13,681.00 289.12△ - 1,572.55∗ 4,023.87∗ 5,552.60 7,145.92 5,601.56 7,513.18 1,868,511.77
3012wp mp ∼ 0 1,815.44 6,303.82△ - 2,411.54∗ 1,348.35∗ 12,907.15 6,179.91 12,882.12 6,924.57 2,600,842.72
are computed using an interior point solver in Julia that identifies a local maximum of
problem (2.4).
As explained in Section 3.5.2, LMPs result in zero side-payments to generators and
positive PCRS. The PCRS may be very large with respect to the total operating cost as
in test case 162 ieee dtc (approximately 32%) or very small as in test case 3012wp mp
(approximately 0.07%). Furthermore, DCLMPs introduce a small amount of side-payments
to generators, although these values will likely be much larger in practice where control on
fast time scales is imperfect.
Approximate CHPs from the SDP relaxation perform well for the three smallest test
cases. That is, as compared to LMPs, they tend to increase side-payments by a small
amount and decrease PCRS significantly. Furthermore, approximate CHPs result in much
lower side-payments as compared to DCLMPs.
Unfortunately, the MATPOWER algorithm used to solve the SDPs was unable to
converge for the three largest test cases. For these cases we use a software package that
employs an additional approximation by placing a penalty in the objective of the SDP-
relaxed problem to encourage convergence [64] (associated quantities are denoted with an
asterisk). The penalty parameters were adjusted for each individual test case. Despite using
an additional approximation, the resulting approximate CHPs are still able to reduce PCRS
as compared to LMPs.
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Approximate CHPs from the QC and SOC relaxations result in similar PCRS and
generator side-payments. These approximate CHPs result in higher generator side-payments
and PCRS as compared to approximate CHPs from the SDP relaxation. In fact, these
approximate CHPs increase the PCRS as compared to LMPs for test cases 300 ieee and
3012wp mp.








Figure 6.3: Competing objectives for test case 162 ieee dtc.
To provide insight into the trade-off between PCRS and side-payments, let’s analyze
approximate CHPs for the test case 162 ieee dtc using the SDP relaxation. Figure 6.3 shows
the generator side-payments and PCRS as the weight parameter α varies from 0 to 1.5.
As expected, side-payments increase in α, PCRS decreases in α, and the trajectories pass
through their associated values in Table 6.2 when α = 1. Interestingly, as the parameter α
decreases, the side-payments reach zero at the point α = 0.72 and cannot decrease further.
At this point the PCRS remains constant at $42.67. In fact, choosing parameter α below
0.72 results in approximate CHPs that achieve savings in PCRS of over 30% of the total
operating cost as compared to LMPs while still maintaining zero side-payments.
6.6 Conclusions and Future Directions
This chapter incorporates non-linear models of the transmission system into the exist-
ing Convex Hull Pricing framework. In the context of the AC OPF problem we theoretically
prove and empirically observe the tendency of CHPs to increase generator side-payments as
compared to LMPs, which is significantly different from the behavior of CHPs in the context
of the UC problem with linear network models. We define CHPs as the optimal solution to a
novel multi-objective minimum uplift problem that captures the trade-off between generator
121
side-payments and PCRS. For the first time, we present a method of approximating CHPs
using non-linear transmission constraints that are general enough to accommodate the AC
OPF problem. Specifically, CHPs are approximated by the optimal Lagrange multipliers
of the relaxed primal CHP problem, which can be approximately solved using well-known
polynomial-time algorithms that approximately solve relaxed versions of the AC OPF prob-
lem. We provide a theoretical result illustrating that approximation accuracy can be im-
proved by tightening the relaxation used or by placing more value in generator side-payments
as compared to PCRS using the parameter α.
Examples show that FTR uplift may be large when using LMPs, motivating the
inclusion of non-linear models of the transmission network into the CHP framework. We then
approximate CHPs using SDP, QC, and SOC relaxations of the AC transmission network.
The SDP relaxation is shown to effectively approximate CHPs; however, existing algorithms
used to solve this relaxed SDP problem do not scale well with the size of the transmission
network. In fact, using the SDP relaxation we are able to identify CHPs that significantly
reduce PCRS while hardly effecting generator side-payments.
Future work will extend the concepts from this chapter to the unit commitment
problem. Of course the unit commitment problem does not incorporate the full AC model of
the transmission system as it is implemented today. However, the unit commitment problem
implemented today does account for a non-linear transmission model using the linearization
techniques derived in Chapters 4 and 5. For this reason future work will define the feasible
set of net real power injections T using the approximate non-linear transmission models
derived in Chapter 4. In fact, when using these approximate non-linear transmission models
we believe the exact CHPs can be recovered by use of the load over-satisfaction relaxation





Part II of this dissertation incorporates reserve procurement into the economic dis-
patch problem. The resulting problem is called a co-optimization problem because it op-
timizes the reserve products along with the electric generation product. The Electric Re-
liability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is currently planning to implement a co-optimization
problem into the real-time electricity market in Texas [26]. As explained in Chapter 1, the
Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) has considered the introduction of real-time
co-optimization separately from the introduction of transmission losses. Consistent with the
PUCT’s analysis, this part of the dissertation will use a linear model of the transmission
network that does not account for transmission losses.
Co-optimization problems enforce a reserve requirement that necessitates the pro-
curement of sufficient reserve to accommodate specific contingencies. For example, ERCOT
requires reserve capable of withstanding the simultaneous outage of the two largest gener-
ators [59]. Chapter 7 derives various reserve requirements from first principles including a
novel requirement termed the rate-based PFR limit and an existing requirement termed the
equivalency ratio requirement, which has only been studied empirically in previous work [59].
Chapter 8 places the derived reserve requirements into a co-optimization problem. This
chapter compares and contrasts the equivalency ratio requirement, which results in a con-





ERCOT recently redefined the reserve types considered in the electricity market in
Texas. As per Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) 863, all reserve types that con-
tribute to primary frequency response are referred to as Responsive Reserve (RR) and in-
clude Primary Frequency Responsive (PFR) reserve and Fast Frequency Responsive (FFR)
reserve [25]. All other reserve types considered in ERCOT are deployed on slower time scales
and will not be considered throughout Part II of this dissertation. This chapter derives re-
quirements for RR that are unaffected by all the neglected slower acting reserve types.
PFR reserve is defined to accommodate standard droop control provided by tradi-
tional generators. The amount of PFR reserve provided by generator i will be denoted ri.
This chapter conservatively assumes that generators contracting to provide PFR reserve are
the only generators in the system that actually do provide droop control. This assump-
tion deviates slightly from ERCOT requirements, which instead widen the droop control
dead-band for all generators that are not contracting to provide PFR reserve [25]. The
definition and implementation of FFR reserve was recently introduced by NPRR 581 and
accommodates fast acting resources that are capable of changing their power output almost
instantaneously [24]. Any resource can provide FFR reserve if it experiences little to no
ramping limitations; however, this type of reserve is primarily intended for new battery
technologies such as lithium ion batteries and so, for brevity, the word battery will generally
be used in reference to FFR reserve. The amount of FFR reserve provided by battery j will
be denoted bj.
This introduction section will first outline a general reserve requirement that ensures
the system is capable of accommodating a large loss of generation of size L. Intuitively,
this requirement will additionally ensure sufficient reserve to accommodate any less severe
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contingencies (See Remark 7.1). To ensure reserve procurement is capable of accommodating
a generator outage (possibly including multiple simultaneous unit outages) of size L, we must
satisfy the following general requirement:
1†r + 1†b ≥ L (7.1)
In the context of primary frequency control, accommodating a generator outage of
size L requires that the voltage frequency trajectory remain above some critical frequency
threshold denoted ωmin, which is 59.4Hz in ERCOT. This critical frequency threshold typ-
ically represents the point at which firm load begins to disconnect from the system as an
emergency precaution to avoid a system wide blackout (See Remark 7.2). As explained in
Section 1.2, this requires power balance between mechanical prime mover power and net elec-
trical consumption to be met before the frequency falls below the critical frequency threshold.
Unlike FFR reserve, PFR reserve may not be capable of providing all procured reserve within
this time constraint due to turbine governor ramping limitations. With this in mind, the
PFR reserve amount appearing in the requirement (7.1), denoted ri, must be available to
be deployed before the critical frequency threshold is met and thus we will hence-forth re-
fer to this quantity as the available PFR reserve. In contrast, the nominal PFR reserve,
denoted Ri, will refer to the product quantity that generator i is contracting to provide in
the electricity market. Intuitively, the nominal PFR reserve will represent the minimum of
the head-room of the generator and the generator’s offered PFR capacity. In our context
the head-room of the generator is the generator’s capacity Ḡi less its generation dispatch
value Gi and the generator’s offered PFR capacity, denoted R̄i, is an offered quantity in the
electricity market representing the maximum amount of nominal PFR reserve the generator
is willing to provide. The distinction between nominal PFR reserve, as determined by the
head-room, and the available PFR reserve, as determined by governor ramping limitations,
is essential to understanding and analyzing the role and value of FFR reserve.
Remark 7.1. All reserve requirements in ERCOT aim to ensure sufficient reserve to accom-
modate the simultaneous outage of the two largest generators in the system and thus L
is chosen to be the combined capacity of the two largest generators, which approximately
amounts to 2750MW [59]. Additionally, the requirement (7.1) intuitively ensures sufficient
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reserve to accommodate any less severe contingencies. For example, this requirement will
ensure sufficient Responsive Reserve to accommodate fluctuations in net demand caused by
variable wind generation. This is because net demand fluctuations are small compared to L
on the short time scales pertaining to primary frequency response.
Remark 7.2. Although the critical frequency threshold intuitively represents the point at
which firm load begins to disconnect from the system, firm load in ERCOT begins to dis-
connect from the system at a frequency of 59.3Hz, which is conservatively set 0.1Hz below
the critical frequency threshold of ωmin = 59.4Hz. In other words, reserve requirements are
designed to maintain the frequency above ωmin = 59.4Hz, which is 0.1Hz higher than the
frequency at which firm load begins to disconnect from the system [59]. This 0.1Hz margin
accommodates, for example, errors in frequency measurement that may occur during the
transient conditions accompanying a large generator outage.
It is apparent that the available PFR reserve should be constrained to be less than the
nominal PFR reserve, e.g. ri ≤ Ri. However, the available PFR reserve for a generator may
also be limited by other factors including the ramping ability of the generator and the time
taken to reach the critical frequency threshold. With this in mind, this chapter will provide
different limits that can be placed on the available PFR reserve to ensure it can be delivered
before the critical frequency threshold is met. Each of these PFR reserve limits utilize
different turbine governor models that account for the ramping ability of PFR reserve. The
first such limit, presented in Section 7.3, is termed the rate-based PFR limit, and is derived
from a turbine governor model that assumes a constant ramp rate. The second such limit,
presented in Section 7.4.1, is termed the proportional PFR limit, and is derived from a turbine
governor model that assumes the ramp rate is proportional to the generator’s nominal PFR
reserve. The third such limit, presented in Section 7.4.2, is termed the equivalency ratio
PFR limit and is consistent with the reserve requirement provided by [59] that is based on
empirical analysis of ERCOT system responses under various conditions of inertia.
The rest of this chapter discusses the following. Section 7.1 provides a model of the
three contributors to arresting frequency decline in the event of a large generator outage:
inertia, PFR reserve, and FFR reserve. This section distinguishes between nominal PFR
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reserve and available PFR reserve. This section additionally explains the traditional offered
PFR capacity limit, which is derived from a droop signal that is proportional to frequency
deviations. The remainder of the chapter builds towards the derivation of other PFR reserve
limits that consider turbine governor ramping limitations and guarantee that the critical
frequency threshold is not violated. Section 7.2 models the ramping limitations of a turbine
governor using a simple time delay followed by a constant ramp rate. This section continues
by providing a system wide model of the frequency response that also utilizes a simple time
delay followed by a constant ramp rate. Section 7.3 then uses the constant ramp rate mod-
els from Section 7.2 to derive the rate-based PFR limit that guarantees the frequency does
not fall below the critical frequency threshold and is proportional to the ramp rate of the
corresponding generator. Section 7.4 derives the proportional PFR limit by assuming that
a generator’s ramp rate is proportional to its nominal PFR reserve. Section 7.4 continues
by presenting the equivalency ratio PFR limit which is derived from the reserve requirement
from [59]. A connection is then drawn between the proportional PFR limit and the equiva-
lency ratio PFR limit that gives first principles insight into equivalency ratios. Finally, the
reserve requirements are summarized in Section 7.5, which explains that any combination of
the derived limits on available PFR reserve can be enforced in a co-optimization problem.
7.1 Three Contributors to Arresting Frequency
The three main contributors to arresting frequency decline in response to a large
generator outage are inertia, PFR reserve, and FFR reserve. Each of these three contributors
to arresting frequency decline will now be modeled in detail.
7.1.1 Inertia and Frequency Dynamics
Voltages in the system are modeled as quasi-steady state sinusoids whose frequency
may be slowly varying. Moreover, this voltage frequency at time t is modeled as being the
same at each generator in the system and is denoted ω(t). The total post-outage inertia isM
(in units of Watt-seconds or Ws) and represents the sum of inertia values for all generators
that are still in service after the outage. The simplified system dynamics are represented by
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where m(t) ∈ Rn represents the vector of mechanical power input from the turbine governor
of each generator in the system and e(t) ∈ R represents the total net electrical demand in the
system. Notice that m(t) is in bold font to distinguish it from the number of transmission
lines in the system, which is denotedm. The number of generators in the system is denoted n,
the vector of ones is denoted 1, and a superscript dagger † represents the transpose operator.
This model makes the common assumption that there is no system damping, which is a
conservative assumption since damping will tend to reduce the frequency excursions. The
nominal frequency is denoted ω0 and will be assumed to be the frequency just prior to the
time of the generator outage.
7.1.2 Fast Frequency Responsive Reserve
We assume that Fast Frequency Responsive (FFR) reserve can be fully deployed
instantaneously and can be provided by any device that does not exhibit ramping constraints.
FFR capable devices include fast-acting battery storage and load-shedding. For brevity, we
will henceforth refer to devices providing FFR reserve as batteries and we will refer to each
battery by its corresponding index in the set B = [1, . . . , β] where β is the total number of
FFR resources. Despite referring to these resources as batteries, the analysis covers both
batteries and load-shedding as FFR resources. The amount of FFR reserve provided by each
battery is denoted bj and each battery provides an offered FFR capacity in the amount of
b̄j. The private battery constraints exhibited by each battery are then written as follows:
Bj := {bj ∈ R : 0 ≤ bj ≤ b̄j}. (7.3)
The FFR reserve is triggered when the frequency drops below a frequency threshold
of ω2 < ω1, where ω1 is the frequency corresponding to the dead-band of droop control. Note
that ω2 is typically significantly lower than the frequency ω1 corresponding to the dead-band
of droop control. In fact, FFR reserve is considered a reserve type that is deployed only
during emergencies involving the largest generator outages as opposed to PFR reserve which
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is used for essentially all contingencies. When deployed, the FFR reserve instantaneously
decreases the net electrical demand in the system e(t) by an amount 1†b. We additionally
introduce the non-negative constant ∆2 := ω1 − ω2.
7.1.3 Primary Frequency Responsive Reserve and Droop Control
Primary Frequency Responsive (PFR) reserve is intended to be compatible with con-
ventional generator droop control, which increases the mechanical power output of the tur-
bine governor mi(t) in response to a large generator outage. PFR reserve is provided by
generators that may also be selling power into the electricity market. The nominal PFR re-
serve Ri must satisfy Gi +Ri ≤ Ḡi, where Gi is the dispatched electric power generation of
generator i and Ḡi is its capacity. Furthermore, each generator has an offered PFR capacity
denoted R̄i. With this in mind, the private constraints of generator i can be generalized from
the previous definition in Section 2.2.2. Specifically, the private constraints for generator i
are now written as follows:
Xi := {(Gi, Ri) ∈ R× R : Gi ≤ Gi ≤ Ḡi −Ri and 0 ≤ Ri ≤ R̄i}, (7.4)
The ISO typically has qualification requirements that implicitly or explicitly deter-
mine a limit on the offered PFR capacity R̄i that a generator can offer into the market. To
derive this limit on the offered PFR capacity R̄i we first must describe standard droop con-
trol in detail. Subsequently, the concept of available PFR reserve will be introduced, which
further limits the amount of PFR that can be deployed in particular system conditions, to
account for turbine governor ramping limitations.
7.1.3.1 Standard Droop Control
Generators providing PFR reserve respond to local frequency via droop control by
adjusting the reference mechanical power output of their turbine governor mrefi (t) on the
time scale of 1
ω0
≈ 0.016 seconds. In the context of droop control, the generation value
Gi represents the nominal value of m
ref
i (t) around which the adjustments are made and is
updated when the real-time market clears on the time scale of minutes. Furthermore, during
droop control the reference mechanical power output of each generator’s turbine governor is
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limited implicitly by the need to preserve capacity for reserves, is adjusted depending on the
generator’s local frequency deviation, and has a dead-band of ∆1 := ω0 − ω1 where ω1 < ω0
represents the low end of the dead-band. This reference signal is written as follows and is
illustrated in Figure 7.1.
mrefi (t) =

Gi if −∆1 ≤ ω(t)− ω0 ≤ ∆1
Gi +Ri if − γi(ω(t)− ω0)− γi∆1 ≥ Ri
Gi −Rdowni if − γi(ω(t)− ω0) + γi∆1 ≤ Rdowni
Gi − γi(ω(t)− ω0)− γi∆1 if 0 < −γi(ω(t)− ω0)− γi∆1 < Ri
Gi − γi(ω(t)− ω0) + γi∆1 else
(7.5)
where ω0 is the nominal frequency, ω(t) is the system frequency at time t, γi is the droop
constant for generator i, and Rdowni is the nominal down PFR reserve. Notice that the droop
reference signal is limited by the nominal PFR reserve Ri. This is because the nominal PFR
reserve Ri intuitively represents either the PFR reserve capacity R̄i or the headroom of the
generator Ḡi − Gi. If this limit is not imposed by the droop reference signal, then droop
















Figure 7.1: Droop signal with dead-band.
The reference mechanical power output then traverses the turbine governor dynamics
of the generator to produce the realized mechanical power output, denoted mi(t). These
turbine governor dynamics can be very complicated and are not detailed in our work. See [50]
for a description of turbine governor dynamics.
7.1.3.2 Offered PFR Capacity Limits
Notice that the reference mechanical power output mrefi (t) cannot attain a value
larger than Gi + γi(ω0 − ωmin) − γi∆1 without the critical frequency threshold ωmin being
violated. For this reason, ISOs should impose the following offered PFR capacity limit for
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each generator i:
R̄i ≤ γi(ω0 − ωmin)− γi∆1 (7.6)
The droop constant γi is chosen based on a required droop percentage imposed by the
ISO. The droop percentage represents the percent change in frequency required to achieve
a governor change of 100 percent capacity. Let νi represent the droop percentage for each
generator expressed as a fraction. For example, in ERCOT the droop percentage is typically
set to 5% and so νi = 0.05. The proportionality droop constant γi used during droop control





This definition of the droop constant is consistent with BAL-001-TRE-1, the reliabil-
ity standard that details primary frequency response requirements in ERCOT [23]. Following
from (7.6) and (7.7) the offered PFR capacity limit is written as follows:
R̄i ≤
Ḡi(ω0 − ωmin −∆1)
νiω0 −∆1
≈ Ḡi(ω0 − ωmin)
νiω0
. (7.8)
The approximation assumes that the dead-band for droop control ∆1 is very small. Although
the approximation over estimates the offered PFR capacity limit, the approximation error
is typically very small and is easily accommodated by the conservatively chosen critical
frequency threshold ωmin (See Remark 7.2). In fact, the typical dead-band in ERCOT
is ∆1 = 0.017Hz, which is significantly smaller than the value ω0 − ωmin = 0.6Hz and
the typical value of νiω0 = 3Hz for the typical droop percentage of 5%. Furthermore, the
critical frequency threshold is ωmin = 59.4Hz in ERCOT and ERCOT uses the approximation
outlined in (7.8). In this case the offered PFR capacity limit is 0.2Ḡi for a generator i with
5% droop. This is consistent with ERCOT protocols.
7.1.3.3 Available PFR Reserve and Ramping Limitations
The reference mechanical power output must traverse the turbine governor dynamics
of the generator to produce realized mechanical power output, denoted mi(t). As mentioned
above, these turbine governor dynamics can be very complicated and are not detailed in our
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work. However, a salient feature of these turbine governor dynamics is that the mechanical
power output mi(t) tends to lag the reference mechanical power input m
ref
i (t), particularly
if the reference signal changes quickly. For this reason, it is possible that a generator’s
PFR reserve is not fully available before the critical frequency threshold is met, effectively
exhibiting ramp limitations that restrict its power output. Current practices do not account
for these ramping limitations. This chapter addresses this shortfall of current practices by
differentiating between the nominal PFR reserve, denoted Ri, and the available PFR reserve,
denoted ri, which represents the amount of PFR reserve that is actually available as increased
generation before the critical frequency threshold is reached.
In general, the available PFR reserve ri may depend on the generator’s nominal
PFR reserve Ri, turbine governor ramping capabilities, and the time taken for the system
frequency to reach the critical frequency threshold, which in turn will depend on various
system-wide parameters. This chapter will provide various limits that restrict the amount of
available PFR reserve based on the generators’ ramping restrictions. The first limit on the
available PFR reserve is very simple and follows from the fact that a generator’s mechanical
power output will never rise above its reference input. With this in mind the available PFR
reserve should be less than the generator’s nominal PFR reserve and thus the following holds:
ri ≤ Ri (7.9)
Note that the available reserve quantity ri will be eliminated as a decision variable in
the co-optimization problems in Chapter 8. On the other hand, this chapter will explicitly
represent the available reserve quantity as ri to clearly distinguish it from the nominal PFR
reserve quantity Ri.
7.2 Approximating Ramp Limitations of PFR Reserve
This section will approximate turbine governor dynamics using a simple ramp rate
approximation. We will first describe the model of the turbine governors and then describe
a model of the system as a whole. The subsequent section will then use these models to
derive a limit on the available PFR reserve.
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7.2.1 Simple Turbine Governor Model
We need only characterize each generator’s turbine governor response to the very
specific situation where a large loss of generation occurs since all smaller contingencies will
result in smaller frequency excursions. Such a response is similar to that of a step response
in the reference mechanical power output because of the fast frequency drop. This type of
response is illustrated in Figure 7.2, where the amount of available PFR reserve for generator
i is denoted by ri and the mechanical power output of the turbine governor for generator i











Figure 7.2: Turbine governor response to generator outage.
The mechanical power output of generator i is assumed to match its dispatched
generation Gdi at the time of the generator outage t = 0, e.g. mi(0) = G
d
i . Following the
outage at t = 0 the frequency begins to drop. At the time t = t1 the frequency reaches
the lower end of the frequency dead-band ω(t1) = ω0 − ∆1. Subsequently, the turbine
governor is modeled as experiencing a small time delay ϵ. Although this time delay will
be assumed the same for all generators, this is only a simplifying assumption that can be
easily extended. After exhibiting this time delay, the mechanical power output will be
modeled as having a constant governor ramp rate κi that will continue until all available
PFR reserve ri is deployed. This constant ramp rate should be chosen conservatively in a
way that underestimates the mechanical power output of the turbine governor. Since this
model underestimates the mechanical power output of the turbine governor, the modeled
frequency trajectory will have a larger excursion than the realized frequency trajectory and
so the analysis will be conservative.
133
7.2.2 System-Wide Frequency Response Model
This subsection provides a simple model of the frequency response exhibited by the
system in response to a large generator outage. The response in system frequency ω(t) and
power imbalance 1†m(t)−e(t) is shown by the solid black trajectories in Figure 7.3. These
trajectories satisfy the swing equation (7.2) and so the frequency ω(t) is proportional to the































Figure 7.3: This plot is not drawn to scale. The top plot shows the energy imbalance over
time. The main power trajectory is shown as a solid black line with aggregate ramp rate K. The
dashed gray line represents a trajectory with a slightly increased aggregate ramp rate K ′. Six non-
overlapping regions are colored and labeled A through F . The bottom plot shows the frequency
trajectory corresponding to the main power trajectory.
As shown in Figure 7.3, the PFR reserve is deployed at time t1 when the frequency
falls below the dead-band threshold of ω1 = ω0 −∆1; however, the ramp of mechanical power
134
1†m(t) begins after a further time delay of ϵ. The frequency is ω0 −∆1 − δ1 at the time
t1 + ϵ of the beginning of the ramp. The PFR reserve is modeled as ramping with constant
aggregate ramp rate K. While the PFR reserve is ramping up the FFR reserve is deployed.
The FFR is instantaneously deployed at time t1 + ϵ + t2 when the frequency falls below
the dead-band threshold of ω2 = ω0 −∆1 −∆2. Subsequently, the ramp continues until the
mechanical power input of the turbine governors meet the electric power demand of the
system at time tNAD, at which point the frequency nadir is realized, denoted ωNAD. We
assume that the PFR reserve ramps at the rate K throughout the time from t1 + ϵ to tNAD.
Remark 7.3. Based on the model from the previous subsection the summed mechanical power
output of PFR generators 1†m(t) will not exhibit a constant aggregate ramp rate, K. In
fact, some generators may deploy all PFR reserve before the frequency nadir is reached,
in which case the aggregate ramp rate will effectively decrease over time. Section 7.3.2 will
explain why using a constant aggregate ramp rate K is a conservative model of the aggregate
behavior of the PFR reserve.
Notice that ϵ, ∆1, ∆2, ω0, ω1, and ω2 are all non-negative constant parameters. The
swing equation (7.2) allows us to derive expressions for the other parameters by computing
















We will additionally impose a few assumptions regarding the response of the sys-
tem. Specifically, we assume the deployment of FFR reserve occurs in the middle of the
PFR reserve ramp. We claim that this is a reasonable assumption because PFR reserve is
typically deployed at a dead-band threshold ∆1 that is much tighter than the FFR reserve
dead-band threshold ∆1+∆2 consistent with the intention that PFR reserve is deployed for
all contingencies, but FFR reserve is deployed only for the largest of contingencies. Further-
more, we assume there is enough reserve to restore power balance and we assume that the
power imbalance 1†m(t)−e(t) remains non-positive after the FFR reserve is deployed. These
assumptions are stated as follows:
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Assumption 7.1. We assume the constant parameters are such that the FFR reserve is de-




≤ ∆2 and ∆1 +∆2 ≤ ω0 − ωNAD (7.12)
We assume there is sufficient reserve to restore power balance and the power imbalance
remains non-positive immediately after the FFR reserve is deployed:
1†b+ 1†r ≥ L and Kt2 + 1†b ≤ L (7.13)
The frequency thresholds are set according to the ERCOT NPRR 863 [25], resulting in
ω0 = 60Hz, ω1 = 59.9833Hz, and ω2 = 59.8Hz. These parameters will be used in all numerical
results in Part II of this dissertation along with a PFR time delay of ϵ = 0.5 seconds.
Furthermore, L is set to 2750MW to represent the loss of the two largest generators in
ERCOT. With these parameters, the assumption from (7.12) holds.
Remark 7.4. Future work should focus on situations where Assumption 7.1 does not hold.
For example, we could accommodate FFR reserve being triggered before or after the PFR
reserve ramp. We could also accommodate the situation where FFR reserve deployment
immediately results in a positive energy imbalance.
7.3 Rate-Based PFR Reserve Limit
This section derives an additional condition that the available PFR reserve should
satisfy in order to ensure adequate reserve procurement. This condition is called the rate-
based PFR limit and is sufficient in guaranteeing adequate reserve procurement under the
assumption that the approximate ramping models from Section 7.2.1 underestimate the
mechanical power output of each individual generator.
7.3.1 Minimum Aggregate Ramp Rate
The frequency nadir increases (that is, improves) with increasing aggregate ramp rate
K. Equivalently, the frequency deviation ∆ω :=ω0−ωNAD decreases with the aggregate ramp
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rate. To see this first notice that the frequency deviation corresponding to the main power
trajectory illustrated in Figure 7.3 can be expressed as ∆ω := ω0
2M
(A+B+D+E+F ), where
capital letters represent their corresponding shaded area indicated in the figure. Now consider
a slight increase in aggregate ramp rate from K to K ′, resulting in the energy imbalance
curve illustrated by the dashed gray line. Notice that the FFR reserve is now triggered
later in time because the frequency does not decline as fast. The frequency deviation can
now be expressed as ∆ω′ := ω0
2M
(A+C+D+F ). Since the FFR reserve is always deployed
instantaneously and fully at the same frequency ω2, the area under the curve prior to the
FFR deployment will remain constant for all aggregate ramp rates. As a result we must
have B = C +D and thus the following holds:
∆ω = ω0
2M
(A+ C + 2D + E + F ) > ω0
2M
(A+ C +D + F ) = ∆ω′ (7.14)
This analysis implies that the frequency deviation ∆ω is strictly monotonically decreasing in
the aggregate ramp rate K. Equivalently, the frequency nadir ωNAD is strictly monotonically
increasing with the aggregate ramp rate K. As a result there exists a unique ramp rate Kmin
such that the frequency nadir is ωNAD = ωmin. Furthermore, all aggregate ramp rates greater
than this minimum aggregate ramp rate Kmin will satisfy the minimum frequency threshold,
e.g. ωNAD ≥ ωmin. The following result provides an expression for Kmin where the total FFR
reserve is denoted b̃ := 1†b and a constant is introduced as ∆3 := ω0 −∆1 −∆2 − ωmin.
Theorem 7.1. Under Assumption 7.1, the frequency nadir satisfies the minimum frequency
















Proof: The nadir frequency can be related to the aggregate ramp rate using the
swing equation (7.2). From the integral of the energy imbalance curve in Figure 7.3, this
relationship is as follows. Notice that Assumption 7.1 preserves the geometry of Figure 7.3,
allowing for the integral of the energy imbalance curve to be explicitly represented using the
137
area covered by a combination of triangles and rectangles.
2M
ω0




























The initial expression (7.16) represents the integral of the power imbalance curve, where
capital letters represent their corresponding shaded area indicated in the figure. Step (7.16)-
(7.17) expresses this integral as the area covered by a combination of triangles and rectangles.
Step (7.17)-(7.18) uses t1 =
2M∆1
Lω0











We will now set ωNAD = ωmin and solve (7.19) for Kmin. Note that there is only one such
Kmin and any K>Kmin will result in a nadir frequency ωNAD>ωmin because ωNAD is strictly
monotonically increasing in K.
First, let’s introduce the constant ω = ω0 − ωmin −∆1 − ω02M ϵL to simplify notation.













Note that both sides of this equation are real and non-negative, else t2 from (7.11) would be





b̃2δ2 − (L2 + b̃2)2Mω0 ω)K +
1
4
(L2 + b̃2)2 − b̃2L2 = 0 (7.21)
This quadratic equation has two solutions, denoted K⋆+ and K
⋆































Under the assumption that Kmin = K
⋆
− where ± takes the sign −, the result follows by
factoring the numerator of the previous expression and replacing ω = ∆2 +∆3 − ω02M ϵL and
δ2 = ∆2 − ω02M ϵL.
We now show that ± cannot take the sign +. Suppose it can take the sign +. Then
K⋆+ solves (7.20) and thus results in a real non-negative LHS and RHS of (7.20). Furthermore,
K⋆− ≤ K⋆+ and so the LHS and RHS of (7.20) remain real and non-negative when evaluated
at K⋆−. Since K
⋆
− solves (7.21) and results in a real non-negative LHS and RHS of (7.20), K
⋆
−
must also solve (7.20). Thus K⋆− and K
⋆
+ result in the same nadir frequency. This contradicts
the fact that the nadir frequency is strictly monotonically increasing in the aggregate ramp
rate K.
7.3.2 Sufficient Condition for Satisfying Frequency Threshold
As stated in Remark 7.3, the system model of a constant aggregate ramp rate does not
fully capture the response of each individual generator. In fact, each individual generator
will exhibit a ramp rate of κi until their reserve has been fully deployed as explained in
Section 7.1.3. Some generators may deploy all PFR reserve before the frequency nadir is
reached, in which case the aggregate ramp rate will effectively decrease over time. That being
said, the frequency threshold is guaranteed to be satisfied if we assume the generators are
capable of fully deploying all of their PFR reserve before the time tmin, which represents the
time of the frequency nadir at the minimum aggregate ramp rate Kmin. This is implied by
the intuitive fact that the frequency nadir rises when a generator ramps faster than expected.
This intuitive fact was illustrated in Section 7.3.1 but is not formally proven. This logic leads
to the following result:
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Theorem 7.2. Under Assumption 7.1, the frequency nadir satisfies the minimum frequency
threshold ωNAD ≥ ωmin if the following holds for each generator i ∈ [1, . . . , n]:
ri ≤ κih(M,1†b) (7.23)















Proof: Following from the discussion, the frequency threshold will be met if each
generator is capable of deploying all of its PFR reserve before the time tmin. This requirement
is mathematically written as follows:




Substituting Kmin with its expression from (7.15) gives the result.
The rate-based PFR limit from (7.23) can be interpreted as a condition that the
available PFR reserve must satisfy. With this in mind, any additional nominal PFR reserve
in excess of this limit cannot be utilized before the critical frequency threshold is met.
Intuitively, any nominal PFR reserve Ri that exceeds the amount κih(M,1
†b) is not classified
as being available, meaning that it cannot be provided before the critical frequency threshold
is met.
The function h(M, b̃) is convex in its second argument. Figure 7.4 provides example
plots of h(M, b̃) versus its second argument b̃ for several different values of inertiaM . Notice
that this function is increasing in M and b̃. As a result constraint (7.23) allows the nominal
PFR reserve for a generator to increase if the system inertia increases, if the total FFR
reserve increases, or if its ramp rate κi increases.
As we will see in Chapter 8, the rate based-PFR limit (7.23) can be enforced as a
constraint in a co-optimization problem. Unfortunately, enforcing this constraint would make
the co-optimization problem non-convex because the limit function h(M, b̃) is strictly convex
in its second argument and appears on the Right Hand Side (RHS) of the inequality. For this
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Figure 7.4: Function h(M, b̃) with parameters consistent with Sections 7.2.2 and 8.4.
reason, it may be beneficial to approximate this function as being linear, which would result in
a convex co-optimization problem. In fact, as shown in Figure 7.4, the limit function h(M, b̃)
is approximately linear for low values of total FFR reserve, e.g. 1†b = 100MW. Furthermore,
a conservatively low linear approximation can be easily constructed as a tangent line of the
convex limit function h(M, b̃). Future work will further investigate linear approximations of
the limit function h(M, b̃).
7.4 Proportional PFR Reserve Limits
This subsection provides a connection between the rate-based PFR limit (7.23) and
equivalency ratios from [59]. To make this connection Section 7.4.1 first introduces a turbine
governor model that assumes the ramp rate κi is proportional to the nominal PFR reserve
Ri. This model results in a proportional PFR reserve limit that depends on the nominal
PFR reserve. Section 7.4.2 then provides the equivalency ratio requirement from [59] and
explains how this requirement can also be represented as a limit on the PFR reserve that is
proportional to the nominal PFR reserve Ri. Section 7.4.3 then explains how the equivalency
ratio can be approximated using the simple ramp rate model of a turbine governor and
provides first principles insight into the behavior of equivalency ratios.
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7.4.1 Proportional Ramp Rate Model
Empirically, in the case of large contingencies, the governor ramp rate of a generator,
κi, tends to increase with its nominal PFR reserve, Ri. This is because the frequency drop
in response to a large generator outage is so fast that the droop signal as described in
Section 7.1.3.1 will nearly represent a step change, where the size of the step is equal to the
nominal PFR reserve Ri. Assuming a low-pass filter type response from the droop signal to
the generator mechanical output power, the ramp rate of the turbine governor’s mechanical
power output will increase with the size of the step reference input to the turbine governor.
To emulate this, a model is proposed that is new to the literature and assumes the
generator’s ramp rate is proportional to the nominal PFR reserve Ri. Let’s denote the
proportionality constant by τi, which may vary among generators. Then the governor ramp
rate of the generator is κi = τiRi. Notice that the nominal PFR reserve amount Ri is changed
on 5-15 minute time scales corresponding to the real-time market clearing. On the other
hand, primary frequency control occurs on time scales of 1
ω0
≈ 0.016 seconds. As a result,
the nominal PFR reserve amount and the ramp rate κi can be considered constant on the
time scales that primary control is being performed. With this in mind, the same rate-based
PFR limit (7.23) can be enforced as follows:
ri ≤ τiRih(M,1†b) (7.26)
Intuitively, any nominal PFR reserve Ri that exceeds the amount τiRih(M,1
†b) is not clas-
sified as being available, meaning that it cannot be provided before the critical frequency
threshold is met. This model attempts to capture the way in which a turbine governor
response ramps faster when it has larger head-room.
7.4.2 Equivalency Ratio Requirement
Reference [59] uses an equivalency ratio reserve requirement of the following form:
1†R + α(M)1†b ≥ υ(M) (7.27)
where α(M) is termed the equivalency ratio and υ(M) is the frequency responsive reserve
requirement (Rfrr), both of which are functions of the total system inertia. Reference [59]
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determines these two functions empirically based on simulation studies so that satisfaction
of constraint (7.27) will ensure sufficient reserve to prevent the frequency from violating the
minimum frequency threshold of ωmin = 59.4Hz in response to an outage of size L, where
L = 2750MW in their work.
The simulation studies in [59] fix the inertia to some particular values of M and
identify pairs of total FFR reserve 1†b and total nominal PFR reserve 1†R that result in a
frequency nadir that exactly meets the frequency threshold ωmin. The corresponding total
FFR reserve and PFR reserve pairs are found to have a linear relationship for each fixed
value of inertia. When plotting these values against each other, the slope of the line is α(M)
and the intercept along the PFR reserve axis is υ(M). The first three columns of Table 7.1
replicate the data from [59, table I] and shows the values of α(M) and υ(M) for different
values of inertia M .
Table 7.1: Parameters required to enforce the equivalency ratio requirement from [59]. The
equivalency ratio α(M) and reserve requirement υ(M) are provided for various values of total
system inertia M .
Total Inertia M Rfrr υ(M) Equivalency Ratio α(M) Ratio υ(M)
α(M)
(GWs) (MW) (MW)
120 5200 2.2 2363.6
136 4700 2.0 2350.0
152 3750 1.5 2500.0
177 3370 1.4 2407.1
202 3100 1.3 2384.6
230 3040 1.25 2432.0
256 2640 1.13 2336.3
278 2640 1.08 2444.4
297 2240 1 2240.0
316 2280 1 2280.0
332 2140 1 2140.0
350 2140 1 2140.0
In its fourth column, Table 7.1 additionally presents the ratio α(M)
υ(M)
, which is approx-
imately constant across all inertia values for α(M) > 1. In fact, this ratio is approximately
equal to but slightly less than the magnitude of the outage being accommodated L = 2750.
We will suggest that this observation merits the approximation of υ(M) ≈ α(M)L. For this
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reason, the constraint (7.27) can be approximated as follows:
1
α(M)
1†R + 1†b ≥ L (7.28)
Notice that this equivalency ratio requirement is similar to the general reserve re-
quirement (7.1) but with ri replaced with
1
α(M)
Ri. This suggests that an equivalency ratio
PFR limit should be placed on the available PFR reserve in the following form:
ri ≤ 1α(M)Ri (7.29)
In fact, the equivalency ratio reserve requirement (7.28) holds if and only if there exists a
vector r ∈ Rn such that constraints (7.29) and (7.1) hold.
7.4.3 Relationship Between Proportional Ramp Rate and Equivalency Ratios
Although [59] initially justified the use of equivalency ratios empirically, our analysis
provides insight into equivalency ratios established from first principles. Specifically, the
PFR limits from (7.29) and (7.26) are both proportional to the nominal PFR reserve Ri,
suggesting that the proportionality constants should be similar. With this in mind, un-
der the assumption that all proportionality constants τi are approximately the same across




To better understand this approximation, Figure 7.5 plots the function 1
h(M,1†b)
versus
the total FFR reserve 1†b for different values of inertia M . Notice that this function varies
only somewhat in the total FFR reserve argument at high inertia levels. In other words, the
function 1
h(M,1†b)
can be reasonably approximated as being constant in the total FFR reserve
1†b when the inertia level is high, further justifying the approximation (7.30).
Notice that the approximation (7.30) provides important insight into equivalency ra-
tios from first principles. Specifically, equivalency ratios may be appropriately approximated
as being constant in the total FFR reserve, 1†b, at the high inertia levels that are similar in
magnitude to the inertia levels seen today in ERCOT. However, as the inertia levels drop, the
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Figure 7.5: Function h(M, b̃) with parameters consistent with Sections 7.2.2 and 8.4.
equivalency ratio may vary significantly with the total FFR reserve. As is seen in Figure 7.5,
the slope of the equivalency ratio with respect to the total FFR reserve is approximately an
order of magnitude larger when the inertia is M = 120GWs as opposed to M = 300GWs.
Future work will extend the empirical results from reference [59] to verify that equivalency
ratios significantly vary with the total FFR reserve for low inertia levels.
The approximation (7.30) can alternatively be used to approximate the proportion-
ality constants τi. Specifically, under the assumption that all generators have the same pro-
portionality constant we can approximate τi ≈ 1α(M)h(M,1†b) . In this context it is particularly




constant. For example, using M = 297GWs we have α(M) = 1 and 1
h(M,1†b)
≈ 0.25s−1
leading to a proportionality constant of τi ≈ 0.25s−1.
7.5 Summary
This chapter derived various reserve requirements that couple FFR and PFR reserve
and ensure sufficient reserve for arresting frequency decline in response to a large generator
outage. The main reserve requirement constraint is stated in (7.1) and requires the total
available PFR reserve and FFR reserve to be larger than some reserve requirement L. The
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FFR reserve does not exhibit ramping limitations and thus all of the FFR reserve is consid-
ered to be available immediately to arrest frequency decline once it is triggered. On the other
hand, PFR reserve exhibits ramping limitations that restrict its availability. For this reason,
this chapter introduces the concept of available PFR reserve, denoted ri, which is upper
bounded by the nominal PFR reserve Ri, resulting in the limit constraint (7.9). Various
other limits on the available PFR reserve are provided throughout this chapter that utilize
different models of a generator’s ramping ability. The rate-based PFR limit (7.23) assumes a
constant ramp rate of the turbine governor. The proportional PFR limit (7.26) assumes the
ramp rate of the turbine governor is proportional to the nominal PFR reserve. Finally, the
equivalency ratio limit (7.29) restricts the available PFR reserve to be less than a fraction
of its nominal PFR reserve. A co-optimization problem can be formulated to enforce any of
the aforementioned limits on the available PFR reserve.
The next chapter will enforce reserve requirements that were derived in this chapter,
particularly focusing on a comparison between the rate-based PFR limit (7.23) and the
equivalency ratio PFR limit (7.29), which is consistent with the equivalency ratio requirement
(7.27) from [59] as shown in Section 7.4.2. Although the equivalency ratio PFR limit is only
justified empirically, it is convenient because it will result in a linearly constrained convex co-
optimization problem. In contrast, the rate-based PFR limit is justified from first principles,
but will result in a non-convex co-optimization problem.
Reference [59] suggested the use of equivalency ratios to formulate the reserve re-
quirement. These equivalency ratios were previously considered to be a function of only the
system inertia level and were determined empirically based on simulation studies. Section 7.4
provided an analytical expression for equivalency ratios that provides first principles insight
into equivalency ratios and suggests that they may vary significantly with the total FFR
reserve at low inertia levels. In other words, the analytical results in this chapter suggest
that the equivalency ratio should be represented as a function of the total FFR reserve as
well as the total system inertia. The empirical results provided in [59] are insufficient to em-
pirically establish this dependence of the equivalency ratio on the FFR reserve. Future work
will extend the results from [59] by empirically justifying the dependence of the equivalency




ERCOT will soon implement real-time co-optimization by incorporating Primary
Frequency Responsive (PFR) reserve and Fast Frequency Responsive (FFR) reserve into the
economic dispatch problem [26]. Chapter 7 described both of these reserve types in detail
and derived from first principles reserve requirements that couple these two reserve types.
Among these reserve requirements includes a novel rate-based PFR limit and a previously
proposed equivalency ratio requirement from [59]. This chapter places these two reserve
requirements into two different co-optimization problems and compares their impact on the
electricity market.
The recently approved Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) 863 defines a Re-
sponsive Reserve (RR) product that contains both PFR and FFR reserve types [25]. This
implies that PFR reserve and FFR reserve will see the same price in the electricity market,
effectively treating them as the same product. This chapter deviates from this convention
by suggesting that PFR reserve and FFR reserve should be assigned different prices that
accurately account for their individual effectiveness in arresting frequency decline. Specifi-
cally, KKT prices will be defined for both co-optimization problems presented in this chapter
based on the Lagrange multipliers of the reserve requirement constraints. These KKT prices
will be different for the PFR reserve product and FFR reserve product. See Remark 8.3 for
further discussion.
We will begin by redefining the market participants to include PFR and FFR re-
serve in Section 8.1.1. This section introduces a market participant in the form of a battery
providing FFR reserve and redefines the generator as a market participant that provides
PFR reserve in addition to electric power generation. Section 8.2 then focuses on the co-
optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement that is convex and enforces a re-
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serve requirement that is consistent with the empirically derived requirement from [59] as
discussed in Section 7.4.2. Section 8.3 formulates the co-optimization problem with rate-
based PFR limit that is non-convex and instead enforces the rate-based PFR limit derived
in Section 7.3.2. Both Sections 8.2 and 8.3 additionally define KKT prices based on the
Lagrange multipliers of their corresponding co-optimization problems. These KKT prices
are analogous to the KKT prices derived in Chapter 2 but additionally include KKT prices
for FFR reserve and KKT prices for nominal PFR reserve.
As explained in Chapter 1, a non-convex social welfare maximization problem could
in principle result in non-zero lost opportunity costs experienced by the market participants
and congestion revenue shortfalls. However, since the private constraints of all market par-
ticipants are convex and the feasible set of net power injections is assumed convex in this
chapter, the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit does not exhibit either of
these problems when using KKT prices. To make this explicit, both co-optimization prob-
lems studied in this chapter are shown to result in zero lost opportunity cost for all market
participants when following the dispatch instructions and that congestion revenue adequacy
is guaranteed when using KKT prices.
As is the case with all co-optimization problems, revenue adequacy is not necessarily
guaranteed for the co-optimization problems studied in this chapter because reserve payments
may be considered out-of-market payments not directly covered by another revenue stream
of the ISO. Section 8.4 numerically illustrates that the rate-based PFR limit results in higher
prices for FFR reserve, resulting in more reserve payments as compared to the equivalency
ratio requirement. Section 8.4 also highlights another fundamental difference between the
two co-optimization problems. Specifically, the rate-based PFR limit encourages PFR reserve
to be evenly distributed over many generators. On the other hand, the equivalency ratio
reserve requirement encourages fewer generators to provide PFR reserve. Further empirical
analysis would be required to determine whether the dispersion of PFR over more generators
is appropriate and necessary.
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8.1 Market Participants
The co-optimization problem that will be presented in Section 8.3 is non-convex. In
principle, this non-convexity could cause congestion revenue shortfalls and/or non-zero lost
opportunity cost experienced by market participants. However, Section 8.3 explicitly shows
that all market participants will experience zero lost opportunity cost and that congestion
revenue adequacy is guaranteed when using KKT prices. To show this, we must first define
the lost opportunity cost associated with each market participant. The definition of Potential
Congestion Revenue Shortfall (PCRS) is unchanged from Section 2.2.3.
This section provides updated models of the market participants in a co-optimization
setting. In this setting generators provide PFR reserve as well as electric power generation
and a new participant is introduced in the form of a battery providing FFR reserve. The
system demand and FTR holders have the same definitions as in Section 2.2.
8.1.1 Modeling Generators Providing PFR Reserve
In this part of the dissertation each generator is capable of providing two products in
the electricity market, namely electric real power generation Gi and the nominal PFR reserve
Ri. These two products are coupled as described by the private constraint set, denoted X
i,
from (7.4) in Section 7.1.3. In this context the generator receives a second payment in
addition to the standard payment of λiGi. This second payment is in the amount ξiRi
where ξi is the price of PFR reserve. Furthermore, the cost function from Section 2.2.2
can be generalized to accommodate PFR reserve-related costs as Ci(Gi, Ri), where this cost
function is assumed jointly convex in both of its arguments. As in Chapter 2, each generator
is modeled as a profit maximizer whose maximum profit is a function of its corresponding
prices and is expressed as follows:
Υi(λi, ξi) := max
(Gi,Ri)∈Xi
(λiGi + ξiRi − Ci(Gi, Ri)) . (8.1)
As explained in Section 2.2.2 each generator is expected to provide its ISO-determined
dispatched generation, denoted Gdi . An analogous quantity determined by the ISO related to
nominal PFR reserve is denoted Rdi and is termed the procured nominal PFR reserve but will
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also be referred to as the procured PFR reserve. That is, each generator is expected to provide
its procured PFR reserve, denoted Rdi , which is assigned to it by the ISO when the market
is cleared. Similar to Section 2.2.2, some generators may have dispatched generation levels,
denoted Gdi , and/or procured PFR levels, denoted R
d
i , that do not maximize their profit in
the absence of a market equilibrium. If the dispatched generation and procured PFR reserve
values for generator i ∈ N, denoted Gdi and Rdi , do not maximize the generator’s profit, then
the generator has an incentive to deviate from its dispatched generation and procured PFR
reserve levels. If the generator follows its dispatched generation and procured PFR reserve
levels, then the generator will experience lost opportunity cost in the amount that follows:













i − Ci(Gdi , Rdi )
))
. (8.2)
The co-optimization problem that will be presented in Section 8.3 is non-convex. As
a result, generators may in principle experience non-zero lost opportunity cost. However,
Section 8.3 explicitly shows that generators will experience zero lost opportunity cost when
using KKT prices. This result follows from the fact that the generator private constraints
are convex.
8.1.2 Modeling Batteries Providing FFR Reserve
This part of the dissertation introduces a new type of market participant in the form
of a battery providing a product termed FFR reserve in the amount of bj. The FFR reserve
will be paid a price ζj so that its total payment is ζjbj. The provided FFR reserve will be
constrained by the private constraints imposed by the individual battery, denoted Bj and
defined in (7.3). Furthermore, the cost of providing an amount of FFR reserve bj will be
represented by the function Bj(bj) and is assumed to be convex. Each battery is modeled




(ζjbj −Bj(bj)) . (8.3)
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Similar to the case with generators, each battery is expected to provide its ISO-
determined procured FFR reserve, denoted bd, which is assigned to it by the ISO when the
market is cleared. If the procured FFR reserve does not maximize the battery’s profit, then
the battery has an incentive to deviate. If the battery provides its procured FFR reserve
value, then the battery will experience lost opportunity cost in the amount that follows:
Cbj (ζj, b
d







The co-optimization problem that will be presented in Section 8.3 is non-convex. As
a result, batteries may in principle experience non-zero lost opportunity cost. However,
Section 8.3 explicitly shows that batteries will experience zero lost opportunity cost when
using KKT prices. This result follows from the fact that the battery private constraints are
convex.
8.2 Co-Optimization with Equivalency Ratio Requirement
A co-optimization problem determines the dispatched generation and procured reserve
values that meet reserve requirements described in detail in Chapter 7. This section studies
a co-optimization problem that enforces a reserve requirement defined by constraints (7.1),
(7.9), and (7.29), which are, respectively, as follows:
1†r + 1†b ≥ L, r ≤ R, and r ≤ 1
α(M)
R.
As explained in Section 7.4.3, this reserve requirement is consistent with the equivalency ratio
reserve requirement from [59]. Since α(M) ≥ 1, as illustrated in Table 7.1, the constraint
(7.9) can be removed because it cannot be violated without violating constraint (7.29). The
intermediate variable r can then be eliminated from the reserve requirement constraints,
resulting in a reserve requirement shown as constraint (8.5b) of the following co-optimization





Ci(Gi, Ri) + Σ
j∈B
Bj(bj) (8.5)
st : Di −Gi + Ti = 0 ∀i ∈ N (8.5a)
L ≤ 1
α(M)
1†R + 1†b (8.5b)
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The real power balance constraints are represented by (8.5a). The reserve requirement
is represented by (8.5b) and is written in terms of the constant system inertia M . Note that
numerical results in Section 8.4 will study the effect of varying the inertia. The private bat-
tery constraints are represented by the set B = {b ∈ Rβ : bj ∈ Bj ∀j ∈ B}. The private gen-
erator constraints are represented by the set X={(G,R) ∈ Rn×Rn : (Gi, Ri) ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ N}.
Although this co-optimization problem (8.5) does not place any restrictions on the feasible
set of net real power injections, denoted T, we will henceforth assume that this set is a
polytope and is thus convex. We additionally assume that this set matches the SFCs as
defined in Section 2.2.3. As stated in Chapter 1, the assumption that T is a convex polytope
is motivated by the fact that the ERCOT ISO is considering implementing market changes
regarding co-optimization separately from market changes regarding transmission losses.
The co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5) is simple be-
cause it results in a linearly constrained convex problem. As a result, Slater’s condition
necessarily holds if there exists a feasible point of the co-optimization problem. Under this
mild condition strong duality must hold for the co-optimization problem and the global op-
timum must also solve the KKT conditions along with some optimal Lagrange multipliers.
These KKT conditions can be efficiently solved to identify globally optimal dispatched gener-
ation and procured reserve, denoted (Gd, Rd, bd), along with corresponding optimal Lagrange
multipliers of constraints (8.5a) and (8.5b), denoted λ⋆ ∈ Rn and µ⋆ ∈ R+ respectively. By
the definition of strong duality, the optimal objective value of the co-optimization problem
is equal to the partial Lagrangian dual function evaluated at optimal Lagrange multipliers.















Similar to Chapter 2, λ⋆ represents the price for real electric power at each location
in the network. Furthermore, the price for PFR reserve is the same for each generator i and
is in the amount of ξi :=
1
α(M)
µ⋆. The price for FFR reserve is the same for each battery j
and is in the amount of ζj := µ
⋆. This definition of the prices will be referred to as KKT
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prices because they are derived from Lagrange multipliers that solve the KKT conditions
of the co-optimization problem. Using this definition of KKT prices, the partial Lagrangian
dual function (8.6) decouples into profit maximization problems associated with each of the
market participants, similar to Section 6.3. With this in mind, the partial Lagrangian dual
function (8.6) can be rewritten as follows:









λiDi + µL. (8.7)
As mentioned previously, strong duality will hold for this co-optimization problem
under the assumption that its feasible set is non-empty. For this reason, L(λ⋆, µ⋆) is equal to
the optimal value of the co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5).
With this in mind, two steps are taken to derive the following expression. First, we subtract
the optimal value of the co-optimization problem from L(λ⋆, µ⋆). Second, we subtract the
terms λ⋆†(D − Gd + T d) = 0 and µ⋆(L − 1
α(M)
1†Rd − 1†bd) = 0, which evaluate to zero by













j ) + C
s(λ⋆, Gd) = 0 (8.8)
Since the opportunity cost for generators and batteries are non-negative and the PCRS is
non-negative, each term in (8.8) must evaluate to zero. This means that congestion revenue
adequacy holds and no generators or batteries experience lost opportunity cost.
Unfortunately, revenue adequacy of the ISO cannot necessarily be claimed for any co-
optimization problem. In fact, ISOs in the US typically consider all reserve payments, even
those not discussed in this dissertation, as out-of-market payments and redistribute this cost
among the consumers in the electricity market. On the other hand, some ISOs outside of the
US suggest that some or all reserve payments be recovered from the entities that cause the
reserve costs. In the context of the co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio require-
ment (8.5), this would mean that all reserve payments be recovered by charging the costs of
procuring the reserves to the two largest generators that directly contribute to the reserve
requirement L. In that case the two largest generators would be charged a total amount







summary, all reserve payments must be recovered by the ISO and the method used to recover
these payments may vary between ISOs.
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8.3 Co-Optimization with Rate-Based PFR Limit
This section formulates a co-optimization problem that enforces a reserve requirement
defined by constraints (7.1), (7.9), and (7.23), which are, respectively, as follows:
1†r + 1†b ≥ L, r ≤ R, and r ≤ κh(M,1†b).
This reserve requirement can be represented in a co-optimization problem by introducing
the intermediate variable ri representing the available PFR reserve for each generator i.
Under the assumption that the cost function of each generator i, denoted Ci(Gi, Ri), is non-
decreasing in its second argument, there is no benefit to allowing the nominal PFR reserve
Ri to be larger than the available PFR reserve ri. For this reason, we will restrict these two
values to be the same, e.g. R = r, eliminating the need for constraint (7.9). The available
PFR reserve variables r can then be eliminated by replacing them with the nominal PFR
reserve variables R, resulting in the reserve requirement shown as constraints (8.9b) and





Ci(Gi, Ri) + Σ
j∈B
Bj(bj) (8.9)
st : Di −Gi + Ti = 0 ∀i ∈ N (8.9a)
L ≤ 1†R + 1†b (8.9b)
R ≤ κh(M,1†b) (8.9c)
The real power balance constraints are represented by (8.9a). The reserve requirement is rep-
resented by (8.9b) and (8.9c) and is written in terms of the constant system inertiaM . Again
note that numerical results in Section 8.4 will study the effect of varying inertia. The private
battery constraints are represented by the set B = {b ∈ Rβ : bj ∈ Bj ∀j ∈ B}. The private
generator constraints are represented by the set X={(G,R) ∈ Rn×Rn : (Gi, Ri) ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ N}.
As in the previous section, the co-optimization problem uses a general form of the feasible
set of net real power injections, denoted T. However, we will henceforth assume that this set
is a polytope and is thus convex. We additionally assume that this set matches the SFCs as
defined in Section 2.2.3.
The function h(M,1†b) is strictly convex in the total FFR reserve 1†b as defined in
(7.24). Since this function is strictly convex in 1†b and appears on the RHS of constraint
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(8.9c), the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit is non-convex. As a result,
we cannot assume that strong duality holds as was done in the previous section. Instead,
this section will use the generalized KKT conditions to prove that market participants do
not experience lost opportunity cost and that there is no PCRS when using KKT prices.
Below is a general definition of a KKT point for the co-optimization problem with
rate-based PFR limit (8.9) where the Lagrange multipliers of constraints (8.9a), (8.9b), and
(8.9c) are denoted λ, µ and γ respectively. This definition of a KKT point is similar to
Definition 2.2 of a KKT price/dispatch pair from Chapter 2. This definition follows from
the normal cone definition of the First Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs) as described
in Appendix A (See [71] as well as Remarks 8.1 and 8.2).
Definition 8.1. A KKT point (λ⋆, γ⋆, µ⋆, G⋆, R⋆, b⋆, T ⋆) ∈ Rn×Rn+ ×R+ ×X×B×T is such
that constraints (8.9a), (8.9b), and (8.9c) hold along with the following conditions:
−λ⋆ ∈ NT(T ⋆) (8.10a)
0 ∈∂
(




j) ∀j ∈ B (8.10b)




i ) ∀i ∈ N (8.10c)
µ⋆(L− 1†R⋆ − 1†b⋆) = 0 (8.10d)
γ⋆i (R
⋆
i − κih(M,1†b⋆)) = 0 ∀i ∈ N (8.10e)
where (8.10a)-(8.10c) represent the generalized stationarity condtitions for problem (8.9)
and (8.10d)-(8.10e) represent the complementary slackness conditions for problem (8.9).
The gradient of the function h(M, · ) evaluated at 1†b⋆ is denoted ∇h(M,1†b⋆). The normal
cone of the set T at the point T ⋆ is denoted NT(T
⋆), the normal cone of the set Xi at the point
G⋆i is denoted NXi(G
⋆
i ), and the normal cone of the set B
j at the point b⋆j is denoted NBj(b
⋆
j).
The subdifferential of a general function g(x) evaluated at a point x⋆ is denoted ∂(g(x))|x⋆ .
A formal definition of the normal cone is provided in [71] and is explained intuitively in
Appendix A.
As discussed in Appendix A, standard off-the-shelf optimization software is designed
to identify a KKT point as in Definition 8.1 using iterative algorithms, such as interior point
algorithms. KKT prices can now be defined with respect to a KKT point. Let the KKT
price for FFR reserve be defined as ζj := µ
⋆ + γ⋆†κ∇h(M,1†b⋆) for each battery j ∈ B,
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let the KKT price for PFR reserve be defined as ξi := µ
⋆ − γ⋆i for each generator i ∈ N,
and let the KKT price for electricity be defined as λ⋆i for each generator i ∈ N. With this
definition of the prices, the condition (8.10c) represents the FONCs of the generator profit
maximization problem (8.1), the condition (8.10b) represents the FONCs of the battery profit
maximization problem (8.3), and the condition (8.10a) represents the FONCs of the FTR
payoff maximization problem (2.4). (Note that the normal cone definition of the FONCs are
generally represented by (A.6) in Appendix A). Notice that each of these problems are convex
because the feasible set of net power injections is assumed convex and the private constraint
sets are convex. Since each of these problems are convex, the FONCs are sufficient for global
optimality. As a result, the price, dispatched generation, and procured reserve values defined
by a KKT point result in zero lost opportunity cost for generators and batteries as well as








i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N, and Cbj (ζj, bdj ) = 0 ∀j ∈ B, and Cs(λ⋆, Gd) = 0. (8.11)
Intuitively, KKT prices result in zero PCRS and zero lost opportunity cost of the market
participants because the only non-convex constraint (8.9c) is being priced. That is, the
prices are defined based on the Lagrange multipliers of (8.9c) and all other constraints in
the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) are convex.
As explained in the previous section, revenue adequacy of the ISO cannot necessarily
be claimed for any co-optimization problem including the co-optimization problem with rate-
based PFR limit (8.9). This is because reserve payments must be recovered by the ISO and
the method used to recover these payments may vary between ISOs.
Remark 8.1. We emphasize that a KKT point may not exist in our general framework because
constraint qualifications may not be satisfied for a general non-linear function h(M, · ). It
is also possible that an identified solution satisfying the KKT conditions could represent
a saddle point, local maximum, or local minimum. However, a local minimum to the co-
optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) satisfying the KKT conditions has
been obtained using standard off-the-shelf software for each test case in this dissertation.
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Furthermore, our results regarding KKT points hold if the solution represents a saddle
point, local maximum, or local minimum.
Remark 8.2. Appendix A provides an elaborate description of how the conditions from Def-
inition 8.1 are related to the common KKT conditions. For the special case where the cost
function is smooth, Appendix A.2 proves any solution (G⋆, R⋆, b⋆, T ⋆) that satisfies the tra-
ditional KKT conditions for the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9)
will also satisfy the conditions from Definition 8.1 for some Lagrange multipliers (λ⋆, γ⋆, µ⋆).
In fact, there may be multiple such Lagrange multipliers (λ⋆, γ⋆, µ⋆) that satisfy the KKT
conditions. Our results do not require such Lagrange multipliers to be unique.
Remark 8.3. NPRR 863 implies that PFR reserve and FFR reserve will see the same price in
the electricity market in Texas [25]. In contrast, this chapter suggests that PFR reserve and
FFR reserve should be assigned different prices that accurately account for their individual
effectiveness in arresting frequency decline. Furthermore, this chapter suggests that the PFR
reserve prices should vary between generators based on their ramping capabilities in order to
accurately account for the individual generator’s effectiveness in arresting frequency decline.
It is also important to recognize that the FFR reserve price ζj := µ
⋆ + γ⋆†κ∇h(M,1†b⋆)
cannot be lower than the PFR reserve price ξi := µ
⋆ − γ⋆i . This is because the Lagrange
multipliers γ⋆i , the ramp rates κ, and the gradient ∇h(M,1†b⋆) are all non-negative. This
effectively places more value in the fast acting abilities of FFR reserve.
8.4 Numerical Results
This section intends to illustrate the effect of introducing FFR reserve into the market
by increasing the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄ in a high inertia setting, representing the
inertia levels experienced today. After introducing FFR reserve into the market, we will
illustrate the effect of decreasing inertia to low levels that represent a future scenario where
there may be significant wind and solar penetration. Section 8.4.1 will analyze the co-
optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) and Section 8.4.2 will analyze the
co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5).
A realistically large 2000 bus test case is used that intends to roughly approximate
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the electric power system in Texas described in [7] and [93] and is based on publicly available
data. We will assume the cost of FFR reserve is zero; that is Bi(bi) = 0, and as a result the
total procured FFR reserve 1†bd matches the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄. The 50 natural
gas generators with the largest capacity are selected to provide PFR reserve and their offered
PFR capacity is set to 20 percent of their generation capacity, e.g. R̄i = 0.2Ḡi, consistent
with the analysis in Section 7.1.3.2. The frequency thresholds are set to values that match
the ERCOT NPRR 863 [25]. Specifically, the PFR threshold is ω1 = 59.9833Hz, the FFR
threshold is ω2 = 59.8Hz, and the minimum frequency threshold is ωmin = 59.4Hz. We
additionally analyze a loss of generation in the amount of L = 2750MW, which represents
the two largest nuclear plants in Texas.
8.4.1 Co-optimization with Rate-Based PFR Limit
Let’s first analyze the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9). The
co-optimization problem (8.9) is solved using the interior point algorithm from the MATLAB
package TOMLAB [44]. This algorithm is not guaranteed to find a globally optimal solution;
however, it seems to perform well and always identifies a KKT point as in Definition 8.1.
Furthermore, the ramp rate κi = 20MW/s and the delay ϵ = 0.5s are approximated as being
the same for each generator i providing PFR reserve and were determined using a dynamic
simulation of a loss of the two largest generators, which amounts to approximately 2750MW.
The dynamic simulations were performed using PowerWorld.
We will first consider the effect of introducing FFR reserve into the market and then
consider the effect of reducing the inertia after FFR reserve has been introduced into the
market.
8.4.1.1 Introducing FFR Reserve to Market
Consider a high inertia scenario M = 300GWs, which represents an inertia value
typical today in Texas. The limit function at this inertia level is plotted in Figure 7.4. Fig-
ures 8.1 and 8.2 analyze the effect of introducing FFR reserve into the market by increasing
the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄ from 0 to 1000MW. Figure 8.1 plots the procured PFR
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reserve for each generator as the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄ increases. When the total of-
fered FFR capacity increases past 1000MW the price of both PFR and FFR reserve becomes
zero and the co-optimization problem has multiple solutions, making it difficult to analyze.
Notice that Assumption 7.1 from Section 7.2.2 is satisfied with the selected parameters and
for the selected range of total offered FFR capacity. As the total offered FFR capacity
increases the procured FFR reserve replaces the most expensive PFR reserve in turn from
highest procurement cost to lowest procurement cost. As a result the procured PFR reserve
does not decrease uniformly among all generators, but instead decreases to zero for only one
or two generators at a time.
Figure 8.1: Procured PFR reserve for increasing total offered FFR capacity using the co-
optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.5). Each trajectory represents the procured
PFR reserve to a specific generator.
The upper bound on the procured PFR reserve from the rate-based PFR limit con-
straint (8.9c) increases as the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄ increases. Generators that
exhibit high generation costs, low PFR reserve costs and high capacity Ḡi are operating at
this upper bound and see increasing procured PFR reserve as the total offered FFR capacity
increases. As a result we see the procured PFR reserve increasing for many generators from
approximately 65MW to approximately 100MW. On the other hand, generators that exhibit
high generation costs, low PFR reserve costs, and low capacity Ḡi are limited by their offered
PFR capacity R̄i = 0.2Ḡi and do not experience this increase in procured PFR reserve.
Figure 8.2 shows the trajectory of reserve payments as the offered FFR capacity 1†b̄
increases. Notice that the total FFR reserve payments initially increase because the procured
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FFR reserve is increasing. However, when the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄ reaches 500 MW
the total FFR reserve payments begin to decrease because the reserve price is dropping. On
the other hand, the total PFR reserve payments experiences a steady decline. The total
reserve payments (including both FFR and PFR reserve payments) also decreases as more
FFR reserve is introduced.
Figure 8.2: Reserve payments and cost savings for increasing total offered FFR capacity using
the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.5).
Increasing FFR reserve also has the benefit of reducing total system costs, or equiv-
alently increasing social welfare. The total system costs at the total offered FFR capacity
of 1†b̄ = 0 is approximately $1.2× 106. Figure 8.2 additionally plots the total cost savings,
which are increasing. Notice that increasing offered FFR capacity increases cost savings in
two ways. First, it allows for lower amounts of procured PFR reserve, in turn, allowing for
low cost generation to be dispatched upward. Second, it increases the PFR reserve limit
from constraint (8.9c), allowing the procured PFR reserve to increase from generators with
low procurement costs.
8.4.1.2 Reducing the Total System Inertia
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 fix the total offered FFR capacity to 1†b̄ = 1000MW and analyze
the effect of decreasing inertia values from 300GWs to 150GWs. This intends to represent
the future scenario of decreasing inertia caused by an increase of wind and solar energy
penetration. Figure 8.3 plots the procured PFR reserve for each generator as the total
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system inertia M decreases. As the inertia drops, the limit function h(·,1†b) decreases
and the rate-based PFR limit becomes tighter. This limit constraint causes the procured
PFR reserve to decrease for many generators with low procurement costs and increase for
many generators with high procurement costs. When the inertia reaches its lowest value
of 150GWs, the procured PFR reserve for many generators matches their rate-based PFR
limit. It is apparent that the co-optimization problem (8.9) accommodates low inertia values
by diversifying the procured PFR reserve, effectively distributing PFR reserve more evenly
among the generators.
Figure 8.3: Procured PFR reserve for decreasing inertia values using the co-optimization problem
with rate-based PFR limit (8.5). Each trajectory represents the procured PFR reserve for a specific
generator.
Figure 8.4 shows the trajectory of PFR and FFR reserve payments as the inertia
drops. As the inertia drops from M = 300GWs the reserve prices and payments remain
zero until approximately M = 275GWs at which point the PFR and FFR reserve payments
begin to increase. For all values of inertia the total FFR reserve payments approximately
double the total PFR reserve payments despite the fact that the total procured FFR reserve
is lower than the total procured PFR reserve. Specifically, the total procured FFR reserve
is 1000MW and the total procured PFR reserve is 1750MW at all inertia levels. This means
that the FFR reserve price is significantly larger than the PFR reserve price as discussed in
Section 8.3. This higher FFR reserve price places more value in the FFR reserve because of
its ramping capabilities.
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Figure 8.4: Reserve payments and cost savings for decreasing inertia values using the co-
optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.5).
8.4.2 Co-optimization with Equivalency Ratio Requirement
Let’s now analyze the co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement
(8.5). The co-optimization problem (8.5b) is convex and quadratic due to quadratic cost
functions in the 2000 bus test case. This problem is solved using the quadratic programming
software in MATLAB’s optimization toolbox, which is guaranteed to converge to a globally
optimal solution. The equivalency ratio will take the values from Table 7.1, which were
identified empirically by [59].
Similar to the previous section, we will first consider the effect of introducing FFR
reserve into the market and then consider the effect of reducing the inertia after FFR reserve
has been introduced into the market.
8.4.2.1 Introducing FFR Reserve to Market
Consider a high inertia scenario M = 300GWs, which represents an inertia value
typical today in Texas. According to Table 7.1 the equivalency ratio at this inertia level
should be α(M) = 1. Figures 8.5 and 8.6 analyze the effect of introducing FFR reserve into
the market by increasing the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄ from 0 to 1000MW. Figure 8.5
plots the procured PFR reserve for each generator as the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄
increases. When the total offered FFR capacity increases past 600MW the price of both
PFR and FFR reserve becomes zero and the co-optimization problem has multiple solutions,
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making it difficult to analyze. We will focus our analysis on total offered FFR capacity levels
below 600MW, in which case the prices are positive and the total procured FFR reserve 1†bd
equals the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄. As the total procured FFR reserve increases it
replaces the most expensive PFR reserve in turn from highest procurement cost to lowest
procurement cost. As a result the procured PFR reserve does not decrease uniformly among
all generators, but instead decreases to zero for only one or two generators at a time.
Figure 8.5: Procured PFR reserve for increasing total offered FFR capacity using the co-
optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5). Each trajectory represents the
procured PFR reserve for a specific generator.
As compared to the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) the
co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5) results in large amounts
of procured PFR reserve for some generators because they do not exhibit a tight PFR limit.
This can be seen by comparing the two Figures 8.5 and 8.1. Furthermore, when using the
equivalency ratio requirement, fewer generators are effected by the introduction of FFR
reserve into the market. First, the equivalency ratio does not change with the total offered
FFR capacity and so most generators maintain constant procured PFR reserve. Second, less
generators are replaced by the newly introduced low cost FFR reserve in the sense that their
procured PFR reserve falls to zero. Notice that only four generators are replaced by FFR
reserve in Figure 8.5 and twelve generators are replaced by FFR reserve in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.6 shows the trajectory of reserve payments as the total offered FFR capacity
1†b̄ increases. Although this figure sees similar trends as in Figure 8.2, we see slightly less
PFR reserve payments and significantly less payment to FFR reserve. Notice that the total
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FFR reserve payments initially increase because the total procured FFR reserve is increasing.
However, when the total offered FFR capacity 1†b̄ reaches 350 MW the total FFR reserve
payments begin to decrease because the reserve price is dropping. On the other hand, total
PFR reserve payments steadily decline. The total reserve payments (including both FFR
and PFR reserve payments) also decreases as more FFR reserve is introduced.
As compared to the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) the
co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5) lowers the operating cost
by approximately $1200 at the total offered FFR capacity level of 1†b̄ = 0. Figure 8.6
additionally plots the total cost savings with respect to the case with zero total offered
FFR capacity for the co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5). As
expected the total cost savings are increasing in the total offered FFR capacity.
Figure 8.6: Reserve payments and cost savings for increasing total offered FFR capacity using
the co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5).
8.4.2.2 Reducing the Total System Inertia
Figures 8.7 and 8.8 fix the total offered FFR capacity to 1†b̄ = 1000MW and analyze
the effect of decreasing inertia values from 300GWs to 150GWs. This intends to represent
the future scenario of decreasing inertia caused by an increase of wind and solar energy
penetration. The reserve prices and payments are zero for inertia at or above M = 230GWs
and thus the co-optimization problem has multiple solutions, making it difficult to analyze.
We will focus our analysis on inertia values falling below M = 230GWs, in which case the
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prices are positive and the total procured FFR reserve 1†b̄ is equal to the total offered FFR
capacity 1†b̄.
Figure 8.7 plots the procured PFR reserve for each generator as the total system
inertia M decreases. The fundamental difference between the reserve requirements in prob-
lems (8.5) and (8.9) is well illustrated by Figures 8.7 and 8.3. Specifically, Figure 8.7 shows
that problem (8.5) accommodates low inertia values by simply increasing the procured PFR
reserve. Notice that all procured PFR reserve trajectories increase as the inertia decreases
in Figure 8.7, which contrasts with Figure 8.3. On the other hand, Figure 8.3 shows that
problem (8.9) accommodates low inertia values by distributing the procured PFR reserve
among more generators. Notice that the total procured reserve (including FFR and PFR) is
equal to L = 2750MW at all inertia values in Figure 8.3, whereas the total procured reserve
is more than L = 2750MW at low inertia values in Figure 8.7.
Figure 8.7: Procured PFR reserve for decreasing inertia values using the co-optimization problem
with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5). Each trajectory represents the procured PFR reserve to
a specific generator.
Figure 8.8 shows the trajectory of reserve payments as the total system inertia
drops. As the inertia drops the reserve prices and payments remain zero until approxi-
mately M = 230GWs at which point the PFR and FFR reserve payments begin to increase.
For all inertia levels the total PFR reserve payments approximately double the total FFR
reserve payments, which is the opposite of what was witnessed in Figure 8.4. Notice that the
trajectory of total PFR reserve payments is very similar for both figures; however, Figure 8.8
experiences a drastic reduction in total FFR reserve payments. In fact, the co-optimization
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problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5) results in considerably lower prices for FFR
reserve as compared to the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9).
Figure 8.8: Reserve payments and cost savings for decreasing inertia values using the co-
optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement (8.5).
8.5 Summary
This chapter analyzed two different co-optimization problems. The first co-optimization
problem uses an equivalency ratio reserve requirement and is consistent with the empirically
derived requirement from [59]. The second co-optimization problem uses the rate-based PFR
limit derived in Chapter 7. Using KKT prices, all market participants are proven to have
zero lost opportunity cost and congestion revenue adequacy is guaranteed.
Numerical results are provided that illustrate the main differences between the two
co-optimization problems. The equivalency ratio reserve requirement is shown to concentrate
large amounts of PFR reserve to generators with low procurement costs at low inertia levels.
In contrast, the rate-based PFR limit disperses the procured PFR reserve more evenly among
many generators. The equivalency ratio reserve requirement is also shown to result in less
reserve payments, which is desirable from a revenue adequacy standpoint. In contrast the
rate-based PFR limit results in significantly higher prices for FFR reserve effectively placing
value in the ramping ability of FFR reserve and resulting in large FFR reserve payments.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
Parts I and II of this dissertation were motivated by two recently proposed market rule
changes in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). Part I aimed to incorporate
non-linear transmission models into the electricity market that account for transmission
losses. This part of the dissertation was primarily based on [31–33]. Part II aimed to
incorporate interdependent reserve types for primary frequency response into a real-time
co-optimization problem. This part of the dissertation extended the work from [30]. Part III
will now conclude the dissertation by summarizing the main findings and suggesting future
research directions.
9.1 Economic Dispatch: Non-Linear Transmission Models
Part I of this dissertation focused on incorporating accurate non-linear transmission
models into the myopic economic dispatch problem. Chapter 3 formulated the most accurate
myopic economic dispatch problem, which is termed the Alternating Current Optimal Power
Flow (AC OPF) problem. Due to the inherent non-convexity of the AC OPF problem it
is generally difficult to solve and it would also result in an electricity market that cannot
guarantee congestion revenue adequacy. This is one reason why ISOs today solve economic
dispatch problems that serve as convex approximations of the AC OPF problem. These
convex approximations were derived in Chapters 4 and 5. On the other hand, Chapter 6
attempted to accommodate non-convexity of the AC OPF problem by using algorithms
that identify a potentially sub-optimal solution and by mitigating the congestion revenue
adequacy problem using convex hull prices.
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9.1.1 Convex Approximations of the AC OPF Problem
A non-linear transmission line model was derived in Chapter 4 that approximates
the fully detailed AC transmission line model used in the AC OPF problem. The proposed
non-linear transmission line model is a generalization of the commonly used quadratic loss
model, incorporates a Fictitious Nodal Demand (FND) representation of losses, and was
used to formulate the Transmission Constrained Economic Dispatch (TCED) problem, which
approximates the AC OPF problem. Chapter 4 additionally contributed to the literature by
deriving various line limit constraints and by providing rigorous justification that the FND
representation of transmission losses should allocate half of the losses of each transmission
line to the busses on either side of the line.
The TCED problem derived in Chapter 4 is convenient because it can easily be
made convex by use of the load over-satisfaction relaxation, which is capable of recovering
the exact solution of the TCED problem under the condition that Locational Marginal
Prices (LMPs) are positive. The Independent System Operator (ISO) in New Zealand rarely
sees non-positive prices because they restrict market participants to provide non-negative
marginal cost offers in the electricity market. For this reason, New Zealand uses the load
over-satisfaction relaxation in their market clearing process. Unfortunately, ISOs in the
United States (US) frequently see negative prices and so they could not directly use the load
over-satisfaction relaxation without modification or post-processing. To make this approach
applicable to ISOs in the US, future work will focus on post-processing methods that can
recover a nearly optimal feasible solution to the TCED problem from the minimizer of the
convex relaxed TCED problem.
ISOs in the US use linearization techniques to approximate the solution to the TCED
problem and these techniques do not require the prices to be positive. Chapter 5 studied
a linearized version of the TCED problem termed the common LCED problem because it
represents an economic dispatch problem used by ISOs in the US. This chapter contributed
to the literature by characterizing the approximation errors associated with each of the three
assumptions required to accurately recover the optimal dispatch of the non-convex TCED
problem from the solution of the common LCED problem. This chapter observed that the
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common LCED problem may have multiple minimizers, in which case small perturbations
of the base-case state may result in large dispatch approximation error. Future work will
identify the economic impacts of this seemingly unavoidable dispatch approximation error.
Another identified source of dispatch approximation error lies in the inaccurate choice
of Loss Distribution Factors (LDFs). Even if the base-case state matches a minimizer of the
non-convex TCED problem, Chapter 5 proved that there does not always exist a choice of
LDFs such that the optimal dispatch of the TCED problem is also optimal for the common
LCED problem. For the situations where such LDFs do not exist, future work will focus on
identifying LDFs that minimize dispatch approximation error. On the other hand, Chapter 5
showed that such LDFs do exist and identified such LDFs for the special case where no line
limits are binding.
9.1.2 Accommodating the AC OPF Problem by use of Convex Hull Pricing
As illustrated in Chapter 4, iterative methods, such as interior point algorithms,
can be used to effectively approximate a minimizer of the AC OPF problem. Although
these algorithms are only, at best, guaranteed to converge to a local minimum, they often
converge to a point that is nearly globally optimal. Chapter 6 suggested dispatching the
resulting identified solution of the AC OPF problem that is not guaranteed to be globally
optimal. As a result congestion revenue adequacy cannot be guaranteed, or equivalently
Financial Transmission Right (FTR) uplift may be positive, as illustrated in Chapter 3.
For this reason Chapter 6 proposed using Convex Hull Prices (CHPs) that solve a novel
multi-objective minimum uplift problem that balances a tradeoff between generator uplift
and FTR uplift. The proposed multi-objective minimum uplift problem includes a weight
parameter representing the relative value of FTR uplift to generator uplift. Although this
chapter illustrates the effect of varying this weight parameter, it does not identify a proper
method of choosing this parameter. Future work will focus on methods of properly choosing
this weight parameter.
Chapter 6 continued by providing the first proposed method of approximating CHPs
in polynomial-time using a transmission network model that is general enough to accom-
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modate the AC OPF problem. The approximate CHPs were computed using convex re-
laxations of the AC OPF problem that have been developed in previous work. Numerical
results showed that the Semi-Definite Programming (SDP) relaxation effectively approxi-
mates CHPs but exhibits computational limitations on large systems. Furthermore, the
Quadratic Convex (QC) and Second-Order Cone (SOC) relaxations are computationally ef-
ficient but are not as effective in approximating CHPs. Future work will aim to improve
upon the convex relaxations studied in this dissertation by developing tight relaxations that
are computationally efficient.
The results in this dissertation focus on an economic dispatch problem that is my-
opic the sense that (in its basic formulation) it only optimizes over a single time interval.
However, convex hull pricing is typically studied in the context of the Unit Commitment
(UC) problem, which optimizes over a time horizon and considers non-convex private gener-
ator constraints. The results provided in Chapter 6 will be extended to accommodate a UC
problem. Remark 6.1 illustrates how this extension can be made. In this context it would
also be useful to approximate convex hull prices using a quadratic loss model as derived in
Chapter 4 along with the load over-satisfaction relaxation. Future work will also identify
special cases where the proposed approximation of CHPs are guaranteed to exactly match
the actual CHPs.
Electricity markets today require each FTR allocation vector to be balanced in the
sense that the elements sum to zero. With the goal of introducing loss modeling into the
electricity market, the convex hull pricing work in Chapter 6 assumed a more general defi-
nition of FTRs that allow FTR allocation vectors to be unbalanced in the sense that their
elements may not sum to zero, e.g. 1†f (ξ) ̸= 0. Unbalanced FTRs have been studied well in
the literature [37, 40] and allow FTRs to hedge locational price differences caused by losses
as well as congestion. That being said, no electricity markets today allow for unbalanced
FTRs and so future work will investigate implementation challenges regarding unbalanced
FTRs.
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9.2 Co-Optimization: Interdependent Reserve Types
Part II of this dissertation introduced interdependent reserve types for primary fre-
quency response into the economic dispatch problem, resulting in a co-optimization problem.
Two types of reserve were considered. The first type was Primary Frequency Responsive
(PFR) reserve, which intends to accommodate standard droop control. The second type was
Fast Frequency Responsive (FFR) reserve, which was recently introduced to the ERCOT
market and intends to accommodate fast acting battery resources. Chapter 7 derived re-
serve requirements from first principles that couple FFR and PFR reserve. Chapter 8 then
placed these reserve requirements into a co-optimization problem that would be solved by the
ERCOT ISO to determine dispatch of generation and procurement of reserves. This chapter
compared a non-convex co-optimization problem that enforces the newly proposed rate-based
PFR limit to a previously formulated convex co-optimization problem that enforces a reserve
requirement based on equivalency ratios.
9.2.1 Reserve Requirements
Chapter 7 distinguished between nominal PFR reserve, as determined by a genera-
tor’s head-room, and available PFR reserve, as determined by the ramping limitations of a
generator’s turbine governor. This chapter provided a simple model of available PFR reserve
that intended to capture the ramping limitations of droop control by use of a fixed time delay
followed by a fixed ramp rate. Using this model, Chapter 7 derived a novel rate-based PFR
limit that ensures PFR reserve has sufficient ramping ability to effectively arrest frequency
decline in response to a generator outage under certain assumptions. Specifically, the FFR
reserve deployment was assumed to occur during the PFR reserve ramping period and was
assumed not to overshoot; that is, the power imbalance is assumed to not become instantly
positive. Finally, Chapter 7 used the rate-based PFR limit to derive the equivalency ratio re-
serve requirement by modeling the fixed ramp rate exhibited by each PFR reserve generator
as being proportional to the nominal PFR reserve of that generator. The resulting equiva-
lency ratio depends on the system inertia as well as the total FFR reserve. It was shown that
the proposed equivalency ratio is approximately constant in the total FFR reserve for high
inertia levels, yielding a reserve requirement very similar in form to the equivalency ratio
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reserve requirement from [59]. This first principles derivation of the equivalency ratio reserve
requirement is novel because previous work has only studied equivalency ratios empirically
through simulation [59].
The assumptions used to derive the rate-based PFR limit will be removed in future
work. Specifically, each possible combination of scenarios will be considered where the FFR
reserve deployment occurs before or after the PFR reserve ramp and where the FFR reserve
does overshoot. Furthermore, future work will determine which turbine governor models are
best represented as having a constant ramp rate versus a ramp rate that is proportional to
the generator’s nominal PFR reserve. In this context, proper ramp rates and proportional
constants will be empirically verified using extensive simulation results of large generator
outages. Finally, future work will use the rate-based PFR limit to provide insight into
offered PFR capacity limits that are enforced in practice through ISO protocols.
9.2.2 Real-Time Co-Optimization
Chapter 8 formulated two co-optimization problems. The first was non-convex and
enforced the newly proposed rate-based PFR limit, which varied non-linearly with the pro-
cured FFR reserve. The second was convex and enforced the equivalency ratio requirement
from [59]. It was proven that both problems result in zero lost opportunity cost for genera-
tors/batteries and zero FTR uplift when using the proposed KKT prices. As compared to
the co-optimization problem with equivalency ratio requirement, numerical results illustrated
that the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit encouraged the procured PFR
reserve to be more evenly dispersed among generators. Furthermore, the co-optimization
problem with rate-based PFR limit resulted in higher prices for FFR reserve, which would
encourage additional investment in FFR reserve but also result in larger reserve payments,
which may be considered out-of-market payments.
The co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit is non-convex and is gen-
erally difficult to solve. This dissertation suggested solving this co-optimization problem
using interior point methods, which are only, at best, guaranteed to converge to local min-
imum. Future work will identify efficient ways of approximately solving this non-convex
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co-optimization problem. For example, [30] briefly suggests an accurate approximate for-
mulation that uses a piecewise linearization of the PFR reserve limit constraint that only





Generalized KKT Conditions using the Normal Cone
This appendix outlines the relationship between the common KKT conditions and
the generalized KKT conditions used in Chapters 8 and 2. Section A.1 intuitively explains
the relationship between the normal cone definition of the First Order Necessary Conditions
(FONCs) from [71] and the common KKT conditions. This section additionally shows that
the common KKT conditions imply the normal cone definition of the FONCs. Section A.2
then explicitly states the common KKT conditions for the co-optimization problem with
rate-based PFR limit (8.9) for the special case where the cost function is smooth and proves
that these conditions imply the generalized KKT conditions from Definition 8.1. The KKT
price/dispatch pair from Definition 2.2 follows by recognizing that the KKT conditions for
the general ED problem (2.6) are a special case of the KKT conditions for the co-optimization
problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) where the reserve requirement L is zero, the PFR
reserve offer R̄ is zero, and the FFR reserve offer b̄ is zero.
The notation in this section of the appendix is consistent with the introduction and
Part II of this dissertation, where the generalized KKT conditions are defined. However, this
notation is not completely consistent with Part I of this dissertation because some symbols
are redefined.
A.1 The FONCs, the Normal Cone, and the KKT Conditions
Section A.1.1 will quickly derive the normal cone definition of the FONCs. Sec-
tion A.1.2 will provide geometric insight into the normal cone definition of the FONCs.
Finally, Section A.1.3 will quickly derive the KKT conditions from the normal cone defini-
tion of the FONCs, intuitively showing that both are equivalent.
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where X represents the feasible set of the optimization problem and ψ : X → R represents
the objective function.
A.1.1 General First Order Necessary Condition using Normal Cones
The optimization problem (A.1) can be equivalently written as the following problem




ψ(x) + IF(x) (A.2)
where the indicator function is defined as follows:
IF(x) :=
{
0 if x ∈ F
∞ else (A.3)
The FONCs of this unconstrained problem require the zero vector to fall in the sub-gradient
of the objective. Before writing this mathematically, let’s first note that the sub-gradient of
the indicator function evaluated at x is the normal cone of the set F evaluated at x and is
denoted NF(x). The normal cone of the set F evaluated at x
⋆ is formally defined in [71] as
follows:
NF(x
⋆) := {y : y(x− x⋆) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ CF(x⋆)} , (A.4)
where CF(x
⋆) is called the tangent cone of the set F evaluated at some point x⋆ and represents
all feasible directions in the set F starting at point x⋆. With this in mind, we have the
following equality:
∂ (IF(x)) = NF(x) (A.5)
Recall that the FONCs of this unconstrained problem require the zero vector to fall in the
sub-gradient of the objective. The FONCs can now be written as follows, where the addition
of two sets represents the Minkowski sum:
0 ∈ ∂ (ψ(x) + IF(x)) = ∂ (ψ(x)) + ∂ (IF(x)) = ∂ (ψ(x)) +NF(x) (A.6)
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In the special case where the objective function ψ(x) is smooth, its sub-gradient is a
singleton and the FONCs reduce to the following:
−∇ψ(x⋆) ∈ NF(x⋆) (A.7)
A.1.2 Geometric Interpretation of the FONCs with Smooth Objective Function
The normal cone definition of the FONCs has an intuitive geometric interpretation.
Consider some point x⋆ ∈ F. Intuitively, if x⋆ is optimal, then the gradient of the objective
evaluated at x⋆, denoted ∇ψ(x⋆), should have a non-negative dot product with all feasible
directions. This can be expressed as follows:
∇ψ(x⋆)†(x− x⋆) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ CF(x⋆) (A.8)
With this in mind, the normal cone of the normal cone of the set F evaluated at x, denoted
NF(x
⋆), represents all vectors with negative dot product with all feasible directions as defined
in (A.4).
These concepts are intuitively demonstrated in a simple two dimensional example
with a smooth objective function from Figure A.1. In this example the feasible set is defined
as F = {x ∈ R2 : ϕ(x) ≤ 0} where ϕ : R2 → R2 is the vector valued constraint function and
the point x⋆ satisfies the FONCs. The tangent cone CF(x
⋆) is illustrated by the orange area in
Figure A.1. The normal cone NF(x
⋆) is illustrated by the blue area in Figure A.1. Intuitively,
if x⋆ is optimal, then the gradient of the objective evaluated at x⋆, denoted ∇ψ(x⋆), should
have a non-negative dot product with all feasible directions.
A.1.3 Deriving the KKT Conditions
Let’s now assume the feasible set is defined as follows, where the vector valued con-
straint function ϕ : R¯ψ → Rϕ̄ is smooth and thus its gradient is well-defined:
F = {x ∈ R¯ψ : ϕ(x) ≤ 0} (A.9)




















Figure A.1: Normal Cone Illustration
Notice that this definition is interpreted as a cone with basis vectors being the columns
of ∇ϕ(x⋆). Furthermore, the ith column is used in the basis only if the ith constraint is bind-
ing, e.g. ϕi(x
⋆)λi = 0. The general FONCs from (A.6) can now be rewritten. Specifically, a
point x⋆ satisfies the general FONCs from (A.6) if the following KKT conditions hold:
∃λ ∈ Rϕ̄ and ∃y ∈ ∂(ψ(x⋆)) such that: (A.10)
x⋆ ∈ F (A.10a)
y = ∇ϕ(x⋆)λ (A.10b)
λ ≥ 0 (A.10c)
ϕi(x
⋆)λi = 0 (A.10d)
Constraint (A.10a) is called the primal feasibility condition and follows from the fact
that the normal cone evaluates to the null set if x⋆ /∈ F. Constraint (A.10b) is called the
stationarity condition and is interpreted as basis vectors of the normal cone being the columns
of ∇ϕ(x⋆). Constraint (A.10c) is called the dual feasibility condition and is interpreted as the
cone weights being non-negative. Constraint (A.10d) is called the complimentary slackness
condition and allows the ith column of ∇ϕ(x⋆) to be a basis vector only if the jth constraint
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is binding, e.g. ϕj(x
⋆) = 0.
The conditions (A.10) are the KKT conditions for optimization problem (A.1) with
feasible set (A.9), with a general non-smooth objective function ψ(x), and a smooth con-
straint function ϕ(x). Most off-the-shelf optimization software aims to identify a solution x⋆
that satisfies the KKT conditions (A.10) along with corresponding Lagrange multipliers λ⋆.
In the case where the constraint function ϕ(x) is smooth, these KKT conditions imply the
normal cone definition of the FONCs (A.6).
A.2 Generalized KKT Conditions for the Co-Optimization Prob-
lem
This section analyzes the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9)
for the special case where that the constraint sets Xi, Bj, and T are defined by smooth
vector valued constraint functions and the cost function is smooth. We show that any point
satisfying the common KKT conditions of the co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR
limit (8.9) along with some Lagrange multipliers must also solve the definition of a KKT
point 8.1.
Consider the general co-optimization problem (8.9) with the feasible set of net real
power injections and the private constraint sets defined as follows:
T = {T ∈ Rn : σ(T ) ≤ 0}
Xi = {(Gi, Ri) ∈ R× R : ρi(Gi, Ri) ≤ 0} ∀i ∈ N
Bj = {bj ∈ R : θj(bj) ≤ 0} ∀j ∈ B
where the vector valued constraint functions are defined as σ : Rn → Rσ̄, ρi : R× R → Rρ̄,
and θ : R → Rθ̄ and are assumed smooth so they have a unique gradient. Notice that these
symbols have different meaning in Part I of this dissertation, but are consistent with the
notation in the introduction and Part II of this dissertation. Using these definitions the






Ci(Gi, Ri) + Σ
j∈B
Bj(bj) (8.9)
st : Di −Gi + Ti = 0 ∀i ∈ N (8.9a)
L ≤ 1†R + 1†b (8.9b)
Ri ≤ κih(M,1†b) ∀i ∈ N (8.9c)
ρi(Gi, Ri) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N (8.9d)
θj(bj) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ B (8.9e)
σ(T ) ≤ 0 (8.9f)
A point (G⋆, R⋆, b⋆, T ⋆) ∈ Rn × Rn × Rβ × Rn is said to satisfy the KKT conditions
for problem (8.9) if there exist Lagrangian dual variables (λ, µ, γ, φ, χ, ς) ∈ Rn × R × Rβ ×
Rρ̄×n × Rθ̄×β × Rσ̄ such that the following conditions hold:
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∇GiCi(G⋆i , R⋆i )− λi +∇Giρi(G⋆i , R⋆i )φi = 0 ∀i ∈ N (A.12)





+∇θj(b⋆j)χj = 0 ∀j ∈ B (A.14)
λ+∇σ(T ⋆)ς = 0 (A.15)
D −G⋆ + T ⋆ = 0 (A.16)
L ≤ 1†R⋆ + 1†b⋆ (A.17)
R⋆i ≤ κihi(M,1†b⋆) (A.18)
G⋆i ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ N (A.19)
b⋆j ∈ Bj ∀j ∈ B (A.20)
T ⋆ ∈ T (A.21)
µ ≥ 0 (A.22)
γ ≥ 0 (A.23)
φ ≥ 0 (A.24)
χ ≥ 0 (A.25)
ς ≥ 0 (A.26)
µ(L− 1†R⋆ − 1†b⋆) = 0 (A.27)
γ†i (R
⋆





i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N (A.29)
χ†jθj(b
⋆
j) = 0 ∀j ∈ B (A.30)
ς†σ(T ⋆) = 0 (A.31)




represents the gradient of the function
h (M, ·) evaluated at 1†b⋆ and is smooth. Furthermore, ∇GiCi(G⋆i , R⋆i ) represents the gra-
dient of the function Ci(·, R⋆i ) evaluated at G⋆i and ∇RiCi(G⋆i , R⋆i ) represents the gradient
of the function Ci(G
⋆
i , ·) evaluated at R⋆i . All other gradient notation matches the standard
conventions from the body of the dissertation.
The stationarity condition is represented by (A.12)-(A.15). The primal feasibility
condition is represented by (A.16)-(A.21). The dual feasibility condition is represented by
(A.22)-(A.26). The complementary slackness condition is represented by (A.27)-(A.31).
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The conditions (A.15), (A.21), (A.26) and (A.31) represent the KKT conditions for
the FTR payoff maximization problem (2.4) and thus the general FONCs from (A.6) are
satisfied for this problem. As a result, the following must be satisfied:
−λ ∈ NT(T ) (A.32)
The conditions (A.12), (A.13), (A.19), (A.24) and (A.29) represent the KKT condi-
tions for the individual generator profit maximization problems (8.1) and thus the general
FONCs from (A.6) are satisfied for this problem. As a result, the following must be satisfied:




i ) ∀i ∈ N (A.33)
The conditions (A.14), (A.20), (A.25) and (A.30) represent the KKT conditions for
the individual battery profit maximization problems (8.3) and thus the general FONCs from
(A.6) are satisfied for this problem. As a result, the following must be satisfied:
0 ∈∂
(





j) ∀j ∈ B (A.34)
Conditions (A.32)-(A.34) represent the generalized stationarity conditions (8.10a)-
(8.10c) from Definition 8.1. The non-negativity constraints on µ and γ in Definition 8.1
are implied by conditions (A.22) and (A.23). The complimentary slackness equations from
Definition 8.1 are implied by (A.27) and (A.28). The primal feasibility conditions from
Definition 8.1 are implied by conditions (A.16)-(A.21).
The conditions from Definition 8.1 represent the generalized KKT conditions for the
co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9), which is a generalization of the
general ED problem (2.6). Specifically, the general ED problem (2.6) is attained from the
co-optimization problem with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) by setting the reserve requirement
to L = −1, by setting the FFR reserve offers to zero for each battery, e.g. b̄ = 0, and by
setting the PFR reserve offers to zero for each generator R̄ = 0. In this case constraints
(8.9b) and (8.9c) are never binding and thus their corresponding Lagrange multipliers must
be zero by the complimentary slackness conditions (A.27) and (A.27). With this in mind, it
is straight forward to see that the generalized KKT conditions for the general ED problem
(2.6) in Definition 2.2 represent a special case of the more general KKT conditions for the
co-optimization with rate-based PFR limit (8.9) in Definition 8.1.
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Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 5.1
This proof will begin by splitting the congestion revenue into two parts denoted Γ
and Ω such that λ†(D−G⋆) = Γ+Ω. Subsequently, the first part of the congestion revenue
will be proven greater than the FTR payoffs, e.g. Γ ≥ −c†f . Finally, the second part of the
congestion revenue will be proven non-negative, e.g. Ω ≥ 0. Let’s begin.
The stationarity condition with respect to N as shown in (5.2) and (5.4) leads to the
following:









µ⋆ − µ̄⋆), (B.2)
Notice that this implies γ⋆ is the negative of the LMP λ by (5.13), (5.14), and (5.15).
This relationship between γ⋆ and λ will be referenced later in the proof.
γ⋆ = −λ (B.3)
Let’s introduce a vector ϱ = N
⋆
1†N⋆
that sums to one. Left multiply both sides of (B.1)
and (B.2) by ϱσ and ϱ̊
† respectively and sum both sides of the resulting two equations to
achieve the following:








µ⋆ − µ̄⋆) (B.4)
Notice that energy component of the LMP e = −κ⋆1 and the LMP λ = e+ l+ c can
now be written in terms of the Lagrange multipliers γ⋆,
¯
µ⋆, and µ̄⋆. We can now decompose
the revenue into two parts. The first part of the revenue, denoted Γ, will be defined by a
price component that incorporates the Lagrange multipliers of the line limit constraints
¯
µ⋆
and µ̄⋆. The second part of the revenue, denoted Ω, will be defined by a price component
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that incorporates the Lagrange multipliers of the loss constraints γ⋆. From (B.4) it is easy
to see that the congestion revenue λ†(D −G⋆) is equal to Γ + Ω.
Γ := (c− ϱ̊†S†(
¯
µ⋆ − µ̄⋆)1)† (D −G⋆) (B.5)
Ω :=
(









The remainder of the proof is split into two parts. Section B.1 provides Part A of the
proof and shows that Γ is at always greater than or equal to the FTR payoff−c†f . Section B.2
provides Part B of the proof and shows that Ω is non-negative under the assumption that
the LMPs, λ = −γ⋆, are non-negative. Theorem 5.1 is then implied.
B.1 Part A of Proof
The following steps are taken to prove that Γ ≥ −c†f . The first expression (B.7)
follows directly from (B.5). Step (B.7)-(B.8) uses the definition of c from (5.15). Step (B.8)-




the constraint (j1), which states that 1†(D − G⋆) = −1†N⋆. Step (B.10)-(B.11) follows
algebraically. Step (B.11)-(B.12) uses the complementary slackness condition for constraints
(j4). Step (B.12)-(B.13) uses the upper and lower bounds enforced by the SFC in definition
(5.16). Step (B.13)-(B.14) follows algebraically. Step (B.13)-(B.14) uses the definition of c
from (5.15).
Γ := c† (D −G⋆)− (
¯








































F + µ̄⋆†F̄ (B.12)
≥ −µ†Sf̊ + µ̄†Sf̊ (B.13)
= (µ̄− µ)†Sf̊ (B.14)
= −c†f (B.15)
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B.2 Part B of Proof
The following steps are taken to prove that Ω ≥ 0. The first expression (B.16)
follows directly from (B.6). Step (B.16)-(B.17) and step (B.17)-(B.18) follow algebraically.
Step (B.18)-(B.19) substitutes the definition of ϱ = N
⋆
1†N⋆
and the constraint (j1), which
states that 1†(D − G⋆) = −1†N⋆. Step (B.19)-(B.20) follows algebraically. Step (B.20)-
(B.21) follows from the definition of θ̇⋆ := H̊−†
(
D̊ − G̊⋆ + N̊⋆
)
. Step (B.21)-(B.22), step
(B.22)-(B.23), and step (B.23)-(B.24) follow algebraically. Step (B.24)-(B.25) uses the first
order definition of convexity for the vector-valued function L (·). In this context the first
order definition of convexity states that 0 = L(0) ≥ L(Ȧθ̇⋆) + ∇L†(Ȧθ̇⋆)(0 − Ȧθ̇⋆). The
final inequality follows from this first order definition of convexity along with (B.3) and the























− ϱσγ⋆σ1† (D −G⋆)
− ϱ̊†̊I†γ⋆1† (D −G⋆)− 1
2







− γ⋆σϱσ1† (D −G⋆)
− γ⋆†̊Iϱ̊1† (D −G⋆)− 1
2
























































Power Flow and Current Flow Quantities
This appendix derives the power flow quantity F̂ℓ(Θℓ, d) from Section 4.1.1 and the
current flow quantity Îij(Θℓ) from Section 4.1.5. Both quantities are derived based on the
equivalent-Π model of a transmission line provided in Figure 4.1. As stated in Chapter 4
voltage magnitudes are assumed fixed.
C.1 Real and Reactive Power Flow Quantities
This section derives the function F̂ℓ(Θℓ, d) in Section 4.1.1. In accordance with Fig-
ure 4.1, this function represents the real power flowing through node c in the series element
of the equivalent-Π model of a transmission line in the direction of bus j at an arbitrary
fractional distance d. First, let Sdℓ denote the complex power flowing through node c toward
bus j. The voltage at node c relative to ground is vc and the current flowing through node



























































− (1− d)V 2j +
VjVi
τℓ








− (1− d)V 2j +
VjVi
τℓ
(cos(ψℓ −Θℓ) + i sin(ψℓ −Θℓ))− 2dViVjτℓ cos(Θℓ − ψℓ)
)
(C.6)




− (1− d)V 2j +
VjVi
τℓ




The function F̂ℓ(Θℓ, d) should represent the real part of S
d
ℓ . This is expressed as follows.




− (1− d)V 2j +
VjVi
τℓ
(1− 2d) cos(Θℓ − ψℓ)
)
− bℓ VjViτℓ sin(Θℓ − ψℓ) (C.8)
C.2 Derivation of Squared Current Magnitude
This section derives the function Îij(Θℓ) in Section 4.1.5. In accordance with Fig-
ure 4.1, this function represents the squared current magnitude flowing into the transmission









j − 2αℓτℓ ViVj cos(ϕℓ−ψℓ+Θℓ)
)
, (4.12)
Let’s derive this function. First, let the complex current flowing into the line from
bus i be denoted Iij. Recognize that the current on the receiving end of the ideal transformer
is aℓIij and is equivalent to the sum of current flowing through the shunt element located




ℓ , and the current flowing through the series impedance, written
( vi
aℓ
− vj)yℓ. The squared current magnitude flowing into the transmission line from bus i is
written as follows. The squared current magnitude function Îij(Θℓ) represents the squared
magnitude of the sum of these terms divided by the squared magnitude of the off-nominal
tap ratio and can be expressed as follows.
Îij(Θℓ) =
∣∣∣ viaℓy(s)ℓ +( viaℓ−vj)yℓ∣∣∣2 1|aℓ|2 (C.9)
=
∣∣∣(zℓ(y(s)ℓ +yℓ) viaℓ−vj)yℓ∣∣∣2 1τ2ℓ (C.10)
=




































Step (C.10) simply factors out y∗ℓ . Steps (C.10)-(C.11) place complex numbers in polar
form and use the definitions of αℓ and ϕℓ. Steps (C.11)-(C.12) expresses squared magnitude
as the multiplication of complex conjugates. Steps (C.12)-(C.13) use simple multiplication.
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Steps (C.13)-(C.14) uses Eulers formula, recognize that the sum of complex conjugates of
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